Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 19)
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- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 19)
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grounded in the theory of the strong chain, rather than on
that of the central link. According to the first, the chain is
never stronger than its weakest link. Hence, ‘Israel’ tries to
consolidate all the links of the chain, instead of concentrating
on a single strong link in a chain of weak links. According to
this theory, the Israeli concept of strength has been the full
expression of force in all spheres: economic, human, social,
scientific, technological and military. The Israeli concept takes
into account all probabilities in its relationship with the im-
perialist center, and tries to convert borrowed force into its
own force on the assumption that the enemy -«the Arabs»-
would make full use of their actual and potential resources. It
is highly probable that the secret of the enemy’s success in at-
taining the status of a great regional power lies in this point.
This is the modern expression of the biblical «Greater Israel»,
not in its well-known geographical sense, though this has not
been cancelled from the comprehensive Zionist strategies, but
in the modern sense of power.
On the other hand, how has the situation of the Arab side
been in the intense struggle that has been going on since the
begining of the 20th century?
I am not going to talk much about the helplessness and
treason of the reactionary forces; the history of the region is
full of dismal records. I’ll point out only the most outstanding
instances, from the reactionaries’ conspiratorial attitude
towards the 1936 six-month general strike in Palestine, and the
same attitude towards the 1939 revolt, to their helplessness and
conspiration in the 1948 war.
ABSENCE OF AN ARAB STRATEGY
What I’d like to point out in this essay is precisely the at-
litude and strategic policy of the Arab nationalist side over the
last four decades of confrontation. Was there any well-
defined, comprehensive strategy adopted by and providing
zuidance to the Arab side? The answer is a definite No. A lot
can be said about the reasons for the lack of such a strategy.
However, the fact to be emphasized is that the Arab national
bourgeoisie, which assumed the leadership of the Arab na-
tional liberation movement in the second half of the century,
was not capable of formulating such a strategy because of its
backward and impotent character. This leadership became
locked in an impasse, but neither have the revolutionary alter-
native forces, the class alternative to this leadership, been
capable of drawing up such a strategy. How then can we im-
agine the existence of a comprehensive common Strategy of
confrontation, uniting and organizing the efforts and energies
of the different detachments of the Arab national liberation
movement?
The plan of the late Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul
Nasser, whatever can be said about it, did for the first time
provide the Arab national liberation movement with the
chance to take the initiative. Yet it was not based on a com-
prehensive strategy as was admitted by Nasser himself.
In such a situation, how could any Arab victory be possible?
How seriously can one view the plan of confrontation pro-
pounded by many successive forces throughout the last forty
years? I am raising these questions in the conviction that time
means more bloodshed, and we don’t have the right to play at
trial and error. We call upon all forces as well as intellectuals,
to give the deserved attention to this vital problem. We pose
these questions without any illusions that our answers will
contain the full solutions; rather we consider them a modest
contribution to the process of materializing the comprehensive
strategy for confronting the Zionist, imperialist and reac-
tionary assault.
As noted above, the proper starting point is clear identifica-
tion of the enemies we face. What do they want? What are
their assets and liabilities? Where have we erred and what did
we manage to do well through experience? How can we
mobilize and organize all our resources and forces in this fierce
battle?
HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE ENEMY
The starting point of any comprehensive strategy is the
identification of the enemy. We must acquire a scientific,
developed and interrelated understanding of the enemy. I say
scientific, because many of the conceptions we have about
‘Israel’ are characterized by mysticism and preconcieved,
superficial notions.Here I include the idea of dividing the
world into two camps, absolutely good or absolutely evil,
respectively, thus blurring the nuances in between; and the
recurring ideas about the impasse of the enemy, its over-
whelming crisis and being lost and troubled. Deliberately or
otherwise, such ideas create the illusion that the collapse of the
enemy is but a question of time.
I say developed, up-to-date understanding, because we are
facing an enemy which is continuously changing. We must not
be satisfied with preconceived attitudes, limiting our informa-
tion within their confines. ‘Israle’ today is not the ‘Israel’ of
1948. We have to follow its development and prevent our in-
tentions, desires and illusions from becoming theoretical theses
which violate the facts.
I say an interrelated understanding because we are not facing
an enemy of about three million people. The root of the pro-
blem lies in the fact that the Zionist project is closely linked
with two centers which should be taken into consideration in
any research: The first is the world Zionist movement which
provides ‘Israel’ with the very essence of its life on the human,
material and spiritual levels. The second is the imperialist
center. Without considering this link, it is impossible to
understand the laws that govern the development of this entity,
or to probe into the basis of its strategic perspectives.
Needless to say, the importance of examining these two links
does not negate the importance of studying the subject in con-
junction with the development of Arab reaction which con-
siders this entity a useful instrument for blocking any pro-
gressive change in the area - a guarantee for themselves to re-
main in power.
The first step in our attempt to outline a realistic picture of
the Zionist entity must be based on recognition that the ‘Israel’
of 1988 is not at all the ‘Israel’ of 1948, by any socioeconomic,
military or human standard. Over the last four decades,
qualitative developments have taken place, placing this entity
in the category of a great regional power. This not only has
consequences locally-in ‘Israel’ itself, but affects its relations
with the world Zionist movement and the imperialist center; it
also affects the Israeli concept of the parameters of the
regional and international role assigned to it. For the sake of
clarification, we shall examine the most significant tendencies
in the internal socioeconomic and political development of
‘Israel’, and the development of its position on the higher
strategic-international level.
A. THE REAL ECONOMIC SITUATION IN
THE ZIONIST ENTITY
Before analyzing the most significant economic indices in >
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