Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 28)
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- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 28)
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the occupied territories, Palestinian and
Lebanese revolutionaries had escalated
their armed struggle. By early May,
eight attacks had been launched against
the Zionist state from South Lebanon,
in contrast to ten such attacks in the
whole of 1987.
‘Israel’ was quick to react to the new
prospects for the liberation struggle.
The first week of May, it launched a
major new attack on South Lebanon,
sending 2,500 troops, backed by tanks
and helicopters out of the ‘security
zone’ to engage in clashes. with
Lebanese patriots, especially around
Maidun. The Israeli troops came within
a few miles of Syrian army positions in
the southern Bekaa Valley. Obviously,
the real intent of the operation was to
send a signal to Lebanon and Syria,
that ‘Israel’ would not tolerate an in-
crease in nationalist struggle.
‘Israel’ escalated its aggression on
Lebanon with a double purpose: Ho-
ping to pacify its nothern front in order
to concentrate its military might on
crushing the Palestinian uprising,
meanwhile pressuring Lebanon to opt
for a president who would not hamper
Zionist aims. By late August, ‘Israel’
had staged fifteen major bombing at-
tacks, most targetting Palestinian
presence in the Sidon area, but also
hitting Lebanese villages. Pressure was
accentuated with the reinforcement of
Zionist troop strength in the occupied
border zone, and almost daily shelling
of Lebanese southern villages by the
Israeli army and their allies, the South
Lebanese Army.
SOUTH BEIRUT
Meanwhile, the conflict between the
two militias, Amal and Hezbollah, over
control of the southern districts of
Beirut was resolved. Unable to main-
tain its positions, Amal evacuated its
forces to South Lebanon in an agree-
ment whereby Syrian troops were
deployed to maintain order in southern
Beirut. This was a further move
towards pacification of West Beirut,
1.e., removing the militias from the
streets, in preparations for the an-
ticipated elections. It was intended as
part of the effort to enforce a similar
situation in East Beirut, whereby the
Lebanese Army would replace the
Lebanese Forces’ control.
30
Of course, the part of this plan con-
cerning East Beirut never materialized.
Instead, the settlement in the southern
districts set a precedent which could be
implemented in a different spirit in the
Palestinian camps, depriving Palesti-
nians of their right to self-defense and
to participate in the liberation struggle.
The inter - Palestinian fighting in the
Beirut camps provided a golden oppor-
tunity to those forces envisioning such
moves to end Palestinian revolutionary
presence in Lebanon.
A PALESTINIAN WAR?
The initial fighting between the Fatah
Central Committee and Provisional
Leadership forces had ended with the
expulsion of the latter from the Beirut
camps. The other Palestinian
Organizations, in coordination with
their Lebanese nationalist allies, stood
against this fighting from the beginn-
ing. They formed a follow-up commit-
tee to work for a ceasefire and for
resolving the conflict through
democratic means. The ceasefire ar-
tanged by this committee provided for
the Fatah Provisional Leadership to
return to its offices in the camps.
However, this option was not heeded
by the Provisional Leadership which
began shelling the camps from posi-
tions outside. This finally forced the
evacuation of Fatah Central Committee
loyalists to Ain Al Hilweh camp, near
Sidon. On this basis, the Provisional
Leadership re-entered Shatila and Burj
Al Barajneh camps, but without a shred
of popular support for this dirty war.
On the contrary, Shatila was left almost
totally destroyed, and Burj Al Barajneh
heavily damaged, with most residents
of both tamps having fled the shelling.
The physical darnage only tells half
the story. Most serious is the political
implications of this round of fighting.
While the uprising in the occupied ter-
ritories had opened a new phase for the
Palestinian national struggle, new
chances for internal unity and for joint
Palestinian-Lebanese struggle, this
camp war preoccupied the Palestinian
revolution, detracting from its efforts
to take advantage of the new oppor-
tunities. In Call no. 21, the United Na-
tional Leadership of the Uprising ac-
cused the Fatah Provisional Leadership
of betraying the Palestinian cause and
Stabbing the uprising in the back.
Already, the shelling of the camps had
been broadly condemned. The PFLP
and DFLP issued a joint communique
holding the Provisional Leadership
responsible for the destruction of
Shatila.
Unfortunately, this war did not end
with the end of the shelling. The Fatah
Provisional Leadership continues to try
and impose its hegemony on the camps,
including the formation of a joint
security force under its own leadership.
However, all but two Palestinian
Organizations have refused to par-
ticipate in this. The PFLP, DFLP,
Palestinian Liberation Front, Popular
Struggle Front and Palestinian Com-
munist Party are in agreement that all
organizations be allowed to operate in
the camps. The Fatah Provisional
Leadership, however, has not heeded
this consensus. On the contrary, in
early August, they attacked four offices
of the PFLP in Burj AI Barajneh,
evoking a mass demonstration against
this act.
Despite these setbacks, the follow-up
committee continues to work for the
formation of a security force represen-
ting all Palestinian nationalist
organizations, that could stabilize the
situation, ensure the right of all to work
among the masses and reconstruct the
camps as soon as possible. Finding a
democratic inter-Palestinian solution is
important not only to salvage the
situation in Shatila and Burj Al Baraj-
neh, but to ward off the repetition of
this tragic war in Ain Al Hilweh or
other camps. It is also necessary to
ward off the attempts of antagonistic
forces trying once again to attack the
camps, as already began happening
when Amal resumed harassing Palesti-
nians in the camps of the Tyre area in
early August.
Putting a decisive stop to inter-
Palestinian fighting is only the first step
to rebuilding the Syrian-Palestinian-
Lebanese nationalist alliance needed
for escalating the battle against the
Zionist occupation. It is likewise a
prerequisite for the Palestinian revolu-
tion to play its role as a main base of
Palestinian struggle, to complement the
vanguard role currently being played by
the Palestinian masses under occupa-
tion. @ - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 30
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- المنشئ
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