Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 25)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 25)
- المحتوى
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WIN)
reflect the full importance of the Palestinian labor force,
because it is concentrated at a certain stage of production. For
example, 89,200 Palestinians from the 1967 occupied ter-
ritories worked in the Israeli economy in 1985, according to
official estimates. This is about 6% of all those employed in
the Israeli economy. Moreover, estimates which take into con-
sideration the so-called illegal workers count a total of about
120,000 Palestinians from the occupied territories working in
Israel.
Let us stick to the official number - 89,200 workers
distributed as follows: 14,000 in agriculture; 15,800 in in-
dustry; 42,500 in construction; and 16,800 in services. Then let
us move to the percentage of employees they constitute in these
sectors. For instance, Palestinians from the 1967 occupied ter-
ritories constitute about 15% of all those working in
agriculture, and 39% of wage laborers in this field. If we add
the Palestinians of the 1948 occupied territories, Palestinians
would constitute 32% of the agricultural labor force, and 54%
of wage laborers.
The number of Palestinian Arab and Jewish workers in the
construction sector was 115,000; Jews constitute 38% of this
number, while the rest are Palestinian Arabs from the two oc-
cupied areas. Workers from the 1967 occupied territories alone
constitute 37% of all workers in the construction sector, but
they account for 43% of the wage labor.
Palestinian Arabs in general account for 28% of those who
work in the service sector, while those from the 1967 occupied
territories constitute 15.5% of the total number of service
workers, and 24% of the wage laborers in thiS sector.
In the industrial sector, Palestinian Arab constitute 15% of
the labor force; workers from the 1967 occupied territories
constitute about 5% of the whole industrial labor force and
6% of wage laborers.
In summary, Palestinian workers from the 1967 occupied
territories have decisive importance in three main sectors in the
following order: construction, agriculture and services, as well
as a lesser importance in industry. Even these percentages do
not totally represent the role of the Palestinian workers in the
Israeli economy. Labor and wage labor are general terms.Even
if the Jewish agricultural engineer or architect is a wage
laborer, is he the same as the Palestinian worker? Absolutely
not, for each has his respective position in the production pro-
cess and the professional hierarchy. Even though we haven’t
statistics about the distribution of the wage labor force, we are
certain that we can conclude that Palestinian wage laborers are
increasingly concentrated in the lowest stratum of wage
laborers.
This means that we can speak of the semi-domination of
Palestinian labor over a total production stage in the main sec-
tors of the Israeli economy. This is extremely dangerous for the
Israeli economy, not only because of the huge number of Arab
laborers, but because of the political implications this has. Any
move on the part of the Palestinian labor force would not only
obstruct a single production stage in one sector at a time, but it
would obstruct several other related sectors as well, since these
sectors are linked by one internal dynamic.
THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE ECONOMIC
GIANT
This indicates the most important direct loss which the
uprising has caused to the Israeli economy. It is not only a
direct, material loss, but has many dimensions connected to the
Israeli development policy. It exposed the weakness of the
political base on which the economic giant was founded. From
a distance, this giant seems to be one body, while in essence it
consists of two simultaneously unified and contradictory parts.
Before moving from this point, it is necessary to confirm that
Israel needs to employ a certain amount of Palestinian labor.
In practice, Israel employs about 120,000 workers from the
1967 occupied territories. Moreover, Israel has previously tried
to dispense with what it found could not be dispensed with - the
Palestinian workers. In other words, Israel has a limited
freedom and capacity to dispense with them and compensate
for their total or partial boycott of work.
There is no need to go further in adding statistical details. I
dare conclude that the Israeli losses can be calculated at more
than one billion dollars to date based on: the size of the Israeli
national product and the share of each economic sector in this,
since the Palestinian workers have a decisive effect on this na-
tional product; the percentage of the Palestinian labor force in
the economic sectors; and the period of time which has passed
since the uprising began.
I elaborated on the previous point because it is the crux of
the whole matter, not only because of its implications in terms
of Israeli economic losses, but because it sheds light on a cen-
tral matter which has rarely been given attention in the past. It
will provide us with a proper foundation for measuring the
position of the 1967 occupied territories in the whole Israeli
economic cycle. This leads us to deal briefly with another im-
portant point concerning trade. The 1967 occupied territories’
exports to Israel in 1985 were valued at 178.4 million dollars,
while imports from Israel amounted to a value of 602.4 million
dollars. This gave Israel an annual surplus in the trade balance
of 424 million dollars. Calculating Israeli losses on this level is
not easy, but whatever they were, they were compound. Like in
other cases, these losses surpass their numerical cost, since they
contribute to the spread of a negative dynamic in the whole
Israeli socioeconomic fabric. We hereby move to another level
which concerns the performance of the economy as a whole
under the new conditions, which should have important effects
in the future.
There are many statements and signs confirming that Israel
longs to become an economic base for the capitalist West. To
achieve that, it offers as incentives cheap labor power, prox-
Imity to the Afro-Asian market and other features. Accor-
dingly, Israel strives to attract foreign investment. While it is
early to talk about numbers in this field, we can speak of the
great negative effect of the uprising on Israeli capacity to at-
tract this kind of capital which seeks profits and safety at the
same time.
Delaying mention of the Israeli security expenditures doesn’t
mean any lessening of their size or importance. These expen-
ditures are not restricted to the cost of maintaining the soldiers, >
25 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 31
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- ديسمبر ١٩٨٨
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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