Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 7)
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- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 7)
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monarchy’s final withdrawal from the
West Bank and Palestinian affairs.
From the political angle, this regime
Was originally created by British col-
onialism to help in controlling the mass
movement in the area and protecting
the Zionist state-to-he. King Hussein
has loyally fulfilled his role in coor-
dination with US imperialism, British
colonialism’s successor. Over the years,
the regime has worked to absorb and
oppress the Palestinians who have been
expelled from their homeland, covering
over their true national identity and
preventing their organization and
resistance to the Zionist occupation.
The most notable example was the
1970-71 massacres where the regime’s
forces killed thousands of Palestinians
and drove the Palestinian resistance out
of Jordan.
King Hussein has always posed as a
key player in any Middle East settle-
ment on the basis of being crucial in
resolving the Palestinian dimension of
the conflict. Without this dimension,
he would have difficulty being con-
sidered an important actor on the
regional and international scene. Also
in demographic and economic terms,
the Jordanian kingdom, without the
West Bank and the Palestinian dimen-
sion, would not have a much greater
Status than any other emirate.
Economically, the Palestinian question
has always been the goose that laid the
golden egg. Besides US aid to Jordan
for controlling the Palestinians, the
monarchy has lived off Arab financial
support given on the basis of Jordan
being a «confrontation» state, plus
money channeled to the Palestinians
under occupation.
In fact, the king did leave a legalistic
loophole for resuming his role. Since
the Jordanian parliament passed the
resolution annexing the West Bank in
1950, it remains the body which can
constitutionally annul this resolution.
Therefore, when the king made the
declaration himself, he was leaving the
door open for resumption of the
Palestinian-Jordanian relationship if
this becomes advantageous in the
future.
All these facts indicate that the Jor-
danian move is not a hasty reaction, but
a calculated step aiming to extract the
kingdom from the dilemma posed by
the uprising, at the same time leaving
loopholes for reversing the new tactical
position. Some observers have
speculated that King Hussein’s moves
were intended to prod the US and
‘Israel’ into concrete moves towards a
settlement before it is «too late.»
However, in view of King Hussein’s
strategic coordination with US ad-
ministrations, it seems inconceivable
that this step was not coordinated with
the US. The US reaction serves to
substantiate this; US officials tended to
downplay King Hussein’s moves, em-
phasizing that he still has a role to play.
Some did concede that this meant the
end of the Shultz plan, but this was on-
ly acknowledgement of a well-known
fact created by the uprising.
THE ISRAELI REACTION
The Jordanian regime’s step had a
big impact on the Zionist state where
the question of how to deal with the
uprising in relation to the upcoming
elections was already the main subject
of debate. The overall reaction was
negative as expressed by Yossi Ben
Aharon, director-general of the prime
ministry: «It is not a positive step...»
while the foreign ministry was quick to
issue a statement that «Israel won’t let
the PLO pay the Jordanian salaries»
(International Herald Tribune, August
Sth).
The Jordanian step created a crisis
for the Israeli Labor Party since its
political platform views Jordan as a
partner in any political settlement, and
it had made the Jordanian option a
focal point in its election campaign. In-
itially, the Labor Party was caught
between two tendencies - whether to ad-
here to the «Jordanian option» or move
towards dealing directly with the
Palestinians. On the external level,
Labor was caught between another set
of conflicting pressures: On the one
hand, the party was eager to appear
flexible in front of the international
community, to counter the PLO’s
diplomatic offensive; on the other
hand, in ‘Israel’, it had to answer the
far right’s accusations that it was too
«soft» on matters of vital interest to the
Zionist state.
The juggling act which Labor
engaged in was expressed in Prime Min-
ister Peres’ statements in Paris, on his
way to meet US President Reagan and
Egyptian Foreign Minister Meguid. He
said that if elected, he would meet with
«every Palestinian leader who re-
nounces terror and violence» and ac-
cepts UN Security Council resolution
242. He even hinted that this didn’t ex-
clude PLO leaders, saying: «We are not
going to look into his (the Palestinian
leader’s) past and his biography... We
are going to look at his positions» (1.e.,
meeting the Israeli demands for con-
cessions-editor’s note). At the same
time, Peres left the door open for a
return to the Jordanian option, saying
that a Labor government would be
willing to negotiate with either a Jor-
danian or a Palestinian delegation or a
combined delegation (International
Herald Tribune, September 26th).
The Likud’s position was more
united. All its leaders basically con-
firmed the coalition’s usual policy that
the maximum to be offered to the
Palestinians is ‘autonomy’ as specified
in the Camp David accords, while rul-
ing out territorial compromise or
negotiations with the PLO. Likud took
the opportunity to attack the Labor
Party for setting its hopes on the Jor-
danian option, and itself interpreted the
king’s step as meaning that Jordan has
desisted from calling for Israeli
withdrawal from the 1967 occupied
territories. The Likud _ extremists
renewed their calls for annexation of
the West Bank, while Sharon reiterated
his position that there is a Palestinian
state and it is Jordan; therefore,
there should not be another one.Sharon
also proposed closing the bridges to
Jordan and cancelling travel permits to
prevent Palestinians from «smuggling»
PLO money into the territories.
Shamir, as head of state and of Likud,
opposed the calls for annexation on the
formal grounds that this would violate
the Camp David accords, and more
pertinently on the basis of his often
repeated position that «you cannot an-
nex what is already yours.»
The final outcome on these issues will
be determined in line with the results of
the upcoming Israeli elections. In the
meantime, the two Zionist blocs in
government, while rivaling each other
in proposed solutions, continue to unite
in all-out efforts to repress the uprising
before the election date. @
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