Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 9)
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- Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 9)
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However, the new situation after the June 1967 defeat,
coupled with our effective presence in Jordan, enabled us to
struggle against the Zionist enemy on a wider scale with many
small military operations. This had a tremendous effect in
restoring the confidence of our people in the armed struggle
and people’s war, especially after the heroic battles of Al
Karameh, Al Wahdat and the Jordan Valley. Our effective
presence in Jordan had a dual impact on the issue of the rela-
tion between the struggle inside Palestine (the interior) and the
struggle outside it (the exterior). On the one hand, the presence
of the bulk of the revolution’s forces outside Palestine provid-
ed an objective alternative for presence in Palestine. This in
itself led to lack of concern about transfering the center of the
revolution to the interior. On the other hand, preoccupation
with defending the Palestinian armed resistance against the
enemy plans for liquidating it, led to the dissipation of a major
part of our potentials, weakening our efforts to transfer the
movement to the interior. This applies especially to the battle
between the Jordanian regime and the Palestinian resistance,
which terminated the state of dual power (September 1970-July
1971).
This stage ended in July 1971 with the departure of the
Palestinian fighters from Ajloun and Jerash, and the transfer
of the revolution, its leaders, forces, organizations and institu-
tions to Lebanon. The center of gravity of the Palestinian na-
tional movement shifted to Lebanon, where the leadership’s
preoccupation with defending the second base of the revolu-
tion, and with the Lebanese arena, led to insufficient concen-
tration on occupied Palestine. This preoccupation was
necessitated by the Palestinian-Lebanese alliance and joint
struggle against the Zionist - rightist front. This situation con-
tinued until 1982, and in that period, the PLO was able to im-
pose the Palestinian presence in the constellation of forces,
because of its effective presence in Lebanon and continuous
confrontation of the Zionist enemy and its agents. Conse-
quently, the political successes of the PLO constituted a prac-
tical substitute for serious, organized efforts to move the center
of gravity into Palestine.
At this time, the mass situation in the occupied territories
rose and fell in accordance with the developments in the
Palestinian arena outside; the mass movement did not possess
clear-cut and mature subjective conditions. However, there
was a move in this direction due to the democratic forces’ ef-
fective role which was geared to the development and the
socioeconomic structure of the Palestinian society under oc-
cupation. Other factors contributing to this were the minimal
influence of the policies of individualism and hegemony (of a
single group) which affected the Palestinian revolution outside,
and the relative absence of the Arab regime’s interference.
Finally, and most importantly, was the masses’ experience of
direct confrontation with the occupation over the years.
Because of all these factors, it was natural for the base of the
revolution to be consolidated in Palestine, and to increase mass
activities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially in the
decisive confrontation of the occupation’s plans and the at-
tempts of the Jordanian regime to create false alternatives to
the PLO... The Palestinian revolution prepared for and
created the objective base for these activities via political,
Democratic Palestine, March 1989
military and material support to the masses in the occupied
territories. The confrontation of the attempts at political li-
quidation contributed to increasing the role of the masses in
the interior, and to making the revolution give greater priority
to the interior.
But the overriding characteristic of the pre-1982 period was
the revolution’s strong presence in Lebanon. Moreover, at that
time, the deterioration of the official Arab situation had not
yet reached its current low level. The center of gravity of the
Palestinian national movement was in the exterior at the ex-
pense of the interior, even though the interior had begun to oc-
cupy a more important place both in the Palestinian strategy
and in the enemy’s strategy against our revolution.
The stage which followed the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
was characterized by a set of facts which contributed to
enhancing the importance of the occupied land in the Palesti-
nian strategy for confronting the Zionist occupation.
The first of these facts was the weakness of the second base
of the revolution due to the results of the Zionist invasion and
the departure of the Palestinian fighters to new places of exile.
In this light, it seemed that Palestinian military action had suf-
fered another setback which would have tangible effects on the
equation of the interior and the exterior. This impression was
reinforced by ensuing developments as the Palestinian revolu-
tion faced a chain of camp wars aimed at finishing what the
Israeli invasion had begun, i.e., to put an end to Palestinian
armed presence in Lebanon once and for all.
The second of these facts was the weakness of Palestinian
national unity and the split in the PLO which lasted from May
1983 until the unifying PNC in 1987. This problem emerged
due to deviationist tendencies on the one hand, and adventurist
nihilist tendencies on the other; it was coupled with unparallel-
ed political tension between Syria and the PLO, which rein-
forced the split whose influence is still felt in the Palestinian
arena.
The third of these facts was the decline of the official Arab
policy, and the diminshing importance of the Palestinian cause
on the Arab political scene which was preoccupied with a set of
regional conflicts: the Gulf war, the Lebanese crisis, the
Maghreb conflict, Egypt’s continued adherence to the Camp
David accords, etc. This culminated in the Amman Summit
which reinforced the collective Arab evasion of the Baghdad
Summit’s decisions concerning Camp David and the boycott of
the Egyptian regime. The aim of all this was to restore Egypt’s
position in Arab officialdom as it was apparent that the op-
ponents of Camp David had become very few in number.
There is no doubt that the extraordinary summit in Amman
aimed to minimize the PLO’s role in favor of King Hussein and
his policies for subordinating the Palestinian cause.
In the light of all this, the masses in the occupied territories
had two options: either to submit to the capitulationist trend,
or to take the initiative and play their required role in keeping
alive the flame of the revolution and the national cause. The
rise in mass action in 1986-87 was a signal that the masses
chose to escalate the struggle, leading to the uprising. We
should also point out that after 1982, the Palestinian leadership
concentrated more on the interior in order to compensate for - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 32
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