Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 25)

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عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 25)
المحتوى
restricted to the military sphere. Rather it shaped virtually all
spheres of society. A total examination of the internal structure
of ‘Israel’ could easily fill a book. Here we will focus on some
aspects which qualify ‘Israel’ to serve as a de facto US military
base, nuclear partner, local CIA station and RDF in the Middle
East.
THE ‘LEGAL’ FRAMEWORK
‘Israel’ is perhaps the only state in the modern world which
is permanently without a constitution. In 1950, the constituent
assembly dropped the idea of a constitution altogether and
turned itself into the Knesset which subsequently passed seven
basic laws, which it refused to formalize as a constitution. Ac-
cording to Zionist apologists, this was due to disagreement
between the religious and non-religious forces, the ‘socialists’
and anti-socialists, and the difficulties of reconciling the func-
tion of the World Zionist Organization, as a suprastate in-
stitution, with the actual Jewish community in Palestine. While
these factors surely played a role, the reason given by Labor
Party deputy, A. Bar Rav Hai, was more to the point: «The
constitution is created for that population which was in ex-
istence within the borders of a state. Ours is a different situa-
tion. Our population is fluid...» (quoted in Israel in the Middle
East, edited by Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz,
1984).
Besides leaving open the size of the state, the lack of a con-
stitution has sweeping implications for the Israeli legal and
political system. The Knesset can literally adopt any law. As
stated by Shulamit Alon, member of the Knesset for the
Citizens Rights Party, «the Knesset majority can legislate ex-
traterritorial laws, in defiance of international law, and create
different legal systems for Arabs and Jews, and it does so in
the occupied territories» (Jerusalem Post, May 5, 1987, in an
article where Alon cites the Israeli failure to ever adopt a bill of
rights). As it is, by referring to article 9 of the Law and Ad-
ministration Ordinance enacted by the Provisional Council of
State on May 19, 1948, the government can pass emergency
regulations which change or cancel any existing laws. This
enables it to dissolve the Knesset, make a new election law,
hold new elections with the new Knesset ratifying the
emergency laws.
Obviously, the Palestinians have borne the brunt of Israeli
unconstitutionality. Those remaining in the state were subject
to military rule until 1966, and are still subject to selective ap-
plication of the 1945 Emergency Laws by the Israeli police.
West Bank Palestinians live under the onus of about 1,200
military decrees (Gazans under 900), in addition to the
Emergency Laws. Theoretically, the lack of basic democracy in
‘Israel’ also threatens Jewish citizens. This is inherent in the
original Zionist doctrine, as spelled out most clearly by
Joachim Prinz in Wir Juden, written in the 1930s: «Only a
state based on the principle of the purity of the nation and the
race can possibly endow dignity and honor on (and only on)
those Jews who themselves ascribe to this principle amongst
Democratic Palestine, March 1989
their own people» (quoted in Uri Davis, Israel: An Apartheid
State, 1987, p.2).
MARGINS OF DEMOCRACY
The limits of democracy for Israeli Jews are seldom exposed
due to the high degree of cohesion among the settler population
in the face of the common enemy. In fact, there is an impres-
sion of lively political debate in Israeli life. Yet the tendency to
curtail basic freedoms is ever present, and even non-violent
protest that touches the fundamentals of Zionism can be sup-
pressed on the pretext that it is tantamount to colluding with
the enemy.
One of the original members of the Israeli Supreme Court,
which decides cases without reference to a constitution or bill
of rights, came out against the right to strike, claiming this is
unnecessary in a «welfare state» where the government is
responsible for all (sic), and especially in a state that needs to
compete on the foreign market. In 1980, Chief of Staff Rafael
Eitan proposed lower wages and a ban on strikes to deal with
the Israeli financial crisis (Haaretz, June 3, 1980). Indeed, in
June 1984, the cabinet used the emergency regulations to break
a strike by television journalists, so election campaign broad-
casts could begin. On June 26, 1980, Haaretz reported the
emergency plan of General Beni Peled, former air force com-
mander: «to save Israel from its present dilemma. He stated
that if he were prime minister he would ask the president for
permission to dismiss the Knesset and all the parties... He
would then appoint an interim government which would
restructure Israel in a more centralized, less parliamentary
fashion. His foreign policy goals include annexing Lebanon up
to the Litani River and the option of transferring the ‘human
potential’ from the West Bank to Jordan.» The subsequent
invasion ot Lebanon showed that such thinking was not far
removed from the mainstream of Israeli politics. So did a
February 1981 poll, where 40.8% of Israelis said they felt a
strong regime of leaders who were not dependent on the parties
was justified to deal with the problems the country was facing
(reported in Journal of Palestine Studies 43, Spring 1982).
In September 1984, at a time when Israeli parliamentarians
and democratic forces were protesting settler violence against
the Palestinians, the military coordinator for the 1967 occupied
territories, Shmuel Goren, said he wouldn’t hesitate to stop
activities by Israeli parties in the territories «which might affect
general order.» A study reported in New Outlook in July 1986,
found that 24% of Israeli Jews would deny Israeli Arabs the
right to vote; 57% would disenfranchise Zionist Jews favoring
the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip under the PLO’s leadership; and 70% would disen-
franchise all non-Zionist Jews favoring a Palestinian state.
During the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and its aftermath,
several Israelis were fired from their jobs because they pro-
tested the war, and the Histadrut did nothing to defend them.
A legal precedent was set when a peace activist, Gideon Spiro,
was convicted on April 18, 1986, for publicly criticizing >
23
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Democratic Palestine : 32
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