Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 43)
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- Democratic Palestine : 27 (ص 43)
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WEAKNESS ON THE
NATIONALIST SIDE
Lack of solidarity and cooperation in
the Arab nationalist camp contributed
to the summit’s passing such resolu-
tions. The weakness in the nationalist
camp makes it incapable of deterring
the US—Israeli offensive against all
nationalist forces, and the reactionary
regime’s increasingly unified strategy
and tactics. It is this weakness that
paved the way for the increasing pro-
minence and success of King Hussein
and President Mubarak on the political
scene.
If the present nationalist divisiveness
continues, the Camp David regime can
be expected to return to the Arab
League at the next summit, where the
resolutions will certainly be even more
dangerous, as the official Arab policies
degenerate further.
Unfortunately, all these negative
signs have yet to prove to the rightist
trend in the PLO leadership the dangers
of the current political moves on the
Arab level, or the dangers of their own
policies to the Palestinian cause. In-
stead of mobilizing the PLO to expose
the reactionary nature of the summit
resolutions, the Palestinian rightists
joined the Arab reactionaries in lauding
these resolutions and calling the summit
«historic»!
It is more than ever essential that the
Palestinian revolutionary democratic
forces join efforts to secure united
Palestinian political stands based on the
resolutions of the April unification
session of the PNC, particularly the
resolution concerning relations with the
Egyptian regime. Thus, the PLO would
be equiped to play a central role in uni-
fying the ranks of all the Arab na-
tionalist and progressive forces and
regimes, including the normalization of
PLO—Syrian relations and of Palesti-
nian-Lebanese-Syria_ relations- all
necessary for confronting the upsurge
in the imperialist-Zionist-Arab reac-
tionary plans. @
The Gulf War
Direct US Intervention
The persistence of the Iraq-Iran war has given the Reagan Ad-
ministration a golden opportunity to test its aggressive plans, forces
and weapons in the Gulf. Inevitably, and as intended, the US’s
reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers led it into acts of war against Iran.
In July, the UN Security Council
adopted resolution 598, calling for an
immediate ceasefire in the Gulf war;
mutual Iraqi-Iranian withdrawal within
their respective borders; and the
establishment of an impartial body to
allocate blame for the war’s start.
However, hostilities have continued
apace. After some procrastination, the
Iranian leadership signalled its de facto
rejection of the resolution. Iraq in turn
escalated its bombing attacks in late
September. The tanker war has
worsened, showing that the US reflag-
ging operation was actually a declara-
tion of expanded war. The
Washington-based Center for Defense
Information reported that in
September, there were 31 attacks on
shipping in the Gulf, 16 by Iraq and 15
by Iran. This compares to an average of
seven such attacks a month throughout
the war. Iraqi air attacks are generally
much more destructive than the Iranian
attacks which commonly use speed-
boats.
The most salient feature of the recent
stage of the war is direct Iranian-US
confrontation. In the wake of the
Irangate scandal, the Reagan Ad-
ministration finally surmised that
bolstering the Iraqi regime was the key
to cementing US-dominated, reac-
tionary control in the region. To this
end, an aggressive campaign of disin-
formation and actual attacks has been
mounted against the Islamic Republic,
similar to the one previously launched
against Libya. Brandishing proof that
the Iranians were mining Gulf waters,
after the September 21st seajacking of
the Iran Ajar boat, the Reagan Ad-
ministration embarked on a new at-
tempt to sabotage the international
concensus reached in July. It began
pushing for a new Security Council
resolution for a mandatory arms em-
bargo against Iran - an effort which is
equally directed against the Soviet
Union that wants to stick to the more
even-handed resolution already
adopted. With the September 20th
Iranian attack on a Saudi ship and the
next day on the British-flagged one,
Mrs. Thatcher found her excuse for
joining Reagan’s new tactics, and clos-
ed the Iranian Military Procurement
Office in London. In an extension of
Iraq’s economic war on Iran, the US
slapped a ban on Iranian imports, after
the rather embarrassing disclosure that
in July, it was the world’s third largest
buyer of Iranian oil. France is also
boycotting Iranian oil.
More dramatically, US forces staged
three major military attacks on Iranian
vessels and installations in September
and October, while also firing on three
fishing boats on November 3rd, killing
one person. On September 21st, US
forces captured the Iran Ajr, killing
five Iranians in the process. On October
8th, US helicopters destroyed three
Iranian speedboats. On October 19th,
US destroyers demolished three Iranian
oil platforms in international waters,
after Iran, for the first time, attacked a
US-flagged tanker in Kuwaiti waters
and a US-owned ship flying the
Liberian flag. Especially the US’s last
attack made a mockery of its claims to
be protecting Gulf oil and waterways.
In fact, the Reagan administration
deliberately chose the military option as
opposed to having Kuwait take the
Iranian aggression to the UN, but
Kuwait had to bear the brunt of Iranian
retaliation - the October 22nd attack on
a Kuwaiti oil terminal.
The US—Iranian confrontation can
be expected to continue, as evidenced
by then US Secretary of Defense
Weinberger’s statement that the US and
its allies may send more forces to the.
Gulf, and stay until the war ends (In-
ternational Herald Tribune, October
24-25, 1987). This was an obvious
counter to the Soviet proposal for a UN
force to replace foreign war fleets in the
Gulf, and there is no sign of change in
the US’s Gulf policy after Weinberger’s
resignation.
TESTING GROUND
With the US invasion of the Gulf on
the side of Arab reaction, the Iranian
leadership eyed the chance to polish its
anti-imperialist credentials. Yet with
operations that more resemble agit- >
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