Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 4)
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- Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 4)
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ly, the basic approach of the US from
the beginning of the uprising was to
give Israel time to deal with the upnis-
ing, i.e., to suppress it.
While some observers have chided
Bush for having no foreign policy due
to delays in presenting initiatives, this is
pure naivety or a willfull cover-up when
speaking of a president who has re-
juvenated the input of the National
Security Council and the CIA in the
decision-making process after the
fiascos of Irangate (in which Bush was,
incidentally, deeply involved). More
credible are those who forecast that the
Bush administration will be more
pragmatic and strategically oriented
than its predecessor. In order to avoid
such diplomatic non-starters as Shultz’s
ill-fated plan to abort the uprising in
1988, the Bush administration may rely
more on behind-the-scenes diplomacy
and promoting general trends rather
than specific initiatives. A paper entitl-
ed «Building for Peace» is reported to
be Bush’s handbook on the Middle
East. It was prepared by a group head-
ed by former Democratic presidential
candidate, Walter Mondale, and
Lawrence Eagleburger, and published
by the pro-Israeli Washington Institute
for Near East Policy in 1988. Its central
thesis is «conditioning the en-
vironment» by encouraging moderates,
and it endorses four principles which
don’t depart in essence from Camp
David. The US motivations in conduc-
ting a dialogue with the PLO can be
analyzed in this context.
Thus, in lieu of a stated US initiative,
we are witnessing the deliberately slow
pace of the dialogue aiming to pressure
the PLO, meanwhile working to get
pro-US Arab regimes to do the same.
UNILATERAL PRESSURE
The US is seeking to pressure the
PLO into modifying its policies
radically whereby it would no longer be
a revolutionary force leading the
Palestinian people to realize their aims.
Alternately, if the PLO resists this
pressure, the US will try to discredit it,
saying it is not ready for peace. This
point is crucial for the US plan to suc-
ceed. Since it is clearly impossible to
end the intifada, the US prefers to at
least circumvent the PLO in order to
select «suitable» Palestinian
negotiators from the occupied ter-
ritories, to liquidate the intifada
politically. It is in this light that the
4
meetings between Palestinians who are
considered PLO supporters and Israelis
from Labor, Likud and other Zionist
parties present adanger to the intifada’s
continuation. What is at stake here is
the importance of the PLO’s represen-
tation of the Palestinian people, which
is at the same time a symbol of the unity
of the Palestinian cause, and a
guarantee against partial solutions that
wouldn’t fulfill minimum Palestinian
rights. These meetings did not lead to
any positive change in the Israeli posi-
tion, but rather create illusions among
the Palestinian right and confusion
among the masses. As a result of inter-
nal discussions, these meetings were
stopped in March based on agreement
among Palestinians in the occupied
territories and the PLO’s_ public
declaration of its intent to stop them.
However, similar moves in the future
would give the US an added lever in its
attempts to pressure the PLO and abort
the intifada.
Concerning the question of «ter-
rorism,» the US position amounts to
outright blackmail, for its definition of
terrorism means not only spectacular
operations on the international scene,
but also any form of militant popular
struggle. Pressuring the PLO to stop
guerrilla warfare against the Zionist
occupation from South Lebanon aims
at relieving Israel of pressure on the
northern front so it can turn the full
force of its military against the masses
of the uprising. Their struggle is the
next target. This was the meaning of the
US call for the PLO to refrain from all
attacks on Israeli military and civilian
targets if it wants to continue the
dialogue. At the very least, the US aims
to halt the escalation of the uprising,
because it compounds Israel’s problems
now and, if continued, will force Israel
to the negotiating table from a position
of weakness in the future. Getting the
PLO to renounce «terrorism» is thus
not a formality to make it «acceptable»
but a lever for getting the PLO to whit-
tle down its aspirations and drop some
Palestinian rights in return for pro-
mises that the US is not forced to
deliver on, such as pressuring Israel to
ease repression.
Though US criticism of Israel during
the uprising has been unprecedented, it
has still only touched the tip of the
iceberg targeting the most blatant
Israeli atrocities because these harm
Israel’s international reputation. The
results of Shamir’s April visit to
Washington D.C. show that the US has
yet to contemplate any real pressure.
All the US statements about «reducing
tension» and «confidence-building
measures» were revealed to be directed
first and foremost at the PLO. Added
to this, the US launched a campaign to
block the State of Palestine from gain-
ing admission to UN agencies, beginn-
ing with the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO).
Shamir’s visit was prefaced by several
seemingly keynote US statements.
Baker had told Congress in mid-March
that Israel might have to talk to the
PLO or at least, as he later modified it,
this should not be ruled out. As Shamir
arrived in the US, Bush spoke of
«security for Israel, the end of the oc-
cupation and achievement of Palesti-
nian political rights» (Guardian, April
Sth). Nonetheless, Bush gave qualified
support to the plan presented by
Shamir for electing Palestinians in the
occupied territories to be negotiators,
provided that these elections are
«directly linked to a broader political
process that includes negotiating and
concluding an agreement on final status
(of the territories)» as Bush said Shamir
had assured him (International Herald
Tribune, April 7th). Since Shamir’s
plan gives no more leeway for Palesti-
nian demands than did Shultz’s a year
‘before, the US administration can be
quite sure it won’t lead to a broader
peace process. Once again, the US ap-
pears to be helping the Israeli govern-
ment to gain time, hoping it can sup-
press the uprising, or that the Palesti-
nians will tire out. In the meantime,
such plans aim mainly to create division
within the PLO and between it and the
people in the occupied territories.
In conclusion, the US-PLO dialogue,
though a gain of the uprising, is one
which must be used wisely in full
awareness of the US aims. This means
refraining from giving concessions that
will not be reciprocated, while
escalating the uprising to pressure the
US to recognize the Palestinian
people’s rights. It is the intifada itself
which brings the Palestinian people
closer to exercising their rights to
repatriation, self-determination and an
independent state. The US will begin to
recognize these rights as their in-
evitability becomes clear in the bat-
tlefield in occupied Palestine. @
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