Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 23)

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عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 23)
المحتوى
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or independence is the degree of the role which others may play
in the economy of any country. All countries depend on each
Other, but this generality cannot be applied in the case of
Israel. The political factor is perhaps the most important one
which enables us to distinguish precisely between a form of
dependence which is essentially mutual, and another form of
dependence which embodies the full meaning of the term. Ac-
cordingly, we can list two forms of Israeli dependence:
The first is positive in that it benefits Israel. It concerns
relations with the capitalist West which provides Israel with
enormous capital on the one hand, and receives the greatest
portion of Israeli exports on the other. Moreover, the direct
and indirect exports (to Israel) of the capitalist West are
equivalent to its imports from Israel. If there is a need for more
clarity, we can affirm the political-strategic consideration
which dominates Israel’s relations with the capitalist West and
has made its reliance on the West the reason for its own
strength. This is very different from the relations other coun-
tries have with the West, because these relations have a dif-
ferent background.
The second is the structural relationship between the rising
Israeli economy and the Palestinian economy which has in-
creasingly assumed the position of an underlying structure of
the Israeli economy, to the point that the Israeli economy can-
not dispense with it, either now or in the future. Our ability to
define the economic effects of the uprising depends on seeing
the structural relationship between the two economies,
especially since the Israeli economy became like a captive to the
Arab economy in Palestine, although its aim was quite the op-
posite.
It must be admitted that the term «captive economy» could
give rise to misunderstanding. Is it reasonable that the
stronger, richer colonist is a captive to the occupied, poorer,
weaker economy? This misunderstanding does not arise if we
look at the matter as one of mutual necessity between the two
parties, or the necessity which the weaker party represents for
the stronger. Accordingly, the relationship between the two
parties is not one between strong and weak, great and small,
but between two necessities, where each party has its ultimate
significance. Therefore, the relationship is between two
qualities, not between two quantities. If one ton of wood is
added to one hundred tons, the amount added would only
amount to 1%. However, adding one ton of iron, or just a few
kilograms of nails, to that amount of wood means the addition
of a new element which cannot be dispensed with if we want to
change wood into a table or chairs. Accordingly, the relation-
ship between the two economies is not only an overall one, but
a relationship between two labor forces and two markets of
two different natures.
What I have said might lead to a very dangerous conclusion
-that the structural relationship between the two economies is a
form of mutual necessity simply because each of them has a
different nature. Doesn’t this mean that the occupation became
necessary for the occupied territories and their economy? I ask
this question in order to use it to answer another two questions:
Firstly, the limits of the necessity and benefit which each
economy represents for the other; and secondly, the loss which
would result from upsetting or severing the relationship bet-
ween the two economies. Addressing the subject matter of this
research will help us to answer all questions which may be
raised about this subject. Moreover, answering the question
about the economic effects of the uprising will enable us to get
a clear picture of the economic background of the uprising
which had been accumulating for more than two decades.
THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY
Talking about a economy under occupation requires defin-
ing the meaning intended by this. Does it only cover the
economy of the 1967 occupied territories, or does it also in-
clude those occupied in 1948? The term as we are using it in this
research covers the Palestinian economy in both areas,
although there are some differences between them particularly
in the degree of Israel’s hold on each of them. We don’t only
say this because of the unity of the land and the people; but
also due to the similarity of the mechanisms to which both
areas have been subjected, as well as the role which the
Palestinians from both areas are playing as an underlying
structure of the Israeli economy. Therefore, talking about the
occupied territories of 1967 is considered a proper standard for
those occupied in 1948.
Israel has run the affairs of the 1967 occupied territories in
accordance with two aims: The first is exploiting all the
resources of these territories in favor of its own economy. The
second is the political aim of creating a situation in the ter-
ritories whereby they can be annexed in the future. However, if
there is a contradiction between the two aims, Israel has given
preference to the political aim. Accordingly, Israel didn’t try to
deform the Palestinian economy, but to destroy it. The first
aim would allow for keeping the structure of the economy,
although in a backward or deformed state, but the second
targets the structure itself.
Thus, the results of the Israeli policy were on two levels: The
first is emaciation of the Palestinian economy, particularly its
productive sectors, since these were less in 1985 than in 1967.
The second has a structural nature, because of the increase of
the Palestinian economy’s dependence on income from outside
the 1967 occupied territories. If we take the development of the
labor force in the 1967 occupied territories as a standard for
measuring economic activity, we will see that the number of
employed in 1985 was the same as in 1970. What should be
taken into consideration is that a considerable number of them
are working in Israeli settlement projects; Israel considers them
as part of the labor force of the 1967 occupied territories.
We find more than one evidence of the structural change.
For instance, the number of those working in the agricultural
field was 37,400 in 1985, only 65% of those in 1970. But where
is the decrease? Surely, the Israeli agriculture has absorbed it.
However, the loss of the occupied territories is not confined to
the size of the labor force, but also applies to the quality of
those employees, since all of them are wage laborers. Accor-
dingly, the labor force in the 1967 occupied territories began to
decline. In 1985, only 64,300 wage laborers were actually >
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هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 31
تاريخ
ديسمبر ١٩٨٨
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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