Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 21)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 21)
المحتوى
engineers and physicians who immigrated to ‘Israel’ from 1955
to 1984. These figures simply meant a total gratuitous revolu-
tion in the structure of labor power in ‘Israel’ with great effects
on the formulation of Israeli perspectives in both economics
and supreme strategy.
Moreover, Israeli educational institutions were continuously
being expanded and developed, turning out thousands of
graduates annually. Among those over 14 years of age, those
with 16 years or more of education were 3.6% in 1961, 4.1% in
1970, 7% in 1975, 8.5% in 1980, and 9.8% in 1984. This means
that scientific potential increased threefold at least.
One of the most important results of both educational
development and the internal population structure is the in-
crease of the labor force which reached 37% of the total
population. (The comparable figure was 22% in Palestine in
1948). This is a high percentage, having been pushed up by ex-
tensive employment of women: 67.5 women per 100 men in
1984, as opposed to 52 in 1972, while among Palestinian Arabs
the comparable figure was 17.5 in 1984. One of the most
significant effects of greater employment of women is the
transfer of 112,200 persons from non-productive consumption
to productive areas. This also compensates for the great
amount of labor unproductively employed for security pur-
poses. This number is nearly equal to the number of imported
Palestinian Arab laborers. In 1984, 125,000 Palestinians from
the territories occupied in 1967 were employed in ‘Israel’. This
enabled Israeli planners to redistribute labor among the dif-
ferent economic branches, directing Israeli laborors towards
higher-level production, while absorbing the Palestinians at the
bottom of the production scale.
3. MARKETING FACILITIES
Having managed to guarantee the influx of financial and
human resources, and employ them according to a scientific
plan that aimed at supreme strategic objectives, how has
‘Israel’ succeeded in solving the problem of marketing? Three
methods are apparent:
First is expansion of the home market through natural
population increase as well as immigration. The increased rate
of capitalization and employment contributed to increasing the
demand for goods and services, activating the economic cycle.
Moreover, ‘Israel’ resorted to the familiar method of inflation
to change the population’s tendency to save into another type
of social behavior - that of converting their income into stable
goods. ‘Israel’ has dealt with the consequences of stagnation
through inflationary policies which are well-known in the
capitalist economies.
Second is expansion of the market by colonial means,
through occupation. It has become known that ‘Israel’, on the
eve of the 1967 war, was facing its first serious structural
economic crisis - the crisis of overproduction, having just
completed a comprehensive industrialization program carried
out with the reparations paid by Federal Germany. The ter-
ritories occupied in 1967 constitute one-fourth to one-third of
the Israeli market itself. They are secure markets, almost
monopolized by ‘Israel’ which dominates 90% of their imports
(amounting to 637.5 million dollars in 1984, while only 50.9
million dollars in 1968). The trade deficit between ‘Israel’ and
the 1967 occupied territories has grown from 36.7 million
dollars in 1968, to 442.1 million in 1984, in favor of ‘Israel’.
This covered 17.5% of the total Israeli trade deficit in 1984.
The territories occupied in 1967 are the biggest single importer
from ‘Israel’ after the USA. Their economic value, in this
sense, Can be compared to that of the main world trade blocs,
because they absorbed 33% and 39% of what was absorbed by
the EEC and the USA, respectively, in 1984.
Third is Israeli integration into the imperialist market.
‘Israel’ has managed to enter international markets under the
most favorable conditions and at a pace which matched the
development of its economic structure. The imperialist states
treated ‘Israel’ as part of the center. As a result of the excep-
tional facilities granted, the Israeli economy made additional
leaps. From 1974 to 1984, the value of Israeli exports to the
EEC increased from 698 million dollars to 1890 million
dollars, i.e., a 170% increase, while its imports increased by
only 73. The facilities provided by the USA contributed to the
increase of Israeli exports to the US market by 445% in
1974-1984, while its imports from the USA increased only
135%.
Simple calculation shows that the practical results of the
agreements between ‘Israel’ and the imperialist world were
further increases in Israeli exports amounting to 1614.5 million
dollars. Of this, 932 million dollars worth was through US
facilities, while 682.5 million dollars worth was through
European facilities. This total figure amounts to one-fourth of
Israeli exports to all parts of the world. It is 253% of total
Israeli exports to the territories occupied in 1967, i.e., the
Israeli agreements with the EEC and USA have had the same
importance as the 1967 war, as far as Israeli exports were con-
cerned.
We can conclude that ‘Israel’ has managed, during the last
decades, to make the utmost use of the abundant influx of
financial and human resources from abroad, and to benefit
maximally from the marketing facilities afforded. ‘Israel’
remoulded its supreme strategy accordingly, not only in the
military sphere, but in the comprehensive framework of the
power concept, which is based on economy, technology,
science, etc. This reformulation led to revision of the priorities
of the internal economic structure whereby industry occupies a
leading position, and electric and electronic industries have in-
creasing importance in total industrial output (17.2% in 1982,
instead of 4.3% in 1965). In addition there was intense con-
centration of labor; 1.5% of industrial firms employ 45.3% of
the industrial labor force. Labor productivity more than tri-
pled from 1950 to 1984.
All this will lead to the reemergence of the marketing pro-
blem in the Israeli economy which is already approaching the
limits of available outlets. This reinforces the belief that
‘Israel’ will force a normalization of relations on its Arab
neighbors, peacefully or by aggression, or by a combination of
the two.
Having seen the extent of modernization and development in
the Israeli economy, are we exaggerating when we say that the
theory of the strong chain has already been applied in ‘Israel’?
Does anyone of us still doubt that the enemy’s concept of
power has long ago surpassed the military field to include all
the economic, social, scientific and technological spheres. Are
we going to take all these aspects into consideration when
outlining our supreme strategy, whether protracted people’s
war or the plan for strategic balance? Or will we remain
prisoners of outdated conceptions about the enemy? Careful
consideration of the significance of the above-cited figures,
about the real economic situation in ‘Israel’, renders it
necessary to think deeply about the enemy, as well as about our
strategy of comprehensive confrontation against its supreme
strategy and plans. >
21
هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 30
تاريخ
سبتمبر ١٩٨٨
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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