Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 39)
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- Democratic Palestine : 30 (ص 39)
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there is no wonder that the Israeli
leadership is disturbed by the prospects
of peace in the Gulf. Not only does the
Zionist state stand to lose an outlet for
its arms industry; it loses a primary
device for deflecting both attention and
resources away from the battle against
its own illegal existence, occupation
and aggression. As the most prominent
Israeli military commentator, Zeev
Schiff, remarked, «If the Iraq-Iran war
stops, this means the end of eight fat
years for Israel.»
US MANEUVERING
The US welcomed the end of the war,
but this does not mean that its real
position contradicts that of its Israeli
ally. Rather, the US has broader in-
terests to pursue in the region and is
following a different set of tactics in the
diplomatic arena. Under the impact of
the Soviet global peace offensive and its
own scandals, the Reagan Administra-
tion has found it opportune for the UN
to have a role vis-a-vis the Iraq-Iran
conflict. So, to preface its diplomatic
maneuvering, the State Department
responded to the ceasefire by terming it
«a major triumph for the president’s
foreign policy,» while other US of-
ficials credited the US war fleet with
having had a decisive impact on the
Iranian decision.
In fact, the US position is double-
edged for the possible end of the war
has both pro’s and con’s from the im-
perialist vantage point. On the one
hand, the US had reason to rejoice that
the war will probably end with a «no
winner - no loser» stalemate. The two
combatant countries have been ravag-
ed, leaving no dominant regional power
+o challenge strategic US control of the
oil fields. The end of the war might also
lead to the stabilization of the
Egyptian-Saudi-Jordanian-Iraqi
alliance in a way which would bolster a
reactionary status quo in the region.
On the other hand, the end of the war
would remove the rationale for exten-
sive US military presence in the area,
and the administration will have to find
new excuses. Still, there are signs that a
partial scale-down is deemed better
anyway to avoid disasters that might
lead to public pressure for bringing the
troops home. US imperialism surely
prefers to use the situation to try and
reassert its old alliance with Iran, by
working to change the Iranian leader-
ship or encouraging so-called moderate
elements within the present govern-
ment. The Israeli leadership, inciden-
tally, has similar intentions.
Significantly, the Iranian decision
followed close on the heels of the big-
gest single US crime committed in the
Gulf to date - the July 3rd shooting
down of the Iranian civilian airliner by
the USS Vincennes, killing all 290
passengers. In retrospect, it appears as
a classical example of gunboat
diplomacy with the US trying to scare
Iran into submission. In this connec-
tion, one should view the article in
Newsweek, July 18th, by Henry Kiss-
inger, the notorious former US
Secretary of State:
Citing US goals of «freedom of
navigation» in the Gulf, preventing
«Soviet domination» and _ preserving
«the territorial integrity of friendly
states,» Kissinger noted: «Fundamen-
tally, there are few nations in the world
with less reason to quarrel and more
compatible interests than Iran and the
United States. Though the shah came to
symbolize the friendship between the
two countries in the 1970s, those in-
terests did not depend on him. They
reflected political and strategic realities
that continue today. This unfortunate
accident may provide the occasion to
reopen a dialogue with Teheran. As
part of the process, the United States
could agree to pay compensation to the
families of the airline victims - but put
the money into escrow until there is a
ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war and
American hostages in Lebanon are
released.»
When Iran was on the offensive, the
US entered into an alliance with Iraq;
how it is planning how to put both
countries in a new form of dependency.
In this light, one can evaluate the State
Department’s condemnation of Iraqi
use of chemical gas as «totally un-
justified and abhorent,» just before the
US Congress approved economic sanc-
tions against Iraq for the same reason.
While the use of chemical weapons
against the Kurdish people - or anyone -
merits only condemnation, one cannot
but doubt US intentions in view of its
selective imposition of sanctions
whereby pro-US regimes committing
comparable crimes are often shielded.
The US measures are less due to con-
cern for the Kurdish people than a
threat to Iraq not to rejoin the con-
frontation front against ‘Israel’.
AN OPPORTUNITY
The possibility of ending the Iraq-
Iran war creates new objective condi-
tions in the area, which could influence
the course of the Arab-Zionist conflict
and the regional balance of forces. It is
indisputably to the advantage of the
Palestinian and Arab national cause,
and in line with long-standing calls
from progressive nationalist forces for
mobilizing all resources against the
main enemy. It has removed all excuses
for diverting attention from the main
struggle or from the main current
question of supporting the Palestinian
uprising.
Taking full advantage of the new
possibilities requires a political decision
on the part of the two combatants in the
war, and on the part of all the regimes
that have aligned themselves in accor-
dance with this war rather than the
struggle against Zionist aggression. The
pivotal point here is whether the Arab
nationalist regimes can seize the chance
to make a strong, new nationalist front
which would limit Israeli aggression
and US maneuvers in the area. Forming
such a front would entail resolving the
conflict between Iraq and Syria, and an
Iraqi decision to rejoin the Arab con-
frontation front. Unfortunately, until
now, the Iraqi regime has capitalized on
the ceasefire with Iran to launch an in-
tense attack on the Kurdish people.
The prospect of ending the war also
raises the question of democracy with
new urgency. Whereas the war provid-
ed an excuse for internal oppression in
both Iran and Iraq, and in a number of
neighboring countries, its end will give
new space for raising the popular
demands for democracy and economic
justice.
All peoples of the area welcomed the
end of the war. The stand taken by each
government as to what to do in the
aftermath will provide a yardstick for
assessing their commitment to the Arab
national cause and its core, the
Palestinian question, and the struggle
to end Zionist occupation.
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