Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 7)
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- Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 7)
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and cause. The uprising has drawn international support and
awakened the conscience of the world. It will enable us to
achieve freedom and independence, in tandem with the efforts
and struggle of our people in exile, and the support of our
friends and allies on the regional and international levels.
TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE UPRISING
The Palestinian uprising continues to pose a series of ques-
tions. Some of these concern the political strategy of the
Palestinian national movement; others concern tactics,
slogans, compromises and political moves. During the last
year, the Palestinian arena has been preoccupied with direct
and tactical political questions related to the uprising, such as
the international conference, the prerequisites for its conven-
tion, the supportive Arab environment, the Algiers Summit
resolutions, Palestinian-Syrian relations, the evaluation of the
Egyptian position, the status of UN resolutions, the European
position on the Palestinian-US dialogue, etc.
Of course, these are important questions to which we were
required to give answers. Otherwise, in the absence of a
Palestinian role, the political arena would have been filled by
other players eagerly awaiting our banishment from the
political scene. We have previously stated our position on all
these matters, so there is no reason to repeat what has already
been said. Rather, the subject to be specifically discussed is
related to the strategic questions raised by the uprising, such
as: How shall we crystallize the theoretical framework upon
which our political positions and slogans are based? Is it true
that we have succeeded in creating the theory of the uprising?
Have we created its ideological framework? How shall we link
tactics and strategy, politics and theory?
Our response to these questions must be negative. The
Palestinian and Arab organizations and intellectuals are still
preoccupied with examining daily events and very far from
deriving theories for the uprising. In spite of our conviction in
the importance of immediate tactics and political thinking, our
loyalty to the uprising and its repercussions requires efforts to
formulate the theory of the uprising, and to discuss its strategic
direction. For example, is it enough, when examining the ef-
fects of the uprising on the Zionist society, to confine ourselves
to the number of seats and votes gained by the peace camp? Or
to monitor Israeli leaders’ statements which recognize the
Palestinian people’s rights to repatriation, self-determination
and, maybe, an independent state and, maybe, the need for
dialogue with the PLO? Is this really sufficient? In fact, the
uprising has posed questions about Israel’s ability to absorb
the results of the 1967 war, and consequently questions about
the Israeli theory of expansionism, settlement-building and
security; it has shaken the fundaments of Zionist ideology and,
for the first time ever, seriously posed the possibility of
destroying these fundaments.
Has not the uprising posed the question of the Israeli future
and demographic destiny more seriously than ever before? In
response, some have spoken of the need for Israel to withdraw
from densely populated areas, which would mean the beginn-
ing of the defeat of the Zionist project as a whole. Others have
emphasized the need to resort to transfer (of the Palestinians),
which would lead to other problems, not confined to the Mid-
Democratic Palestine, March 1989
dle East. Let’s not forget the question related to the future of
the Zionist project. What does the formation of an indepen-
dent Palestinian state mean for the Zionist plan of expansion
and settlement-building? Does it mean the beginning of the
final countdown for this scheme? Or will we be faced by a
miniature of the Zionist scheme? We must devote more time to
responding to these questions in line with our immediate goals.
On the other hand, did not the uprising pose important
questions related to the nature of the Palestinian national
movement, its forms of struggle, the changes in the degree of
influence exerted by its social forces? Did not the uprising pose
a question as to the crisis of the leadership and the alternative
to this crisis? Did not the uprising raise the problem of the
relationship between the struggle inside and outside of
Palestine, and about the revolution’s need for a supportive
base, and the strategic relationship with Jordan in terms of its
people? Did not the uprising pose a question concerning the
needed change in Palestinian political thinking and the actual
change in this after the uprising?
In fact, the uprising also raised the question of the crisis of
the Arab national liberation movement after the decline of the
official Arab policies and the adjustment to the Camp David
stage. It also accentuated the historical crisis of the Arab na-
tional bourgeoisie which controls the course of this movement.
The uprising also highlighted the crisis of the Arab revolu-
tionary alternative forces, including the Arab communist par-
ties, after their failure to benefit from the objective opportuni-
ty offered by the uprising to reawaken the Arab mass move-
ment and transform the Palestinian uprising into an Arab
uprising.
Did not the uprising expose all the faults of the Arab regimes
- their subordination, their repressive, anti-democratic nature,
their backwardness which has destroyed the structure of the
Arab society, turning it into a consumer market for the latest
technological inventions in weaponry and consumer goods,
serving only to keep these regimes in power?
This is only part of the many questions and strategic con-
cerns posed by the uprising. The organizations, leaders and
revolutionary intellectuals have a very important duty to start
offering scientific answers if we are truly faithful to the upris-
ing. This article cannot give answers for all these questions, but
rather aims to encourage attempts to arrive at theories for this
turning point.
A NEW STAGE
Since the first month of the uprising, two points-of-view
have crystallized in the Palestinian arena concerning this
qualitative phenomenon. The first point-of-view is that which
governed the positions of the bourgeois trend, and its policies
in the revolution and the PLO. The advocates of this view also
included some of the democratic forces and individuals. This
trend strives for realizing quick political gains from the upris-
ing. The positions taken by this trend reflect the Palestinian
bourgeoisie’s lack of faith in the masses on the one hand. On
the other hand, some of the democratic forces have become
impatient, fearing that the uprising will end without having
produced any gains. >
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- Democratic Palestine : 32
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