Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 3)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 3)
- المحتوى
-
Why the US Talks to the PLO
the Camp David agreement which
stipulates «self-rule» as the solution for
the Palestine question. After a period
of three years, the PLO can participate
in the second phase of negotiations,
along with the Jordanian regime that
The Bush Aministration’s continuation of the dialogue begun by the
Reagan Administration with the PLO, though belated, shows that
such contacts have become a component of the US’s Middle East
policy under the impact of the uprising. With this in mind, one
should analyze the US’s motives in continuing this dialogue.
The second round of the US-
Palestinian dialogue, which took place
in Tunisia in March, did not produce
the desired result of breaking the
deadlock and paving the way for peace
negotiations. The Bush Administration
decided to continue talks with the PLO
following a waiting period of three
months. During the time between the
first and second meetings, the intifada
did not subside or slow down. Rather it
maintained its momentum despite the
escalation of Israeli repression. The
decision to hold a new round of talks,
like the US’s original decision to talk to
the PLO, was prompted by the in-
tifada, its escalation and the un-
precedented international support it has
galvanized for the Palestinian cause.
This in turn has isolated Israel and the
US which has continuously vetoed and
threatened to veto any UN Security
Council resolutions which condemn
Israeli brutality in the occupied ter-
ritories.
It is no surprise that the latest US-
PLO talks did not produce any tangible
results. The US Middle East policy did
not change substantially with the
changing of administrations. On the
eve of the second round of the US-PLO
dialogue, US Secretary of State James
Baker, speaking before a congressional
committee on foreign aid, reaffirmed
the US government’s opposition to a
Palestinian state, as well as its com-
mitment to the Camp David accords,
including the section on the Palesti-
nians, which calls for «self-rule» under
Israeli occupation, a plan very similar
to the bantustans created by South
Afrcia, and which has been em-
phatically rejected by the Palestinian
people.
The US does not recognize the PLO
as the sole legitimate representative of
the Palestinian people; nor does it
recognize their national rights of
repatriation, self-determination and the
establishment of an independent state.
Democratic Palestine, June 89
Why then does the US continue the
dialogue with the PLO? The answer to
this question lies in the US agenda for
the Tunis meetings and in _ the
statements of US officials.
Charles Redman, State Department
spokesman during the Reagan ad-
ministration, spelled out the three main
points which the US would stress in the
dialogue with the PLO. The second
meeting with the PLO confirmed that
the Bush Administration has not
changed the emphasis on these three
points:
First and foremost is the issue of
«terrorism.» By placing this issue at the
top of its agenda, the US is attempting
to kill two birds with one stone: putting
the PLO on the defensive in order to
limit its maneuverability, while
gradually transcending from renounc-
ing terrorism to a denunciation of any
kind of «violence,» i.e., the intifada; in
addition to asking the PLO to
cooperate with the CIA and FBI.
Secondly: The US intends to keep its
representation at these meetings at the
ambassadorial level.
Thirdly: The US views these talks as
a forum for presenting its point of
view vis-a-vis a settlement, rather than
for dialogue in the real sense of the
word.
The US’s preferred mechanism for
achieving a settlement is direct negotia-
tions. If there is to be an international
peace conference, then it should be a
prelude to direct negotiations. Fur-
thermore, such negotiations are to be
conducted between Israeli officials and
Palestinians from the 1967 occupied
territories rather than PLO officials.
The negotiations would ultimately lead
to the withdrawal of Israeli troops from
certain populated areas of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palesti-
nians would then be granted
«autonomy» within the framework of
continued Israeli military occupation;
this is in accordance with the section of
would be given the major role in runn-
ing the bantustan.
KISSINGER’S LEGACY
Although the uprising broke through
the 1975 ban on speaking to the PLO,
the basics of US Middle East policy
have not changed radically since Kiss-
inger’s step-by-step approach began
creating the conditions for Camp
David. By the early seventies, Israeli
military superiority was already con-
sidered of paramount importance in
this strategic area. Israel was increas-
ingly viewed as a strategic asset,
safeguarding the interests of US big
business by keeping the Arab na-
tionalist countries and forces in check.
Overall imperialist interests were
translated into a concrete policy where
virtually all Israeli positions were
deemed correct - an orientation that
encouraged Israeli aggression and in-
transigence over the years; meanwhile
US imperialism strove to extract con-
cessions unilaterally from the Arab
side. In the US’s geopolitical view, the
Palestinian liberation movement, the
PLO and, by extension, a potential
Palestinian state are viewed not only a
threats to Israel but as destabilizing
elements in the Middle East of
subservient oil monarchies which the
US aspires to maintain.
The continuity of the Kissinger
legacy is particularly apparent today
with Bush’s appointment of Brent
Scowcroft as national security adviser
and Lawrence Eagleburger as deputy
secretary of state; both have worked
closely with Kissinger in. government
and in his consulting firm. Here it is
relevant to recall Kissinger’s «con-
sultations» on the uprising. According
to the New York Times of March 6,
1988, he told US Jewish leaders at a
private gathering, «The insurrection
must be quelled immediately, and the
first step should be to throw out televi-
sion a la South Africa.» According to
him, the uprising should be suppressed
«brutally and rapidly.» Although US
officials do not say such things public- >»
3 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 33
- تاريخ
- يونيو ١٩٨٩
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed