Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 8)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 8)
- المحتوى
-
The second point-of-view dealt with the uprising as a
qualitatively new stage in the Palestinian national struggle,
considering that it could establish a qualitatively new stage for
the Arab national liberation movement. This view does not
belittle the need for striving to make political gains from the
uprising. It advocates striving to open new Strategic horizons to
enable the uprising to create the needed change in the nature,
structure and role of the Palestinian national liberation
movement. This would prepare for changes in the nature,
structure and role of the Arab national liberation movement,
in order to overcome its crisis.
Some have evaluated our call to deal with the uprising as a
qualitatively new stage, as a kind of revolutionary romanticism
and a tendency towards the strategic at the expense of im-
mediacy and tactics. But our view differs totally from this
mistaken evaluation. We remain convinced that the value of
tactical or interim slogans lies in their ability to shorten the
distance to the strategic aims. There is a vast difference bet-
ween dealing with the uprising as an event to be utilized under
all circumstances, and dealing with the uprising as a
qualitatively new stage which will make needed changes in the
nature of the Arab-Zionist conflict and its motive forces on the
Arab-Palestinian front. We are still convinced that the ideal
realization of our aims, even in immediate slogans, involves
dealing with the uprising as a qualitatively new stage, because
in this way we can best support the uprising.
Why do we believe that the uprising constitutes a
qualitatively new stage? What are the conditions for
transforming the uprising into a qualitatively new stage in the
Palestinian and Arab struggle? In this article, I will try to
answer these questions.
FEATURES OF THE UPRISING
Three major features have made the uprising a qualitatively
new Stage in the Palestinian-Zionist and Arab-Zionist conflict;
they give us confidence that the uprising can constitute the
beginning of a qualitatively new stage in the Arab national
liberation movement.
1. THE CENTER OF GRAVITY SHIFTS TO
PALESTINE
The first feature is that for the first time since the establish-
ment of Israel, the center of gravity of the Palestinian
national movement has shifted to inside Palestine. After 1948,
only 170,000 of our people remained in Palestine, and no one
mentioned them when speaking of the balance of power. No
one paid attention to the role of this minority living on their
land in the midst of the Zionist majority who were celebrating
their victories, meanwhile viewing the remaining Palestinians
with suspicion and hostility. The main concern of this minority
was self-defense and guaranteeing the minimum necessities of
life. Meanwhile, the Palestinians outside the 1948 occupied
territories were facing conspiracies to obliterate, disperse and
confiscate their national identity. The Palestinian national
movement was in exile and was absorbed into the Arab na-
tional movement - Nasserism, the Baath Party, the Arab Na-
tionalist Movement, the Arab communist movement and the
6
Islamic fundamentalist movements which began to appear at
that time.
From 1948 until the June 1967 defeat, the Palestinian na-
tional movement had not emerged as an influential force in the
area, despite the beginning of the nationalist reawakening and
the feeling that it was necessary to restore the Palestinian na-
tional identity in the late 1950s. The roots of the reawakening
had always been there, as seen in the attempts to infiltrate back
into Palestine. Some of the events which contributed to this
national reawakening were the Israeli attempt to divert the
course of the Jordan River, Syria’s withdrawal from the
United Arab Republic (with Egypt) and the victory of the
Algerian revolution in 1961. In this period, the center of gravi-
ty was embodied in Nasserism. The masses attached their
hopes to Nasser. For all these reasons, the issue of the struggle
inside Palestine, as opposed to the struggle outside, did not ex-
ist.
After 1967, around 40% of the Palestinian people fell under
occupation. It was no longer a question of a small minority,
but involved vast sectors of our masses. Consequently, a new
question arose to be solved by the Palestinian national move-
ment. This was parallel to the defeat of the Arab nationalist
regimes and the frustration of the Arab masses with the
slogans propagated during this period, as well as the emergence
of the Palestinian national movement as a center of gravity in
the area.
It is true that the national reawakening’s roots date back to
the 1950s, and the militant Palestinian organizations were
established in the 1960s, which together began a qualitatively
new stage towards crystallizing the Palestinian national identi-
ty and an independent center for our people. However, it is
also true that the failure of the Arab national bourgeoisie’s
program, as exposed by the June defeat, played a prominent
role in the establishment of the contemporary Palestinian
revolution and in the great national reawakening of the
Palestinian movement.
When speaking of this period, we cannot but mention the
earlier instincts about the importance of the struggle inside
Palestine, as was manifested in the first attempts by the
Palestinian organizations to assert themselves in the interior by
sending weapons, cadres, fighters and leaders into the occupied
territories. In this, they were able to benefit from the relative
weakness of the new occupation, and from the potentials of-
fered by the armed Palestinian presence in Jordan. This en-
abled infiltration into Palestine before the occupation
authorities had tightened their control through population
registration and security measures.
The early nationalist consciousness came up against many
obstacles, the most important of which were: (1) the total
security measures enacted by the occupation to stop infiltration.
attempts, leading to the arrest and expulsion of scores of
cadres and leaders, and hundreds of militants; and (2) the
spontaneity which characterized the movement of cadres and
weapons into Palestine, due to our lack of experience and
organization. This led to the failure of early attempts to con-
solidate the base of the revolution inside Palestine. The objec-
tive conditions of that period ruled out big achievements on
this level. .
Democratic Palestine, March 1989 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 32
- تاريخ
- مارس ١٩٨٩
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed