Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 40)
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- Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 40)
- المحتوى
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decisive confrontation because of the enemy’s superiority.
They have, in addition, repeatedly tried to prevent the Palesti-
nian people from practicing the strategy of protracted people’s
war against the Zionist enemy, under the pretext of preparing
for a «comprehensive» war against the enemy, or avoiding in-
volvment in a war without full preparation.
Thus it was not surprising that some views emerged in our
circles, considering the two strategies mutually contradictory.
We have always been firm supporters of the strategy of pro-
tracted people’s war for facing the imperialist-Zionist enemy
which is superior in resources and weapons, as well as destruc-
tive capacity. We still call for the mobilization of all the
capacities of the Palestinian and Arab peoples in the battle to
counter the superiority of the enemy and steadily proceed
towards realizing our people’s rights. Yet we do not consider
the strategy of protracted people’s war contradictory to the
strategy of classical warfare. On the contrary, the two may be
complementary when there is a unity of political objectives and
views, and when the proper foundations for a well-defined
Palestinian-Arab nationalist front are crystallized.
The experience of the 1973 war provides good evidence. In
this particular war, the self-confidence of the Arab soldier was
restored. He proved to be distinctly capable of mastering
modern weapons and waging battles, some of which were the
greatest in recent military history against the Zionist enemy. If
not for the incapable and collaborationist leadership of Sadat,
the war would have been much different, not only in terms of
the political results but also on the operational level, as has
since become clear.
For all these reasons, the people’s war strategy should by no
means be put in contradiction to the classical war strategy. It is
necessary to look at them as mutually complementary.
The sixth lesson lies in the dialectical relationship
between strategy and tactics in the Palestinian
political action.
It is not enough to define our strategic long-term objectives;
nor is it enough to draw a structural map of the camp of
friends and the enemy camp, although stich things are most
essential. We must also have a clear picture of the correct tac-
tical steps which lead to the ultimate aims. Also needed is
observation of all the contradictions and differences within the
enemy camp, to make use of them in both our partial and
comprehensive battles against this camp. It is essential to
precisely observe the existing balance of forces, to be aware of
what demands and goals are obtainable at each stage, and to
formulate the suitable tactical slogans according to the existing
balance of forces. It is also necessary to study the situation ac-
curately in order to define the principal central link at every
stage, to avoid being plunged into a heap of tasks which are not
so important. Finally, it is necessary to conclude alliances ac-
cording to all these considerations. This is an essential task
without which we cannot successfully proceed towards our tac-
tical or strategic objectives.
We don’t exaggerate when we say that the official instate-
ment of the interim program of the PLO towards the end of
1979 played an important role in guiding the militant Palesti-
nian movement and defining goals within the realm of the
historically possible. This program expressed a higher level of
ideological development.
The battle we are fighting now for the international con-
ference should enrich our struggle with increasing numbers of
allies and friends on the international level; it contributes to
40
Our success in winning over ever increasing circles of world
public opinion. These are just a few examples. There are scores
of others which concretely show the fundamental importance
of successful tactics in our political struggle, without being
satisfied by general slogans.
Concerning the dialectical relationship between strategy and
tactics, two erroneous tendencies have emerged among the
Palestinians:
1. There is a pragmatic tendency expressing the national
bourgeoisie’s limitations and incapacity to shoulder the
burdens of continuing the struggle. Their confidence in the
possibility of obtaining the ultimate goals and rights of our
people has been shaken. That is why the representatives of this
tendency have often behaved impatiently and put current tac-
tics above the ultimate long-term strategy. We also notice that
some of them have shown an inclination to relinquish the
long-term goals under the pressure of the existing cir-
cumstances. In the chaos of our daily struggle, while exercising
political tactics, the most serious setback we may face is
forgetting our strategic goals and consequently losing the
compass which directs our »rogress and shows our people the
way forward.
2. The other erroneous tendency is of a dogmatic nature
which limits itself to repetition of big, strategic slogans and
remains aloof from political tactics, while viewing the enemy
front through rigid stereotypes without noticing any political
nuances. The danger of this tendency lies in the fact that it
leads to nihilism and sectarianism, removed from the real
political movement; it leads its advocates to the margins of
political life, rendering them incapable of effective action.
On the other hand, we see that the scientific approach, as
experience has proved, should be based on:
(a) clear definition of the strategic goals of both the people
and the revolution, and precise identification of the camps of
the friends and the foes; (b) the role of the political leadership
which has to define the interim tasks of the national struggle in
the given conditions and balance of forces of the particular
stage; (c) successful connection between tactical and strategic
targets so that we have a chain of interconnected links, each
leading to the next, rather than tactics that are alien to the
strategy; and (d) practicing political tactics involves among
other things seeing the minor differences which exist among
the parties of the enemy camp, without ever forgetting that
they are all integral parts of this camp.
These are some of the most outstanding features of the
dialectical relationship between tactics and strategy as shown
by our experience of the last forty years. Just as the enemy has
managed to attain its goals, one after the other, to reach its
present status, we have to complete our process of return, self-
determination and establishing an independent Palestinian
state through continuous and persistent struggle, without los-
ing the compass that points towards our right to restore the
whole of our homeland, and the ultimate goals of our people.
At the same time we must be free of all seclusionism; we must
abstain from compromising on vital issues or squandering our
people’s achievements.
The seventh lesson lies in the class question and the
importance of a decisive political line in the con-
frontation.
While reviewing the forty-year process of continuous strug-
gle against the Zionist entity implanted on our homeland, we - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 31
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- ديسمبر ١٩٨٨
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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