Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 22)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 22)
- المحتوى
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HHI
This study was presented by Dr. Hussein Abu Nimal at the intellectual debate held by the Arab Cultural
Club at the Carlton Hotel in Beirut, in June 1988.
The subject matter of this research falls basically in the field
of political economy, with special priority given to the political
- Strategic factor which has always been a determinant in Israeli
affairs, including the economy. I believe that it is necessary to
deal with this subject on two interrelated levels: The first is the
direct costs (of the uprising) to Israel, due to increased security
expenditures and the interruption of production... The second
is the indirect losses which have occurred in the realm of
morale, and their overall and long-term implications. While
the direct losses have been more prominent and measurable,
the indirect ones are deeper, more long-term and more closely
linked to the present conflict in the area. Based on this, a writer
would adopt the opinion that one side achieves its aim by
breaking the will of the enemy; this is both a material and
psychological state; in this way, one of the two conflicting
parties will be forced to submit to the aims of the other.
This concept applies to the Arab-Israeli conflict and pro-
vides us with a proper interpretation of the state of ambiguity
which has continued for many decades. Although Israel has
militarily won all the wars it waged, it could not achieve the
aims of these wars. Thus, losing the war did not lead to the loss
of our aim. Therefore, the concept of winning or losing has a
relative and changing meaning which can be defined by
understanding all elements which interact at a given historical
moment.
Dealing with this subject on the two levels mentioned above
will give us a picture of the reality of the uprising’s present and
future cost to Israel, taking into consideratron the qualitative
difference between the direct material costs, which can easily
be compensated for via foreign economic aid, and the Israeli
losses on the second level, which are not so easily compensated
for; nor is it so easy for Israel to adjust to the new balance in
the historical battle of wills...
Whatever way of evaluating the costs and effects of the
uprising on Israel is chosen, it is important to describe the pre-
sent relationship between the Palestinian Arab and Jewish
economies in Palestine, in an attempt to clarify the limits and
nature of this relationship, which in turn defines the extent of
the mutual effects between them. However, this requires prior
knowledge of the two economies, simply because any relation-
ship is but the outcome of the structures of the two parties. I
would not start from this point if not for the mistaken concept
that has prevailed about the two economies and the relation
between them. The Arab point-of-view on this matter has
mainly depended on what Israel has said about its problems or
its relationship with the 1967 occupied territories. Those who
follow this subject notice that Israel concentrates on its secon-
dary problems, avoiding as far as possible any serious or ex-
22
tensive talk about the problems which have a distinctively
structural nature.
ISRAEL’S «CAPTIVE ECONOMY»
The Israeli economic experience has passed through dif-
ferent stages. For various reasons which cannot be included
here, many factors contributed to the formation of the Israeli
economy. This experience was based on three integrated
elements: highly qualified human resources, great capital input
and political administration. If we put aside the human and
financial resources which were provided internally, and talk
‘only about the external contributions, then we are speaking
about an influx of 25,000 engineers and 62 billion dollars in the
period between 1950 and 1985. These resources and others
were channelled through the state and its different institutions.
This process enabled them to function in accordance with a
long-term, overall development strategy for achieving aims
which originally seemed very difficult to attain. As a result of
the abundance of resources, the political administration
redefined priorities at every stage on the basis of two in-
variables: integrating the immediate and short-term plans with
the long-term, overall strategy; and constantly strengthening
the connection between development and security considera-
tions, reaching a stage in which development expenditures
became security ones, and vice versa.
Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of this was the
mutual reinforcement between the material achievements and
the political aims; each was expanded ambitiously with every
success of the other. All this happened in a continued mutual
movement, leading to a meaningful change in Israeli strategic
thought. Accordingly, the demand increased for Israel to move
to a new stage in which it would apply the strategy of a great
power and seek to be a great regional power... Military vic-
tories combined with economic achievements and Biblical
heritage. The demand for supremacy in all fields grew greater
and greater. Therefore, it has become difficult to distinguish
between the archaic ideas of rabbis who rely on the saying of
«God’s chosen people,» and the concepts used by secular
scientific Zionists to predict the twenty-first century. Accor-
dingly, it is imperative to distinguish between knowledge and
civilization; we see that the most brutal form of barbarism oc-
curs when science and reactionary ideology are combined.
The problem lies not only in this, but in the pattern of
subordination exhibited by the Israeli experience. In spite of its
claims of having become more independent, Israeli dependence
has increased with every advance it has made. We will not
argue about abstract political or economic concepts, simply
because it is agreed that the standard for economic dependence - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 31
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