Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 28)
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- Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 28)
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tional consensus shared by organized
forces and the masses.
THE INTERNAL FRONT
A high degree of internal unity and
security has been essential for bringing
about the current state of civil disobe-
dience and popular authority. The calls
always refer to this question in one
aspect or another. One is warning col-
laborators and others who are not
following the program _ concerning
resignations and strikes. Another is
alerting the people to rumors, false
calls, provocations and other devices
used by agents and the Shin Beth to
plant division.
On another level, the calls deal with
the need for unity of action despite the
existence of different political trends.
Calls no. 23 and no. 24 appeal to the
national and progressive forces behind
the green line (Palestinians living under
occupation since 1948) to end their dif-
ferences and unite for the sake of the
uprising and Palestinian national
rights, in reference to the disagreements
that have prevailed between Rakah and
other groups, such as the Sons of the
Village, on how to best support the
uprising. In this case, the call does not
«take sides» or prescribe a specific
solution, but leaves this up to the forces
involved.
The approach is different in the case
of groups in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, who make divisive actions or
challenge the uprising’s unity and
adherence to the PLO. Here the pro-
blem is addressed via internal discus-
sions, as in the case of Hamas (Islamic
Resistance Movement) with whom
there have been discussions both inside
and outside the occupied territories,
aimed at preserving the maximal degree
of unity. Still, the problem reached the
point of being dealt with openly in one
call, no. 29, which condemns Hamas’
decision to deciare a three-day strike in
Al Khalil (Hebron), separate from the
uprising’s stated program. Here the call
alerted the masses to the problem posed
by this, whereas direct discussions are
continuously conducted to try to get
Hamas to join the UNL, or at least
agree on the joint program of action.
The calls consistently link the upris-
ing with the Palestinian revolution
outside of Palestine, stressing the unity
of the PLO. Accordingly, call no. 15
28
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asserts that the new situation created by
the uprising allows for the return of all
Palestinian organizations to the PLO,
based on the 18th PNC. Calls no. 20
and 21 contain strong statements
against the inter-Palestinian fighting in
the Beirut camps. This elicited the first
explicit condemnation of another
Palestinian force by name: «We con-
demn the savage bombing of Shatila
and its destruction by the renegade
group of Abu Musa, because this is a
stab in the back to the PLO.»
POLITICAL VISION —
NATIONALIST AND
INTERNATIONALIST
The UNL’s firmness in political line
but flexibility in tactics is apparent in
all its calls. The second call sets out in-
terim demands such as withdrawal of
the army from populated areas, release
of detainees, an end to the iron fist,
settlement-building, land confiscation
and unjust taxation, etc. These are
maintained but never confused with the
ultimate goal of ending the occupation
and establishing «a free Palestine - a
united land, people and cause» (call no.
4). Throughout, it is clear that there can
be no compromise on the Palestinian
people’s right to repatriation, self-
determination and an_ independent
state. Equally important, the calls ex-
pound the link between tactical and
strategic goals as being an ongoing
struggle, in view of the nature of the
Zionist enemy. Call no. 29 expresses the
basic similarity of the Labor and Likud
blocs in uniting on repressing the upris-
ing, adding after the Israeli elections:
«we expect four more years of the rule
of the most racist extremist trends in
the Zionist entity. But this does not
scare us.»
Even with the euphoria of what the
uprising has achieved, the calls exhibit
no illusions that victory can be quick,
or that the US can be begged into sup-
porting the side of justice. Those who
argue that the PLO should make con-
cessions for the sake of the people
under occupation have perhaps not
read call no. 17 which affirms Palesti-
nian rejection of Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338, while asserting
that in the eyes of the uprising, Security
Council resolution 605 (Dec. 22, 1987)
cancels the council’s earlier resolutions
because it «expresses an international
consensus; it deals with our people’s
cause as one of a people with legitimate
rights to live on their land, and calls for
sending international observers to the
occupied territories.» As stated in call
no. 26, it is the US that should offer
concessions, not the PLO.
At the same time, the calls express a
mature and concrete concept of
political and diplomatic work, and how
to widen the Palestinians’ circle of
friends and concurrently Israeli isola-
tion. This is coupled with explicit sup-
port to the PLO’s work to translate the
uprising’s achievements into interna-
tional achievements, as expressed in call
no. 27, prior to the PNC’s 19th session.
Call no. 28 expressed the dialectical
relationship between struggie and
diplomatic gains: «The enemy
understands only the language of
violence. Therefore, the more the
flames of the uprising rage, the closer
we are to victory, and the more our
leadership and cause gain diplomatic
status.»
Call no. 23 notes the three UN
Security Council resolutions passed
during the uprising (605, 607 and 608)
which «spoke for the first time about
the occupied Palestinian territories» as
opposed to previous resolutions which
referred to the «territories occupied by
Israel since 1967,» without specifying
their Palestinian identity. The call lists
these three resolutions and the interna-
tional exposure of the occupation’s
racist and fascist face as main
achievements of the uprising, on a par
with the Israeli economic losses, the
fragmentation of the civil administra-
tion’s apparatus and Jordan’s decision
to sever ties with the West Bank. The
UNL carefully defines the uprising’s
demands to the international com-
munity in accordance with the adopted
principles and responsibilities of the
UN, such as enforcing the Geneva
Convention of 1949, seeing this as a
protective support to the Palestinian
people, but always retaining the idea
that the responsibility for advancing the
struggle rests with the Palestinians - هو جزء من
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