Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 36)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 32 (ص 36)
المحتوى
Windhoek: Protest against Botha’s visit to Namibia, April 1988
tinued to support UNITA, providing it
with extensive funds, weapons, training
and direct troop support.
With the coming to power of the
Reagan administration, support for
UNITA became open. The Clark
amendment, adopted by Congress in
1976 and forbidding open or covert
support for UNITA and other counter-
revolutionary groups, was suppressed
in 1985, and interference in Angola’s
affairs became the «legal» policy of the
US administration. J. Savimbi,
UNITA’s leader, visited the US, and
was welcomed there as a head of state
and granted extensive financial support
and modern armament.
Nevertheless, the initiative for a
negotiated settlement was taken by
Angola. In the middle of 1987, the
Angolan government went into a
military and diplomatic counteroffen-
sive. Angolan troops launched an of-
fensive against UNITA in the
southeastern part of the country. As
happened before, South African troops
intervened to help their puppet. At the
same time, in July 1987, the MPLA
resumed talks with the US, which had
previously been stopped because of the
US support for UNITA. The Angolan
government remained firm on its posi-
tion that the condition for Cuban
withdrawal from Angola was the in-
dependence of Namibia, because only
an independent Namibia could
guarantee Angola’s security and peace;
yet Angola was flexible concerning the
timing of such a withdrawal.
34
While certain progress was made in | ,y....
the US-Angolan discussion, South
Africa proved to be the biggest obstacle
to a peaceful solution. An Angolan-
Cuban proposal for a peaceful settle-
ment, presented in March 1988, was | ek
rejected by South Africa. The Pretoria
regime declared it was not ready to im-
plement resolution 435 and demanded
UNITA participation in the govern- | ;. |
ment of Angola. Some weeks later |< .
however, it changed its position, mak- |.) wae
ing possible the first round of negotia-
tions that took place between South
Africa, Angola, Cuba and the US on
May 3-4, 1988 in London.
Finally,
negotiations during which South Africa
repeatedly tried to link the timing of its
withdrawal from Namibia with that of |...
the Cubans from Angola, and to in-
clude UNITA participation
an agreement was reached in December
1988.
South Africa’s sudden willingness to
negotiate and to make compromises
stems from both internal and external
factors. The heavy military losses it
suffered in Angola in 1988 forced
South Africa to agree to a cease-fire
and withdraw its invasion troops. At
the same time, the half-hearted sanc-
tions of the Western countries, and the
costs of war and occupation, were
harder to cope with economically. Inter-
nal resistance against the policy of oc-
cupation, expressed by the growing
number of draft resisters, has increas-
after several months of |
in the |,
Angolan government in the settlement, b=
ed. Finally, the atmosphere prevailing
in world politics, the trend of replacing
military confrontations by negotiated
political settlements, certainly played a
role.
PERSPECTIVES
According to the timetable set by the
UN, South Africa is supposed to
withdraw all but 1,500 of its troops
from Namibia by June. Their place will
be taken by an international UN
peacekeeping force in charge of
overseeing the direct vote to a consti-
tuent assembly, due to take place on
Democratic Palestine, March 1989
هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 32
تاريخ
مارس ١٩٨٩
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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