Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 20)

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عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 20)
المحتوى
of the PLO, to join its ranks, whether they accept or not. It is
the PLO’s responsibility to seriously continue with this
dialogue and exert all possible efforts for the unification of all
the Palestinian forces in order to confront the occupation. It’s
impossible to understand that such differences (in the Palesti-
nian arena) can exist in the period of the uprising, whereas this
might be understandable in other circumstances. It is our
responsibility, just as Comrade George Hawi mentioned, not
to forget that the enemy’s plan aims at all of us. By taking this
into account, it is possible to protect ourselves from many
political mistakes. For example, we disagreed with a central
point in the political statement and yet we chanted afterwards,
«Revolution Until Victory» and «Unity Until Victory.» We
were later asked, «How can you be like this?» We answered
with two points: because there is an uprising and because
events will prove, after one or two years, that the concession
policy will not accomplish anything ; then we will return and
unify on a decisive political program. I refer to a person with
great experience, Comrade Ho Chi Minh, who said, «The more
flexible we are, the more the bombs increase over Hanoi.» So
the uprising imposes a ceiling on expressing differences of
opinion, and the PLO is obligated to be open to every
organization that wants to struggle via its framework.
THE NEED FOR REFORM
Also on the Palestinian level, I would like to emphasize a
major task which will contribute to adjusting the balance of
power in the PNC: This is the achievement of real reform
within the PLO. This subject cannot be taken lightly. It is true,
everyone is comfortable with what is happening in the occupied
territories, but only a small percentage of our people’s poten-
tials are mobilized. Why don’t we mobilize our potentials
100%? The answer is because the PLO does not yet have the
organizational frameworks for mobilizing all the Palestinian
masses’ potentials, in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the US and
everywhere. I hope that the Palestinian leadership will be on
the same level of the masses and their enthusiasm, potentials,
abilities and willingness to offer sacrifices. Why don’t we aim
for the PLO being like the Algerian National Liberation Front
- a real front, giving every organization the right to its own
ideology and organizational life. If this is our goal and hope,
then it demands the following: collective leadership, respecting
institutions, and democratic proportional representation. This
battle for democratic reforms will be on the top of our list of
priorities in the coming PNC sessions. We will work hand-in-
hand with all the other organizations who feel the danger of
not making such reforms and know what this will lead to in the
long run. In this context, I ask: «Is it true that the size of the
PFLP is the number that voted against UN resolution 242 in the
PNC?» I am not convinced of this, especially when I hear that
78% of our masses in the occupied territories reject the equa-
tion of establishing a Palestinian state in return for recognizing
‘Israel’. It is my right to say that the political line that the
PFLP represents does not constitute 14%, as is the case in the
PNC. We will work in order to reorganize and re-establish the
PLO on the basis of proportional representation. At that time
we promise that we will submit to the majority opinion. The
representation of each organization will not be determined by
prior agreements. The size of each organization and the
strength of their political lines will be determined according to
proportional representation. During this process, it is our right
to convince the others that the PFLP represents the majority,
20
just as it is the DFLP’s right and the Palestinian Struggle
Front’s and others. This is how we understand democratic
reforms which are obligatory for the PLO.
Some believe that there is no relationship between the subject
of reforms and the uprising, but this subject is related to the
essence of the uprising. This is what Comrade George Hawi
meant when he said he was pained about the lack of support to
the uprising, in spite of its having continued for one year. This
leads me to ask about the role of the Palestinian masses outside
of Palestine. It is true that they responded to the uprising, but
to what degree was their strength mobilized? Is this all of their
potentials? Once again, we see the necessity of reforms.
What do we mean by spreading the uprising? We mean
spreading it to include our masses in the territories occupied
since 1948. I don’t mean that the Palestinian state that we will
establish tactically will include the Galilee. Rather, they should
be included in order to increase the pressure on ‘Israel’ and
force it to deal politically with the uprising. Despite the great
value of international pressure, internal pressure must be in-
creased, because ‘Israel’ and the fascist forces don’t care about
international public opinion. For example, South Africa 1S
isolated and internationally boycotted, but yet it does not care.
‘Israel’ after one year of the uprising continues its policy of
suppression. How can we force it to change its approach? How
do we force it to agree to an international conference? The only
way is increasing its economic and other losses as much as
possible by preserving the mass character of the uprising. In
Lebanon, there are 15,000 armed Palestinians; their respon-
sibility is to support the uprising and pressure ‘Israel’ so that it
submits to the demand of freedom and independence and even
to the international conference.
Last May and June, the War of Fires took place in the 1948
occupied territories and the Palestinians threw tens of
firebombs in many cities, which shook ‘Israel’. I have read
many editorials in Israeli newspapers which said: «If the upris-
ing spreads to Israel, then we will have two disasters.» We
want them to have four disasters, and it is our duty to use all
means possible against them. We do not underestimate the
importance of the Palestinian and Arab roles. We must strug-
gle to change the balance of forces on the Arab level. The cur-
rent lack of activity is not acceptable. The Arab masses have an
honorable history of struggle against imperialism. It is incor-
rect to only emphasize the prevailing subdued political condi-
tions on the Arab mass level. Revolutionaries should unders-
tand the reality in order to change it. Then and only then, will
the US and ‘Israel’ feel threatened; both are observing with
great interest the uprising’s effect on the Arab and Palestinian
levels. We should not despair nor surrender.
THE ARAB LEVEL
On the official Arab level, we call for the implementation of
the decisions of the Algiers Summit, that were among the first
political victories of the uprising. These decisions were good,
but the important issue now is their implementation, especially
on the material level, in order to secure that the people of the
uprising have their basis necessities of life provided for. I am
sorry to say that the majority of the Arab countries did not live
up to their promises, but rather they implemented the recom-
mendations of the US administration by reducing their
material support to the PLO.
Palestinian-Syrian relations is a central point in the PFLP’s
thinking. The strategic interests of both Syria and the PLO
هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 31
تاريخ
ديسمبر ١٩٨٨
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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