Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 12)
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- Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 12)
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enemy until the uprising moved the Arab-Zionist conflict to a
qualitatively new stage.
The uprising began, and for the first time in forty years, it
was the war of our masses, not the classical war of the Arab
armies and regimes. It was also not the war of vanguards and
revolutionary groups alone. For the first time, the struggle
against the Zionist enemy acquired a comprehensive and
distinguished popular nature. It is a fact that the Palestinian
masses have suffered most from the defeat and weakness of
Arab officialdom. Our masses, especially under occupation,
had truly despaired of the Arab demagogy. From their own
experience, they discovered that all these lies and claims led to
nothing but Camp David that is now spreading in the area.
After the results of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the
weakness of the revolution’s second base, and official Arab
negligence towards the PLO, the masses sensed the direct
threat to their national cause and the future of their legitimate
struggle. Consequently, they rose in revolt with their collective
will and consciousness, rejecting surrender and presenting an
example for the Arab masses of how to confront Camp David
and its consequences in the area.
It is no exaggeration to say that the popular nature of the
uprising has elicited the fears of the Arab regimes. This makes
them assume the role of spectators, if not conspirators against
the uprising. The lesson drawn by the generation of the upris-
ing can spread in the area. At that time, the stones of the upris-
ing will ring the alarm bells in more than one Arab capital.
As we have said, the Palestinian uprising is a qualitatively
new Stage in the history of the Palestinian national struggle. It
will have a great impact on the strategy, major forces and
social structure of the Palestinian national movement. It will
also have irreversible interim and strategic effects. As such, the
uprising provides an objective opportunity for the Arab na-
tional liberation movement to enter a qualitatively new stage.
The preceding stage, from Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, was the
stage of Camp David. It has become clear that Camp David is
not simply a legal framework for organizing bilateral relations
between the Zionist entity and the Egyptian regime. Camp
David is actually a social, political, economic and historical
process aimed to end the Arab-Zionist conflict at the expense
of our people’s interests and those of the Arab nation. It aims
to reinforce the subordination of the Arab regimes to im-
perialism, so that they ally with Israel in confronting the Arab
mass movement, having surrendered to the humiliating
conditions of Washington and Tel Aviv.
In confronting this capitulatory process, we notice that the
Arab regime’s response was insufficient to counter the enemy’s
strategy. The form and instruments of confrontation were only
tactical - the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, the Arab
People’s Conference, the National Charter and the Baghdad
Summit aimed at isolating Camp David. Today, a decade
afterwards, what did this achieve? Are the Arab regimes still
serious about rejecting the Camp David regime in Egypt, and
the Camp David accords?
Our response to this question is based on a scientific assess-
ment of the results of this painful experience, i.e., the failure of
these forms and frameworks in most cases. The decision taken
at the Amman Summit, to end the boycott of the Camp David
10
regime, is the prime example. It is not unthinkable that the
Egyptian president will be welcomed at the next Arab summit.
This signifies the decline of the Arab regimes and their inability
to protect themselves from the Zionist enemy’s aggression, or
to seriously resist its plans. Moreover, the Arab regimes have
taken part in efforts to contain the Palestinian cause, to abort
the uprising and liquidate our people’s rights. Without the
uprising, these regimes would have appeared to be the
spearhead of the confrontation, marginalizing the Palestinian
role as they moved to do in the Amman Summit...
The Palestinian uprising against the fascist enemy has
presented the objective opportunity for the Arab national
liberation movement and the Arab masses to overcome this
dilemma and open a new stage of serious and comprehensive
confrontation of the Camp David stage. The objective condi-
tions for overcoming this crisis have existed for a long time,
but the uprising highlighted the depth of this crisis. However,
objective conditions are not sufficient, but must be combined
with mature subjective conditions in order to overcome this
crisis and begin a qualitatively new stage.
The Arab bourgeoisie which led the liberation movement for
more than half a century has become impotent and bankrupt.
What is needed is a revolutionary alternative to meet the re-
quirements of the new stage, and work for establishing a new
Arab revolutionary movement. The weapons of criticism,
review and evaluation of our experience are the point of depar-
ture for this historical process. We should adopt a new vision
in view of the new international and regional developments, as
a prerequisite for launching this new revolutionary movement.
What is needed in the Arab arena is needed in the Palestinian
arena as well. The Palestinian left, including its main forces
and trends, should rise to meet the challenge of this
qualitatively new stage, and not be satisfied with engaging only
in the tactical questions of the uprising. The left must pose the
real questions of the uprising in order to guarantee scientific
responses. It is the left, and not the Palestinian bourgeoisie,
that is expected to move the uprising into a qualitatively new
stage. We are deeply convinced that the PLO should, objec-
tively speaking, be moving in this direction. There is a sharp
contradiction between the minimal concessions the Palestinian
bourgeoisie is willing to give, and the maximal concessions
which the Arab regimes want the PLO to make, in order to in-
corporate it in their plans. Still, we cannot but hold the
Palestinian left responsible for moving the uprising to a
qualitatively new stage.
In conclusion, it is time to stop repeating the terms of crisis
and difficulties which the Palestinian and Arab liberation
movements have faced. It is time to start charting the course
for overcoming this crisis. I am not being unfair to anyone
when I say that those who have acknowledged this crisis are
responsible, more than all others, for starting this work; of
course, this includes ourselves. This is the most essential issue
raised by the uprising, from among the many important and
strategic questions it has highlighted. We must crystallize the
theoretical and ideological framework for our political prac-
tice, and for the uprising itself. This is the challenge to all par-
ties, organizations and intellectuals, to search for scientific
answers to these questions. ®
Democratic Palestine, March 1989 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 32
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- مارس ١٩٨٩
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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