Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 34)
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- Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 34)
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Nabih Berri for the Amal movement,
Abbas Mousawi for Hezballah, and the
foreign ministers of Syria and Iran. The
essence of this agreement was ending
the state of war, providing for a cease-
fire and the return of residents who fled
their homes during the fighting. Amal
and Hezballah agreed to form a joint
coordination committee and a joint
Operations room to _ coordinate
resistance against the Israeli occupa-
tion. They also agreed not to endanger
the lives of the UN troops or the per-
sonnel of international organizations
present in the South. According to the
agreement, Amal is in charge of securi-
ty in the South, but each party has the
right to its own political and cultural
activities.
Once again, the «no winner, ne
loser» formula prevailed as has so often
been the case in resolving clashes in
Lebanon. Amal’s conditions were met
as were those of Hezballah. The alleged
killers of three Amal leaders last
autumn will be turned over to Amal
that also gained charge of security in
the South and Hezballah’s withdrawal
from the areas they moved into in the
latest round of fighting. On the other
hand, Hezballah will have their detain-
ed members released, the siege lifted
from their positions, and the right to
resist the Zionist occupation from the
South.
If implemented, this agreement
would enable the two parties to unite
efforts against the Zionist occupation
and its agents in the South. This would
also open the possibility for better
cooperation with the Palestinian
resistance in the struggle against oc-
cupation, and provide more security for
the residents of the South. On the other
hand, failure to abide by this agreement
will lead to the continuation of un-
justified bloodshed and prolong the
sufferings of the masses.
CONFLICT IN EAST BEIRUT
In view of the Arab League efforts to
find a solution in Lebanon, General
Aoun has been especially intent on
presenting himself and his part of the
Lebanese Army, as the sole authority in
East beirut and the surrounding area
controlled by the rightist Christian
militias. Thus, he hoped to improve his
chances of becoming president of all of
32
Lebanon. In the process of trying to
impose his control over the militias,
Aoun involved himself in a power
struggle with the most powerful of
these, the rightist Lebanese Forces, led
by Samir Geagea. This triggered a new
intersectarian battle in East Beirut in
the second week of February. In bloody
clashes that left 76 dead and 200
wounded, Aoun’s army gained the up-
per hand; the general accepted a cease-
fire on the condition that the Lebanese
Forces withdraw from East Beirut’s
streets and government facilities. In late
February, the Lebanese Forces were
reportedly replaced by Aoun’s troops in
the Sth basin of Beirut’s port from
which the Lebanese Forces had derived
their main income by collecting
customs duties in lieu of the Lebanese
state; a number of checkpoints where
the Forces had collected illegal taxes
were also withdrawn from.
This enables Aoun to claim that he
has reinstated state control in a
«amilitia-free» East Beirut, in order to
enter into an administrative reunifica-
tion of Beirut, whereby he would aim at
disarming the Lebanese national
movement and the Palestinian
resistance in West Beirut and other
patriotic areas.
This scenario does not, however,
mean that there has been a decisive
break between Aoun and Geagea. Both
need the other in their common cam-
paign against Syrian presence in
Lebanon, which is really just another
expression for their aim to eliminate the
Lebanese nationalist and progressive
force, and block any real reform of the
sectarian system from which the
Maronite bourgeoisie draws _ its
privileges. The joint committee formed
between Aoun and Geagea actually ac-
cords the Lebanese Forces a recognized
status, alongside Aoun’s Lebanese
Army units. This impression was rein-
forced by Geagea’s declarations in early
March, that the Lebanese Forces will
not withdraw from East Beirut. There
are moreover reports that Aoun has
given the Lebanese Forces alternative
income sources to compensate for their
loss of the port.
RENEWED CIVIL WAR
Subsequent events made it quite clear
that Aoun, in concert with the Lebanese
forces, was ready to ignite a new war in
Lebanon, rather than accept political
reforms. In early March, Walid
Jumblatt, president of the Progressive
Socialist Party, a main force in the
Lebanese national movement, correctly
surmised that Aoun and Geagea were
only working to maintain their
privileged position in the sectarian
system. Jumblatt thus declared his in-
tention not to attend the meetings in
Kuwait, urging the Hoss government
and other nationalist forces to beware
of making concessions on the need for
political reform. Amal leader Nabih
Berri also expressed reservations about
the prospects of the talks.
On March 6th, ten days before the
talks in Kuwait were to convene, Aoun
ordered a blockade of all ports in
Lebanon except the one in East Beirut,
which he ccntrols. The nationalist
forces quite rightly regarded this as
tantamount to a declaration of war, for
it meant a de facto economic siege of
other parts of Lebanon, as all incoming
goods would be detoured to the East
Beirut harbor. In the following days,
the coast guard of Aoun’s government
impounded two tankers carrying fuel to
ports south of Beirut. At the same time,
artillery battles broke out between the
nationalist forces and Aoun’s Lebanese
Army on the frontlines at Souq Al
Gharb, in the mountains southeast of
Beirut. This fighting continued, and in
the following days, Aoun imposed the
closure of Beirut airport, further
escalating the crisis.
On March 14th, major artillery bat-
tles erupted between East and West
Beirut, judged to be the heaviest such
fighting in two years. Aoun confirmed
the seriousness of the situation by pro-
claiming the beginning of the battle to
drive the Syrian forces out of Lebanon.
As we go to press, the Arab League in-
itiative appears eclipsed by this new
round of war. However reasonable this
initiative may have been, events have
shown that resolving the conflict in
Lebanon will, in the last analysis,
always depend on the attitudes of the
conflicting Lebanese parties. If any one
of them says no, things will return to
point zero. It is now obvious that the
rightist forces in East Beirut have again
said no to political reform which is the
key to any solution of the crisis.
Democratic Palestine, March 1989 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 32
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