Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 10)
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- Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 10)
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the weakness of the second base of the revolution, and reacting
to the new state of exile and dispersion. This strengthened the
subjective conditions of the Palestinian national movement.
From 1982 to 1987, there was a revival of the mass movements
- workers, students, women, voluntary work committees, etc.,
despite all the problems they faced, such as splits, secondary
conflicts and the emergence of the (Islamic) fundamentalist
trend.
Meanwhile, a set of objective conditions were building up,
chiefly the unbearable conditions imposed by the occupation
on our masses. This, combined with the crystallization of the
Palestinian subjective conditions, created the uprising. With
the uprising’s having continued for a year and all the gains it
has made, it is clear that the center of gravity of the Palestinian
national movement has begun to shift to the occupied ter-
ritories. By the center of gravity, we do not mean the Palesti-
nian leadership and the institutions of the PLO. According to
their nature and role, these will remain in the exterior. Rather,
we mean that the frontline with the enemy has shifted into
Palestine. We also mean the transformation of the Palestinian
cities, villages and camps into battlefields against the occupa-
tion on a daily basis. In the battles with the occupation forces,
the United National Leadership of the Uprising has succeeded
in leading the people more successfully than has ever happened
before. On the other hand, the occupation still controls the
land. The day will come when the uprising will gain control of
the people and the land; at that time, the dawn of freedom and
independence will be at hand.
THE INTERNAL BALANCE OF FORCES
At the beginning of this article, we criticized the point-of-
view which is trying to realize quick gains from the uprising,
and posing only tactical questions. In fact, this is just another
version of the point-of-view which for many years regarded the
occupied territories as the «backyard» of the Palestinian
decision-making center in the exterior, remembering the oc-
cupied territories only when the center was besieged or beset by
conspiracies. At the same ttiae, this trend regarded
developments in the occupied territories with a degree of anx-
iety, for they might reverse the balance of forces in the PLO
-the «equation of the exterior» (which does not allot represen-
tation to all organizations on the basis of their actual degree of
activity and influence ca the mass level).
Despite all the channels connecting the occupied territories
with the exterior, the interior remained relatively free of the
direct influence of the «exterior equation» just as it was
relatively removed from the harmful influence of the Arab
regimes. Moreover, a set of social and economic transforma-
tions have occurred in the occupied territories. These constitute
new objective conditions conducive to the rise of the
democratic forces in the course of the daily battles against the
occupation. This has consolidated the role of the democratic
forces to the point that the unjust «exterior equation» no
longer applies to the interior. The mass struggle has shown that
there is a new balance of forces on the ground, which should
impose itself on the decision-making center and have an in-
fluence in defining the overall course of the Palestinian na-
tional movement.
8
The problem of the «equation of the exterior» is one of the
reasons for the failure of the pre-1982 efforts to establish the
Palestinian National Front in Palestine, and for mistakes in
directing the union, student and women’s movements. This
«equation of the exterior» may explain the attempts to spread
the ways of individualism, domination (of the single organiza-
tion) and corruption. Some insist on imposing the «exterior
equation» on the interior whenever there are serious discus-
sions about unifying the mass movements in the occupied ter-
ritories.
There are still some who resent dealing with the fact that the
center of gravity has shifted to the interior. They are ready to
use the same methods that have been used in the exterior, in
order to control the movement and political decision-making.
The critical issue is that some are dealing with the uprising as
an «emergency issue.» Of course, it is an urgent issue, but we
should primarily deal with it as a qualitatively new stage for
consolidating the revolution. We can understand that the
Palestinian bourgeoisie is dealing with the uprising as if it were
an «emergency». However, we cannot understand that some of
the democratic forces are falling into the same trap, confining
themselves to tactical and interim questions, while neglecting
the future of the Palestinian national movement. Loyalty to
the uprising imposes strategic, tactical and interim tasks on us.
Finding answers to these questions will lead us to serious
discussion of how to overcome the crises of the Palestinian and
Arab national movements.
2. ACCENTUATION OF THE
PALESTINIAN—ZIONIST CONFLICT
The second feature of the uprising is that the Arab-Zionist
conflict has assumed the character of a Palestinian-Zionist
conflict, occurring in the framework of the overall struggle
between the Arab nation and the Zionist enemy. Obviously, the
pre-1948 struggle against the Zionist invasion of Palestine was
in its essence a Palestinian-Zionist conflict. The Palestinian
people were facing the Zionist settlers who depended on the
support of the British Mandate. This did not minimize the im-
portance of Arab participation in confronting this invasion, as
was apparent in the continuous waves of Arab volunteers to
the war for Palestine. However, we cannot overlook the
negative influence of Arab reactionary interference in Palesti-
nian internal affairs. The reactionary regimes played a major
role in aborting the great Palestinian revolt in 1936-39, and
then in squandering Palestine with the scenario orchestrated by
Prince Abdullah who led the Arab armies that entered
Palestine in 1948.
From 1948 until 1967, the nature of the conflict was an
Arab-Zionist struggle, with the total absence of an independent
Palestinian national role. All the attempts to create a Palesti-
nian national center failed to make any serious change in the
nature of the struggle, because the Arab national dimension
predominated over the Palestinian national dimension which
was exposed to obliteration, dissipation and confiscation. In
spite of the rise of the Palestinian revolution after the 1967
war, the struggle against Israel remained confined to the Arab-
Zionist framework, especially after the 1973 war, and until
1982, when the Palestinian revolution, alongside the Lebanese
Demccratic Palestine, March 1989 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 32
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