Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 37)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 37)
- المحتوى
-
SWAPO President Sam Nujoma
criteria cannot be automatically ap-
plied. The move to end the Gulf war,for
example, stemmed mainly from local
circumstances. The US had adhered to
the military option despite the common
international platform for a peaceful
solution created by UN Security Coun-
cil resolution 598. The Arab-Israeli
conflict remains in a deadlock because
the US and its strategic asset, ‘Israel’,
refuse to acknowledge the national
rights of the Palestinian people. Even
under the impact of the Palestinian
uprising, the USA continues to adhere
to the Camp David course. In addition,
the Palestinian question, which is at the
core of the Middle East crisis, has a
different character, stemming as it does
from Zionist colonization, not from a
regional conflict. This also applies to
the struggle in South Africa, which is
formally considered an internal ques-
tion in one country, but in fact involves
the question of colonization and the
national rights of the African people.
Also in Central America which US
imperialism considers as its ‘backyard’,
the Reagan Administration has from
the beginning sought to undermine the
regional peace process which was
outlined in the Esquipulas II agreement
by five states one year ago, and the
resuiting peace process in Nicaragua. In
general, where major US interests are
involved, the US will do all to maintain
bridgeheads of imperialist dominance.
In such cases, Washington clings to its
old power games, military interven-
tionism and unilateral diplomacy, try-
ing to keep both the Soviet Union and
the UN out of these zones. Even here,
though, some modifications have oc-
curred, such as the Reagan Ad-
ministration’s formal adoption of the
idea of an international peace con-
ference for the Middle East, with Soviet
and UN involvement; still, the US idea
of such a conference is a world apart
from the conference advocated by the
Soviet Union, the PLO and non-aligned
countries.
The Reagan Administration’s old,
counterproductive policy has,
moreover, brought loss of influence
and even scandals, as with the failure of
the contra-war against Nicaragua and
the recent attempt to interfere in
Panama’s internal affairs. Thus, tac-
tical changes in US foreign policy can-
not be ruled out; nor can the possibility
of more successful efforts to resolve
regional conflicts.
The dynamics of the peace processes
already underway will also influence
the position of the various states in-
volved in or adjacent to regional con-
flicts, creating new facts which US policy
will have to deal with. On the other
hand, a backlash against the partial
change in the Reagan Administration’s
foreign policy is already underway
among right-wing policymakers, and
the outcome of the coming US elections
will certainly impact on future pro-
spects for resolving regional conflicts.
HAS US POLICY CHANGED?
Compared to the extreme anti-
communism and militarism with which
Reagan launched his presidency, and
the concurrent US approach to regional
conflicts, the administration’s tone has
become somewhat less primitive after
the recent US—USSR summits. Until
1987, these conflicts were seen ex-
clusively as manifestations of «Soviet
expansionism» and used to block pro-
gress in disarmament. At the same
time, the US refused the participation
of the Soviet Union or its allies in any
negotiations. This policy actually dated
back to the confrontation course begun
by the Carter Administration in
response to the fall of the Shah in Iran
and the Afghanistan crisis in 1979/80.
At this time, NATO decided to station
Pershing II and cruise missiles in
Europe, while the US _ unilaterally
escalated its military presence in the
‘third world’, particularly around the
\
Nicaragua’s President Daniel Ortego
Middle East and Indian Ocean, and
created the Rapid Deployment Force,
justifying all this with the entry of
Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
These moves were further escalated
in practice by the Reagan Administra-
tion and given a more extreme
ideological justification, resulting in the
first-strike strategy against the Soviet
Union and the concept of global in-
terventionism against liberation
movements. Based on the supposed
«Soviet threat» but actually to protect
imperialist dominance, the Reagan
Administration developed the strategy
of «low intensity warfare» to besiege
progressive governments by funding
counterrevolutionary sabotage of their
achievements, meanwhile launching
direct, but limited military intervention
in Lebanon, Grenada and _ Libya;
Nicaragua became the no. | testcase for
«low intensity warfare.» The more the
Reagan Administration promoted «low
intensity warfare» and presented this as
the southern dimension of East-West
relations, the more events in the third
world affected these relations. Thus,
the danger of an escalation beyond
regional boundaries increased. At the
same time, the Reagan Administration
worked to accumulate an_un-
precedented nuclear arsenal,
dramatically escalating the threat to
world peace. US military doctrine was
that a confrontation with the Soviet
Union or one of its allies in the ‘third
world’ could call for a «horizontal
escalation» whereby US forces would
simultaneously attack on the central
>
39 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 30
- تاريخ
- سبتمبر ١٩٨٨
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed