Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 3)
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- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 3)
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Editorial
a
For Palestinian Independence
After the July 31st declaration of the Jordanian regime’s
decision to end legal and administrative ties with the West
Bank, attention focused on the anticipated Palestinian
response: Would the PLO bow to US and Israeli demands, in
line with the wishes of Arab reaction? Or would it utilize the
new situation to make a step forward towards the achievement
of Palestinian self-determination and an independent state?
The PLO and the Palestinian people welcomed the Jorda-
nian move, despite King Hussein’s motives, for they con-
sidered it the most important victory of the Palestinian upris-
ing in the occupied territories to date. The PLO has accepted
the challenge and engaged in intense internal dialogue in order
to reach consensus on decisions that could have historical
import.
Ending legal and administrative ties with Jordan does not
mean that the West Bank will be in limbo. Far from it, the
Palestinian people in the course of the current uprising have
‘shown themselves more than capable of running their own lives
and civil affairs. The popular committees, an offshoot of the
uprising, have proven this irrevocably, organizing the people’s
lives without a trace of the corruption of the Jordanian ad-
ministration and in diametrical opposition to the fascism of
Israeli military rule. The popular committees’ truly democratic
mode of functioning is perhaps the real reason they were
outlawed by the occupation authorities, for they represent a
threat not only to the occupation but to the very heart of the
racist Zionist ideology.
DIALOGUE FOR CONSENSUS
The Palestinian Central Council was meeting in Baghdad at
the time King Hussein announced the new Jordanian move. It
thus became the first Palestinian body to discuss the implica-
tions of this step. The Central Council debated the issue
thoroughly and confirmed the PLO’s readiness to shoulder its
responsibilities towards the Palestinian people, and to do
whateve. ..as needed in the new situation, in accordance with
previous PNC decisions. The Central Council formed a
puutical/legal co-mittee to study all options open to the PLO
and present its findings vc the Executive Committee.
Another meeting among Palestinian organizations was
hosted by Libyan leader Qaddafi, in an effort to bring back
into the PLO those organizations which have remained outside
its framework. However, these organizations set conditions
that could not be fulfilled. Thus, the discussion on how to res-
pond to the new situation continued among those organiza-
tions who are in the PLO. A series of Palestinian leadership
meetings in August and September resulted in the crystalliza-
tion of two trends:
The first trend is represented by some sectors of the Palesti-
nian bourgeoisie outside the occupied territories, who lean
towards accomodation of US and Israeli demands, 1.e., un-
conditional recognition of ‘Israel’ and acceptance of UN
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. In addition, they feel
that the PLO should seek to revive the Amman accord with the
Jordanian regime and negotiate directly with ‘Israel’ through a
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The representatives of this
trend find their support in the reactionary Arab regimes who
stand doubly exposed in the face of the Palestinian uprising.
Their efforts to impede the uprising are futile; they have no
mass support in the occupied territories or outside, and their
influence within the PLO itself is very limited.
The second trend is represented by the mainstream of the
PLO which examined the various options for responding to the
new situation in the context of safeguarding the historic
achievements and unity of the PLO, and advancing the upris-
ing. The opinions expressed by this mainstream prevailed in the
discussions, resulting in agreement on the following as viable
options to be presented to the PNC for ratification: (1) Making
a Palestinian Declaration of Independence at the upcoming
PNC meeting, based on the principles outlined in the UN
Charter concerning the right of all people to self-
determination, freedom and independence; (2) calling for
temporary UN supervision in the 1967 occupied territories, to
be followed by Israeli withdrawal and the convening of an in-
ternational peace conference, attended by the permanent
members of the UN Security Council and all parties to the
conflict, including the PLO on an equal footing with others;
and (3) forming a provisional government at a future date
when this would be beneficial as a step for realizing Palestinian
rights.
The idea of UN troops in the occupied territories has its
origin in the interim demands put forward by the United Na-
tional Leadership of the Uprising in the spring. At that time, it
was proposed as a way of protecting the masses from the un-
bridled brutality of the Israeli occupation troops. Adopting
this position, and combining it with the other points listed
above at the proper juncture, would substantially strengthen
the PLO’s position. It would provide concrete guidelines for
combining the mass and militant struggle for a just peace in the
region. It would accentuate that it is the Palestinian cause that
stands at the core of the Middle East conflict, while
simultaneously providing a simple and straightforward plat-
form on which the Palestinian people’s allies can base their
support.
In the same vein, declaring an independent Palestinian state,
to be recognized by friendly coutries around the world, would
errect a legal barricade against any future attempt by the Jor-
danian regime to reusurp the West Bank, and against Israeli
annexationist ambitions in the 1967 occupied territories. This
state would be born occupied, so to speak, which is all the
more reason for the deployment of UN troops, to supervise the
withdrawal of the occupation troops.
This set of options is based on the twin priorities of national
unity and advancing the uprising. Historically, Palestinian na-
tional unity and mass struggle have proven to be the PLO’s
most valuable assets, and the reason behind its achievements.
This has never been more clear than today when the ten-
month-old uprising in the occupied territories has opened new
horizons for the Palestinian liberation struggle. The upcoming
PNE is expected to make decisions that will reinforce these
priorities, especially the uprising, at this historical juncture.
The challenge delivered by King Hussein is being turned into an
opportunity for qualitatively advancing the Palestinian cause. @
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- Democratic Palestine : 30
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