Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 53)
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- Democratic Palestine : 31 (ص 53)
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Chile
Verdict on Pinochet: No
On September 11, 1980, as Chileans were voting at gunpoint for a
so-called constitution, General Pinochet certainly didn’t expect what
would happen eight years later. The opposition had been reduced to
silence by seven years of bloody repression; the gaps in the economy
weren’t apparent yet; and he felt confident enough to accept the idea
of a referendum on his rule for the sake of «authoritarian
democracy». On October 5, 1988, the general’s dream was over. The
Chilean people were to vote Yes or No on giving Pinochet eight more
years as president, and with 54.68% voting No as opposed to 43.04%
voting Yes, the answer was clear.
In the beginning of the 80’s, the idea
of the referendum was unacceptable to
the opposition, mainly because it was
stipulated by a constitution which was
only seen as a tool for Pinochet to re-
main in power. When the economic
crisis reached its peak starting in 1981,
and a huge number of Chileans took to
the streets and participated in the pro-
testas, the opposition’s slogan was
«Democracy Now». Towards the end
of 1986, the protest movement lost
some of its strength and broadness as a
result of the repression. The Christian
Democratic Party, due to a new growth
of the economy from which it certainly
profited, started to distance itself from
mass actions, and was the first to break
the consensus within the opposition and
to announce that it would participate in
the referendum. Within the left, a
broad discussion about the relation
between mass activities and armed
struggle took place. Finally, in
February of this year, 13 parties agreed
on a platform calling for a mobilization
to vote No in the referendum. The
command for a No vote, as the alliance
was called, later grew to 16 parties and
represented a broad spectrum of the
opposition. Participation in the
referendum was seen as a possibility for
inflicting defeat on the military dic-
tatorship, by refuting its claims that the
majority of the Chilean people stand
behind it and its economic program,
and thereby denying it the legitimation
for staying in power. After a successful
campaign which simply outclassed
Pinochet’s_ well-financed effort, the
opposition was sure to win the
referendum. It managed to mobilize
enough forces inside and outside of
Chile to deter Pinochet from calling off
the referendum or from instigating a
coup and reinstating the state of
emergency, two options that certainly
came to the dictator’s mind when he
realized he would lose.
PINOCHET BALKS
It came as no suprise when Pinochet,
soon after the referendum, made it
clear that he has no intention of
respecting the will of the majority of
the people. Defying calls for his
resignation, he repeated that he and the
army are the guarantee «that neither
the spirit of the constitution nor its
content will be amended.» According to
the constitution, presidential and con-
gressional elections are to be held at the
end of 1989, and the new president is to
begin his term in March 1990, which
means that Pinochet will remain in
power for 17 more months. After this
period, he will remain commander in
chief of the army for at least four more
years. The constitution also stipulates
that the elected president would need
the consent of the military-dominated
National Security Council to make ma-
jor amendments to the constitution. All
this means that Pinochet would retain
enough power to veto any decision
taken by the parliament.
Within the opposition, the discussion
has started about the degree of changes
that can be achieved in the near future.
The agenda of the No Command in-
cludes the following:
1. Immediate negotiations to allow free
elections in the shortest time possible.
2. The withdrawal of the military from
politics.
3. Guaranteeing respect for human
rights.
4. An end to political bannings, and
reforming the constitution.
One of the most controversial issues
is that concerning negotiations with the
military. Parts of the armed forces were
not in favor of Pinochet’s candidacy,
and would have preferred a younger,
civilian-candidate, but for the sake of
unity, they finally backed him. It seems
unrealistic to expect them to mediate
between the opposition and Pinochet,
first of all because some of them, like
Admiral Merino, are at least as
fanatical anti-communists as Pinochet.
Moreover, an amendment to the con-
stitution reducing the role of the Na-
tional Security Council, as demanded
by the opposition, is against their in-
terests. The military has accepted that
local military officials were replaced by
civilian ones in the last weeks, but it
remains unclear whether they will
tolerate constitutional reforms.
The controversy within the Christian
Democratic Party about the tactic to be
adopted has become sharper. The youth
organization and the party’s left agree
that Pinochet has to resign as soon as
possible. The party’s conservative
presidium is not really interested in his
immediate resignation. For them, it is
enough to have some constitutional
reforms which will make a formal
democracy possible, without changing
the economic system. National
Renewal, the strongest right-wing par-
ty, has similar aims. Though it sup-
ported Pinochet during the campaign,
it distanced itself from him after his
defeat. Both parties’ declared aim of
pursuing Pinochet’s neoliberal
economic policy make their program
sound like «Pinochetism without
Pinochet». The 1985-87 macro-
economic concept implemented
by the dictatorship, with the full sup-
port of the international banking
system, has had a catastrophic impact
on the majority of the people. The 24%
increase in exports in 1987 was attained
at the price of further reducing con-
sumption and the interior market.
53 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 31
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