Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 38)
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- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 38)
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European front or other fronts.
It was these extreme dangers which
the Soviet peace offensive set out to
counter, and under its impact, some
changes in US policy can be detected as
referred to earlier in this article. At the
same time, there is still reason to doubt
Washington’s intentions. As noted by
Ricardo Ribera of the FMLN/
FDR — El Salvador, «It has to
show itself whether the US is ready to
make steps in this direction (of solving
regional conflicts). It is possible that
the US will try to reduce detente to
relations between them and the Soviet
Union,while increasing their aggression
against the revolutionary countries and
liberation movements in the so-called
third world. Declarations of the Pen-
tagon, announcing higher spending for
conventional weapons as well as the in-
tensification of the dirty war - called
today the ‘strategy of low intensity
conflicts’, make us fear that this is the
course taken by US imperialism.»
Similar reservations were expressed
by Nicaragua’s president, Daniel
Ortega, at the end of June, about the
fate of Sapoa,the provisory ceasefire
agreement between the Nicaraguan
government and the contras, signed on
March 23rd: «Sapoa has been declared
dead by the US. Shultz’s trip to Central
America at the end of June was meant
to create new conditions to continue the
military aggression against Nicaragua.
A direct intervention by US troops is
still among the options.»
A report issued in Washington on
January 18th, entitled Discriminate
Deterrence, adds credence to such
fears. It was written by the commission
on integrated long-term strategy,
chaired by former secretary for defense
policy, Fred Ikle, a well-known super
militarist. The report recommends a
shift in focus from Europe to «US
security interests» in Asia, Africa and
Latin America. Forecasting that the
‘third world’ will play a greater role in
the US war strategy, the commission
recommends increased mobility for US
intervention forces and more extensive
and flexible US engagement in areas of
crisis. It also recommends increased
«security aid» for pro-US regimes and
contras trying to destabilize revolu-
tionary governments. Published five
weeks after the signing of the INF trea-
ty, the report also contains a broadside
attack on arms control and disarma-
ment.
Right now, the proposals of this
commission do not fit into the political
landscape, because of the strong public
opinion for disarmament in Europe and
partially in the USA. However, it is
conceivable that this proposed strategy
will influence the foreign policy of the
coming president, and it is obviously
more likely to influence Bush than
Dukakis. @
Ceasefire 1n the Gulf
The beginning of direct talks between Iraq and Iran at the UN’s
Geneva headquarters on August 25th, five days after a ceasefire went
into effect in the Gulf, raised hopes for ending the grueling, eight-
year war. It also heralded the possibility of a new stage in the struggle
against Zionist and imperialist aggression in the Middle East.
Iran’s July 18th announcement that
it would abide by the UN ceasefire
resolution no. 598 was mainly due to
the military losses incurred by its forces
over the preceding year. It was also a
reflection of the new tendency in the
Iranian government to be more con-
scious of the need for bettering rela-
tions with other countries. Iran hopes
to use improved regional and interna-
tional relations in the negotiations to
counterbalance its disadvantages in the
military outcome of the fighting.
As of this writing, it 1s impossible to
predict the outcome of the Geneva
talks. There is every reason to an-
ticipate that they will be protracted with
issues of contention ranging from the
international border between the two
countries and control over the Shatt Al
Arab waterway, to political prisoners.
40
It is not our purpose here to go into the
details of the issues to be negotiated.
However, progressive’ forces
everywhere must have a general posi-
tion that questions which involve com-
pensation between the two countries
should not be resolved in a way that in-
flicts more hardship on the population
of either Iraq or Iran. The two peoples
have already suffered enough for their
respective governments’ decisions to
begin and then to pursue this war.
One can, however, discuss the im-
plications of the ending of this war in
terms of how this will impact on the US
military presence in the area on the one
hand, and on the Arab-Zionist conflict
on the other.
‘ISRAEL’ OPPOSES PEACE
‘Israel’ stood alone in all the world,
being the only state to express mainly
negativ2 reactions to the possibility of
ending the Gulf war. The Israeli foreign
ministry did issue a prefunctory state-
ment on August 10th, welcoming the
ceasefire. However, the Zionists’ real
position was more accurately reflected
in Israeli radio broadcasts and the
press, quoting officials who expressed
worry about what an end to the war
would mean, especially the possibility
of Iraq rejoining the Arab confronta-
tion front. As AP reported on July
22nd, «Israeli defense officials on
Wednesday stepped up warnings about
the potential threat of an Iraqi army
left idle by a ceasefire in the Gulf war...
‘If there is an eastern front of Syria,
Iraq and Jordan, with the assistance of
Saudi Arabia, the armored force facing
Israel would be equal to the number of
tanks of all NATO countries,’ Defense
Minister Yitzhak Rabin said in Israeli
radio.»
This was a typical Zionist appeal for
more military aid, trying to restore the
image of ‘Israel’ as besieged by over-
whelming enemy forces, a myth that
has been irrevocably destroyed by the
Israeli response to the Palestinian
popular uprising. Intense debates in the
Israeli cabinet and Knesset followed the
Iranian decision for a ceasefire, and - هو جزء من
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