Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 5)
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- Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 5)
- المحتوى
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There are some appeals to the PLO to change its
Charter. What is your opinion on that?
We reject this. There was agreement on two basic issues
prior to the discussions which took place before the convening
of the PNC. The first was not to alter the Palestinian National
Charter, and the second was not to change the political pro-
gram of the PLO. I realize that such talk did take place;
therefore, it was necessary to have consensus on rejecting any
change in the Charter or the program so that we could begin
dialogue on the other issues. Of course, the demands for
changing the Charter are basically from ‘Israel’ and the US.
World public opinion should know that their aim is to put
obstacles to the peace process. The Israeli motto is ‘Greater
Israel’ from the Nile to the Euphrates. The program of the
Likud incorporates all of Palestine and Jordan into the Jewish
state.
If the US demands that we change our Charter, and if we
and our Soviet friends demand a change in the charter of the
Zionist movement, the program of the state, etc., this will be
placing obstacles to the process of peace. The imperialist-
Zionist plan is clear. Until this moment, they do not recognize
the PLO or our legitimate national rights; they object to our
right as a people to self-determination.
How do you evaluate the PLO’s effectiveness in
galvanizing support for the intifada on the Arab
and international levels?
We realize, of course, that the PLO’s major issue is the in-
tifada and facilitating support for it. All the political and
diplomatic endeavours since December 8, 1987, are related to
the intifada. However, allow me to say that, despite that, we
are not satisfied. The most prominent example was during the
Palestinian dialogue prior to the PNC; 95% of the dialogue
centered around the political issues stemming from the in-
tifada, the Jordanian move severing ties with the West Bank,
and the new international political climate. Of course, all this
is important. However, it should not be at the cost of the con-
tinuation and escalation of the intifada, its consolidation and
expansion, its repercussions on the Palestinian and Arab levels,
and our tasks based on these repercussions. Placing emphasis
on the political issues is not satisfactory to us.
Our main concern now after the PNC is for our comrades
who represent the PFLP in the (PLO’s) occupied territories
committee and the Executive Committee, to work on im-
plementing the PNC resolutions concerning the intifada. Of
course, supporting the intifada does not mean financial sup-
port only; it includes material, mass and military support from
outside. As far as the financial support is concerned, we feel
that it should go to the United National Leadership and its
various committees in the different cities, villages and camps,
so that this support will reach the poor masses who bear the
largest share of the burden. The intifada is on the agenda of all
activities of the PLO. However, we are not satisfied because
there is an opportunity to do more, to make more reforms and
to give more support on all levels.
What are the immediate tasks for the independent
Palestinian state, and what are the dangers facing
it?
Before I answer this question, I want to point to the vast dif-
ference between the declaration of the state and establishing a
state. Extracting a state from ‘Israel’ will not be easy. It’s sad
to see that there are some who take this lightly. The Palestinian
state will not come about unless the balance of forces makes
‘Israel’ accept the establishment of this state. The intifada has
raged for one year, and had vast repercussions internationally,
as the cry of a people calling on the world to face up to its
responsibility towards the values of humanity. Despite that,
despite the isolation of ‘Israel’ and its economic losses which
have been beyond our expectations, both the Likud and Labor
agree on force as the only means for dealing with the intifada.
The experience of this last year exposed the true nature of
Zionism and the settler-colonialist interests which it will not
easily yield. Therefore, we stand before a long and difficult
struggle in order to bring about tangible changes in the balance
of forces. We have to think of how to make such a change, to
think of all the factors which affect the balance of forces.
I hope that the declaration of independecne will give our
masses a new motivation for struggle, and not cause illusions
among us about the difficulty of bridging the gap between the
declaration of the state and its establishment. Before I answer
the question about the tasks of this state, we should examine
the tasks of the PLO for closing this gap. The task of this state
at present is attaining the greatest recognition possible, as well
as membership in the Arab League, the Islamic Conference,
the Organization of African Unity, the non-aligned movement
and the United Nations, even if not full membership... Of
course, we hope for more recognition in the future because that
would be a big moral support for the intifada and the Palesti-
nian people, and a big slap in the face to ‘Israel’.
As for the dangers facing this state, there are three sources:
from ‘Israel’, from the Arab states and from within. The most
dangerous, of course, are those from ‘Israel’ and the US ad-
ministration. ‘Israel’ will try its outmost to prove to the
Palestinian people and the world that what the PLO did during
the last PNC is but a joke and has no practical value; with the
passing of time, the Israelis will ask the Palestinians: Where is
your state? Where are your leaders? What have they done for
you? This is the bigyest danger.
The Arab reactionary governments, such as Egypt and Jor-
dan, will say: Your state has been declared, congratulations!
This is a very good thing you’ve done. Why don’t you think of
a confederation with Jordan? This will bring us back to the
Jordanian option; this is another danger.
The danger from within stems from the present condition of
the PLO. I am afraid that there exists a discrepancy between
the resilience of the intifada and the PLO’s reaction to it; this
gap should be closed. I wish to reiterate, however, my deep
belief in the ability of our masses in the occupied territories and
outside to persevere and bypass all of these obstacles and
establish our state.
Where does the Palestinian bourgeoisie stand now?
We are in a stage of national liberation. We face a settler-
colonial enemy which hurts the interests of all classes of the
Palestinian society. This explains the comprehensiveness of the
intifada which encompasses all cities, villages and camps, all
ages, all political and ideological trends, all classes,
businessmen and workers. We can only explain this by the
nature of the contradiction between Zionism and the Palesti-
nian people. The bourgeoisie is now in the nationalist camp.
After the accomplishment of national liberation, then it is
another story, but for now it is a national bourgeoisie and
plays a very basic role relative to its size and ability. @
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- Democratic Palestine : 31
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