Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 7)
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- Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 7)
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on the Arab and international arenas. The most important sign
if this change is the US decision to accept a dialogue with the
PLO, which is a great victory for the uprising on the interna-
tional scene. The US modified its absolute rejection of an in-
ternational conference, although it prefers direct negotiations.
It called on Israel to consider the idea of negotiations with the
PLO and not to deal with the uprising as a matter of terrorism.
These changes, brought about by the uprising, should be pur-
sued until the needed change in the US position is achieved,
i.e., until the US recognizes our people’s right to self-
determination and an independent state.
Forcing the US to change its position should be a major aim
of the Palestinian political moves, based on escalation of the
uprising, because the US position is the main international
asset on which the Zionists rely in continuing their occupation
of Palestinian land. While the intifada in the occupied ter-
ritories works to undermine the pillars of the occupation,
Palestinian diplomacy must intensify to make the desired
change in US public opinion, and to urge the new administra-
tion to accept the legitimate rights of our people.
THE ISRAELI POSITION
As of now, the official Israeli position is based on the
following no’s: (1) no to the PLO; (2) no to an independent
Palestinian state; (3) no to an international conference; (4) no
to returning to the pre- 1967 borders; (5) no to withdrawal from
Jerusalem which is considered the eternal, indivisible capital of
Israel; and (6) no to the Palestinian right of repatriation.
These six no’s are apparent in the program of the coalition
government and in the programs of the main parties. They
constitue the main obstacle to any possible solution for the
Palestinian question, especially since Israel has two main
assets: direct occupation of Palestinian land, and unlimited US
support for its intransigent policy. Up until now, these two
factors have enabled Israel to bear the international pressure
and isolation it faces. However, there is less understanding to-
day for the Israeli political discourse than there was in the past,
for this discourse is based on chauvinism and obstinance which
are now outdated. It reminds of the worst cold war rhetoric
and portends the escalation of tension and the possibility of an
all-out military explosion. Thus, it no longer enjoys the sup-
port of all Jewish communities in the world or all of Israel’s
traditional friends. Although the six no’s still constitute the
essence of the official Israeli position, this should not obscure
from view the effects which the uprising and the international
and Arab reactions to it, have had on the Israeli scene.
The Israeli position on the intifada and the means for deal-
ing with it has passed through several stages:
1. considering repression as the only means for dealing with
the intifada and rejecting any political discussion;
2. continuing repression while searching for political outlets
via Jordan and some Palestinians in the occupied territories,
who are not affiliated to the PLO;
3. continuing repression and searching for a political outlet via
Palestinians in the occupied territories, including followers of
the PLO.
Still, we need more struggle to oblige Israel to accept the
PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people
and to sit with it at the international conference. Although the
six no’s still constitute the essence of the Israeli government’s
position, there is a new growing political current in Israel, not
only among democratic Jewish forces, but also in the big
Democratic Palestine, June 89
Zionist parties, especially the Labor Party. This trend realizes
that sooner or later Israel will have to talk to the PLO, and that
the intifada cannot be stopped by military means. Moreover,
some who previously supported the Jordanian option now
speak about a demilitarized Palestinian state with limited
sovereignty. This shows the current of change that has started
in Israel among groups which we by no means consider to be
democratic forces or from the peace camp.
The appearance of such phenomena in Israel does not mean
that the rightist and extremist camp has been weakened. Rather
the strength of this camp is growing as shown by the results of
the Knesset elections and the Israeli municipal elections. There
are two contradictory phenomena in Israeli political life today:
On the one hand, the rightist and extremist positions are grow-
ing and gaining strength; while on the other hand, there is also
growth of the forces that call for talking with the PLO, and
exhibit various degrees of willingness to accept a Palestinian
state. The hesitant and inconsistent centrist forces pay the price
of this polarization which was induced by the uprising and its
international repercussions. The outcome of this polarization
process will be determined by many factors, the most impor-
tant of which are: our capability to continue, expand, escalate
and consolidate the uprising, and to pursue our diplomatic and
political battle without giving gratuitous concessions.
The Israeli government still refuses to sit with the PLO at the
table of direct negotiations, so we can only imagine how long
and difficult is the road we have to traverse before we can
oblige Israel to accept negotiations with the PLO at an inter-
national conference, or to acknowledge our right to an in-
dependent state, withdraw to the 1967 borders including in
Jerusalem, dismantle the settlements and last but not least, ac-
cept the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland.
We are still at the beginning of this long road, and we must not
underestimate the difficulties we face, because this would
spread harmful illusions and justify the logic of giving conces-
sions without getting anything in return. This would weaken
the alertness of our people and their willingness to fight a pro-
tracted war.
BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN DECLARING
INDEPENDENCE AND ACHIEVING IT
In the light of the above-mentioned obstacles which widen
the gap between declaring and achieving independence,
especially the Israeli and US positions, we dare say that the
declaration of the Palestinian state is a project that requires
struggle. In order to actually establish the state, we had better
notice the difference between declaring and achieving in-
dependence.
For precisely this reason, we noted from the very beginning
the existence of two points of view concerning the intifada. The
first counts on harvesting the political fruits of the uprising
prematurely. Accordingly, the advocates of this viewpoint are
ready to give gratuitous concessions. The other point of view
sees the necssity of making political gains from the intifada,
but at the same time, the advocates of this viewpoint are work-
ing to turn the uprising into a qualitative turning point in the
process of Palestinian national struggle. Hence, we say that we
are on the threshold of a new stage which had resulted from the
stage of Palestinian armed struggle, without ending it or belit-
tling its historical importance as some people imagine. We
consider the uprising the legitimate offspring of the Palestinian
armed struggle. Although the uprising is now the first among >
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