Democratic Palestine : 29 (ص 24)
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- Democratic Palestine : 29 (ص 24)
- المحتوى
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danian and Egyptian regimes have of-
ficially welcomed the reconciliation. In
reality, their welcome is a facade; the
reactionary forces will exert all efforts
to foil the reconciliation, to prevent it
from being completed and having an
impact on the Arab situation. It is
therefore our duty to complete this
beginning reconciliation, by activating
the joint Palestinian—Syrian commit-
tees that were formed in view of the
Palestinian—Syrian summit. We must
commit ourselves to implementing the
points agreed upon, such as supporting
the uprising, affording it political pro-
tection and thwarting the Schultz plan.
The normalization of Palesti-
nian—Syrian relations is not a coin-
cidence. It was a necessity imposed by
the Palestinian uprising - a requirement
for confronting the US—Israeli
schemes that aim at suppressing the
uprising.
We must be aware that besides the
important issues that were agreed upon,
there are points of disagreement. It is
our duty to continue the dialogue in
order to consolidate this alliance. What
was achieved must be followed up by
many other steps. The PFLP specified
after the last PNC, that our main
struggle on the Arab level was to restore
the PLO-Syrian alliance. We feel that
this step will be the prelude to other
tasks on the Arab level, first and
foremost restoring the Palestinian
- Syrian - Lebanese national alliance,
and coordinating among Syria, the
PLO and all the nationalist regimes
(Libya, Algeria, and Democratic
Yemen).
There are still five points of
disagreement with Syria. First is the
PLO’s relations with the Camp David
regime in Egypt. Second is the PLO’s
relations with some Israeli forces (that
are not anti-Zionist). Third is
disagreement about Lebanon. While
there is Palestinian—Syrian agreement
on the necessity of Palestinian (armed)
presence in Lebanon, this issue is com-
plicated and needs more discussion.
Fourth is some of the PLO’s tactics in
the Arab—Israeli conflict. Fifth is
about the reentry into the PLO of the
Palestinian organizations that did not
participate in the last PNC.
3. THE ARAB SUMMIT
The Arab regimes that have worked
to postpone the summit were hoping
that the uprising would be over after
the month of Ramadan. But, to their
24
disappointment, the uprising continues
to escalate and it will continue until
achieving its goals. These regimes will
now try to muddle the summit by rais-
ing the issue of Egypt’s rejoining the
Arab League. They will try to prevent
the summit from taking clear political
decisions concerning the Palestinian
people’s national goals, such as the
establishment of an independent state.
They will try to prevent it from passing
any resolution that would counter the
US administration’s arrogance in
repeatedly using its veto against the
Palestinian people’s national rights.
When Algeria’s President Ben Jadid
proposed an Arab summit to discuss
exclusively the uprising and the means
for supporting it, he did not specify
Algeria as the place for the summit.
The Algerian leadership preferred to
convene it in Riyadh, as was decided at
the last summit in Amman. The
Algerians told the Palestinian leader-
ship that their next choice would be
Tunis, the headquarters of the Arab.
League, but that if neither place was
possible, they were more than willing to
host the summit. The Algerian leader-
ship would not be against convening the
summit in Riyadh or Tunis, but on the
contrary would welcome this, because
they want to talk frankly about the of-
ficial Arab negligence towards the
uprising. There is no doubt that they
can better do that if they are not
hosting the summit.
4, PLO RELATIONS WITH
EGYPT
In our view, the decision taken at the
last PNC on the PLO’s relations with
the Egyptian regime was very clear. The
PFLP considers that the contacts with
the Egyptian regime that took place
after the PNC are deviations from this
resolution. Now that the reconciliation
with Syria has begun, I have great
hopes that this resolution on boycotting
relations with the Egyptian regime,
unless it abrogates the Camp David ac-
cords, will be renewed. I am hopeful
for two reasons: First, in the past, the
trend that leaned towards relations with
Egypt justified this by saying that they
must go anywhere the door was open to
them, since the door to Syria was closed
to them. This excuse is no longer valid.
Second, some had illusions about the
PLO’s relations with Egypt, and about
the possibility of the Egyptian regime
supporting the Palestinian cause. They
said that after implementation of the
part of the Camp David accords con-
cerning Egypt, the Egyptians will not
forget about the Palestinian section.
They felt that Mubarak could possibly
be a force on the Palestinian side con-
cerning the interim program of
repatriation, self - determination and
an independent Palestinian state.
The uprising has, however, exposed
the reality. It has been going on for
four months, and still Mubarak did not
even dare to dismiss the Israeli am-
bassador or recall the Egyptian am-
bassador from Tel Aviv. Mubarak felt
that it was a blow to his pride when the
PNC decided to boycott relations with
his regime. Where is his pride now
when he hears about the Israelis using
poisonous gas, administrative deten-
tion, the policy of breaking bones and
deportations against Palestinians. At
this stage, I feel that the illusions about
the Egyptian regime’s support have
evaporated.
5. THE SOVIET POSITION
You are all familiar with the attempts
of imperialist and Arab reactionary
forces to undermine the important
results of the PLO delegation’s visit to
Moscow. I would like to stress one
point, and that is the great support of
the Soviet leadership to the Palestinian
cause. The Soviet leader Gorbachev
assured Yasir Arafat that Soviet atten-
dance at an international conference is
linked to the attendance of the PLO. In
other words, the Soviet Union will not
attend an international conference on
the Middle East if the PLO does not at-
tend, because the Soviet leadership
considers that the Palestinian question
is the central issue in the Middle East.
Concerning the talk that the Soviet
Union asked the PLO to recognize
‘Israel’, this has been denied by Farouk
Qaddoumi and other members of the
Palestinian delegation. Their
statements were published in Soviet
newspapers.
The Soviet leadership has a new
policy which is based on a change in
tactics only, while adhering to essential
principles. The principled Soviet posi-
tion is based on the fact that there can
be no solution to the Palestinian ques-
tion without giving the Palestinian
people their right to selt-determination;
that the PLO is the sole, legitimate
representative of the Palestinian peo-
ple; and that only the PLO decides how
the Palestinian people want to exercise
this right. e - هو جزء من
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