Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 29)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 29)
- المحتوى
-
Lebanon
From Elections to Partition
The Lebanese parliament’s failure to elect a new president stands as
- the latest and most dramatic evidence that the Lebanese crisis cannot
be resolved short of ending the outmoded and corrupt confessional
system.
The procedure for electing the presi-
dent in Lebanon is both a symptom and
a cause of the present crisis. Added to
the fact that the president is elected by
the parliament rather than by direct
popular vote is the unwritten agree-
ment, dating from 1943, that the
president must be a Maronite Christian.
The inherent gap between such a system
and a representative democracy is even
more glaring since the presiding
parliament was elected over fifteen
years ago, and only 76 of the original
100 deputies remain.
Obvicusly, such conditions give little
room for the Lebanese people to ex-
press their will. Rather, Lebanon itself
is left vulnerable to the blackmail of the
rightist Lebanese Front and_ their
backers, chiefly the Zionists. Having
repeatedly failed to impose a ‘strong
state’ that would steer Lebanon in a
direction favorable to imperialism and
Zionism, the US and ‘Israel’ wanted at
all costs to prevent the election of
a Lebanese president who would
safeguard national interests and em-
bark on the reform needed to resolve
Lebanon’s crisis. They prefered some-
one who would simply manage the
crisis, leaving space for the interference
of ‘Israel’ in particular, via its occupa-
tion of the southernmost border strip.
The imperialist-Zionist-rightist posi-
tion was clearly articulated after former
president Suleiman Franjieh announced
his candidacy in mid-August, and was
backed by Syria and the Lebanese na-
tionalist forces. Since Franjieh could
not be expected to cooperate with the
plans of the Israelis and the Lebanese
Front, Geagea’s Lebanese Forces im-
mediately announced their rejection of
his candidacy. The US also rejected
Franjieh’s candidacy, as did the Israeli
government. Uri Lubrani, coordinator
of Israeli government policy on
Lebanon, termed Franjieh «not a good
candidate» on the basis of his close
relations with Syria. At the same time,
Lubrani implicitly endorsed a rival
candidate, Lebanese Army Com-
mander Michel Aoun, by saying, «A
strong president in the Lebanon is
something that Israel would
welcome... If that will happen we will
be only too pleased to reconsider our
present deployment in South
Lebanon...» (AP, August 17th).
The Lebanese Forces’ opposition was
punctuated by five bombs exploding in
the streets of West Beirut, and the
flare-up of fighting against the na-
tionalist forces southeast of the capital,
immediately after Franjieh’s an-
nouncement. Although Amin Gemayel
did not overtly declare his position, it
was to become clear that the outgoing
president was working hand-in-glove
with the Lebanese Front and Forces to
avoid being succeeded by a compromise
candidate acceptable to all parties in
Lebanon.
In the months preceding the election,
there had been a series of meetings and
measures in West Beirut to stabilize the
situation and create an atmosphere
conducive to a measure of reform. >
Aoun, third from left, convenes his truncated military government. - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 30
- تاريخ
- سبتمبر ١٩٨٨
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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