Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 6)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 6)
- المحتوى
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All in all, what was seen in call no. 3 as a remote dream has
become a realistic possibility, after the Jordanian step.
The second qualitative step towards freedom and in-
dependence was the Palestinian National Council’s extraor-
dinary session in Algiers, and the historical decision it adopted
on November 15, 1988, to declare the independence of
Palestine and the establishment of the independent Palestinian
state. This was the logical culmination of the intifada, the rais-
ing of the slogan of freedom and independence, and the Jor-
danian decision. The declaration of independence was met by
broad Arab and international recognition and increasing sup-
port. This laid siege to the Zionist dreams of expansion, and
made the continued occupation of the Palestinian territories a
very expensive enterprise for which Israel pays the price in
terms of its international reputation in the international arena
and among Jewish communities abroad.
Today, the following questions are posed to the Palestinian
revolution, leadership, cadres and masses: How can we
transform national independence from a declaration to a reali-
ty? How can we bridge the gap which separates us from
establishing the Palestinian state on Palestinian land? To what
extent is there a realistic possibility of attaining full in-
dependence? What are the obstacles facing us and how can we
overcome them?
THE HISTORICAL POSSIBILITY AND THE
REALISTIC POSSIBILITY
Naturally, the slogan of freedom and independence was
prominent throughout the course of the Palestinian struggle
against the Zionist invasion and gradual occupation of
Palestinian land. The Palestinian people were governed by
colonial mandate authority when the first world war ended.
They were unable to attain political independence as did other
peoples in the area, because they were confronted by the
Zionist invasion which uprooted them and constructed a col-
onial entity on about 80% of their land in 1948. With the war
of 1967, Israel occupied the rest of the land and drove more
than half of the inhabitants into Arab and foreign countries
where they lived between the hammer of the Zionist occupation
and the anvil of the conspiracies of subordination, annexation
and the confiscation of their national identity. Although the
contemporary Palestinian revolution, led by the PLO, has until
now been unable to expell the occupation from any piece of
Palestinian land, still it revitalized the Palestinian identity and
the concept of national independence as the only acceptable
solution for the question of Palestine and the aim which we will
not relinquish.
In the two preceding decades, the Palestinian revolution has
experienced ups and downs; it has experienced conducive con-
ditions as well as obstacles, but never before was there a
realistic possibility of attaining independence and establishing
a state on our national land. Although each round of confron-
tation brought us closer to this cherished aim, still it remained
in the realm of historical possibility until the intifada erupted
to accentuate realities which the enemy had always worked to
negate. The uprising asserted to the world that Israel cannot
absorb the results of the 1967 war, and that the Palestinian
people will refuse any option that detracts from their legitimate
rights to their land and state, as enjoyed by other peoples of the
world, in accordance with international law.
The uprising proved to the world that the Palestinian
revolution is not a set of centers and offices which the Zionist
6
army can destroy and occupy as happened in 1982 in Lebanon.
Rather it is a living expression of the Palestinian people’s will
for survival and their yearning for freedom and independence.
The roots of the revolution in the occupied territories are no
less deep than in other areas. The struggle of the Palestinian
people will continue, using all available means until achieving
their aims. The outbreak of the intifada in the occupied ter-
ritories, its broad mass character and its use of strikes, stones
and molotovs as weapons, elicited great support for the
Palestinian cause. For the first time, the fascist face of Israel
was broadly exposed - a characteristic which Zionist and im-
perialist propaganda had tried to hide by lies and false allega-
tions. The Palestinian demand for freedom and independence
has now become more understood in the international arena
than ever before.
Monitoring European and American popular reactions to
the uprising, which have begun to influence governmental
positions in these imperialist centers, shows the extent of the
change in international public opinion in favor of our cause.
The same applies to Jewish communities around the world, as
well as to Jews in Israel where more are calling for dialogue
with the PLO or accepting a Palestinian state in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, especially after the Jordanian decision which
reinforced the independent Palestinian option. However, we
also realize that the uprising has created a situation wherein a
large section of the Zionist public has moved further to the
right.
OBSTACLES
Saying that there is a realistic possibility for attaining a
Palestinian state does not mean that we should belittle the
obstacles to this goal. No one should underestimate this task as
if the state were within reach. The distance between the
declaration of independence and its acutal achievement is very
difficult and long. Bridging this gap requires overcoming two
main obstacles: the US and the Israeli positions.
THE US POSITION
To date, the US continues to base its policy on the following
premises:
1. commitment to helping Israel be absolutely superior to the
Arabs and the Palestinians;
2. considering the Palestinian state as a destabilizing element
in the region, which must not be allowed to happen;
3. considering an international conference to be premature,
and preferring direct, bilateral negotiations; viewing the pro-
posed international conference as merely an umbrella for direct
negotiations;
4. promoting certain Palestinian personalities in the occupied
territories, and keeping the door open for the Jordanian regime
to share in the arrangements of any solution of the Palestinian
problem;
5. stopping the intifada is a main aim of US diplomatic
maneuvers in the region;
6. the Jordanian option is the preferred solution for the
Palestinian problem.
Any observer of US policy, whether at the end of Reagan’s
term or under the new administration, will have noticed these
main lines. From the US side, the first two rounds of dialogue
with the PLO focused on these premises. But this should not
obscure the change which has occurred in the US stand on the
Palestinian question due to the intifada and its repercussions >»
Democratic Palestine, June 89 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 33
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