Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 8)
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- Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 8)
- المحتوى
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the Palestinian strategic priorities, this does not mean omitting
the distinguished role of the armed struggle in this strategy.
From this perspective, we have a series of responsibilities to
shoulder in order to shorten the distance between declaring and
achieving independence. The focus of these responsibilities is
how to protect the uprising and guarantee its continuation and
escalation, for it is the Palestinian people’s primary asset in
this period of the national struggle.
I. PROTECTING THE UPRISING
POLITICALLY
«The uprising will go on for years, and nothing can put an
end to it except a political solution.» This is a quote from the
annual report of the Israeli intelligence, which was presented to
the cabinet. This means that not only our friends, but our
enemies as well, are convinced of the futility of a military
solution, and convinced of the Palestinian people’s insistence
on continuing their legitimate resistance until achieving
freedom and independence.
It is now obvious that even massive savage repression will
not stop the intifada. Since the uprising has become part and
parcel of the Palestinian people’s dailv life, they will not allow
things to return to the status quo prior to December 9, 1987.
This is the situation in the occupied territories. It shows that
our fears about the future of the uprising are not related to
Rabin’s repressive measures. Rather, our fear arises from
deficient political protection of the uprising and from the
political battle being conducted on the basis of trying to make
hasty gains from the uprising, and thus giving concessions
without getting anything in return.
Over the previous months, we have faced many situations
which reflected the haste of some Palestinian circles - from the
premature call for forming a government-in-exile, to the
document of an adviser, to brother Yasir Arafat’s press con-
ference in Geneva and its aftermath - Arafat’s expressing
readiness to engage in direct, bilateral negotiations. These and
other similar positions weaken the revolutionary vigilence of
the masses of the intifada. They cause confusion in their ranks
and serve to weaken Palestinian national unity, because they
are a clear violation of the resolutions of national consensus.
The Palestinians have passed many crossroads of this type,
and managed to maintain their unity and cohesion. Yet this
does not mean that the dangers of this policy have diminished,
for the believers in this logic insist on trying again and again.
Moreover, we may face situations which would lead some
Palestinians to lower the minimum platform of our legitimate
rights if we do not begin working from now to block such
policies and practices. Hence we call for adhering to the in-
variable princples of the Palestinian struggle, as well as to the
PNC’s decisions, because the road of concessions is endless,
and our obstinate enemy will not be defeated unless we show
more firmness and adherence to our basic goals.
II. CONSOLIDATING THE INTIFADA
Consolidating the uprising means first of all maintaining the
war of stones by reinforcing its organizational and
socioeconomic structure. This entails work on two levels.
The first level: The organizational structure of the uprising
can only be reinforced by developing the United National
Leadership of our people under occupation, which is the em-
bodiment of the broad national coalition represented by the
PLO which reflects the interests of all classes and strata of our
8
people. Reinforcing the organizational structure of the upris-
ing requires bolstering it with more popular committees which
are the auxiliary leadership of the UNL in every street, alley,
village, town and camp; and the broad popular base which
carries Out its militant activities and programs. It also entails
reinforcing and enlarging the strike forces, the militant arm of
the UNL for confronting the enemy and its agents. It entails
developing popular voluntary work in the fields of health,
education, social services and family solidarity. It also means
that the UNL should be complemented with trade unions and
popular orgonizations, so that the termination of the uprising
would mean an unprecedented termination of a whole people.
One Israeli leader has already had to admit that arresting the
activists of the popular committees means arresting a whole
people; it a mounts to the same if they are considered outlaws.
This truth must be enshrined in the minds of the Zionist leaders
until their fascist measures are abolished forever, and they are
obliged to recognize our people’s legitimate aims.
The second level: Consolidating the socioeconomic base of
the uprising can be achieved in part by returning to the land,
developing agriculture and spreading the «victory gardens»
(homegardens) experiment. It can also be fulfilled by en-
couraging local industry, developing self-sufficiency, rejecting
consumptive habits, adopting a policy of austerity, being
satisfied with necessities and working to disengage from the
Israeli economy as much as possible. Successfully increasing
self-reliance not only guarantees the continuation of the in-
tifada, but also shortens the life of the occupation, because the
enemy will someday discover that the price of occupation is
much greater than the benefits.
III. ESCALATION OF THE INTIFADA
We must not give the enemy the chance to adapt itself to the
uprising as might be the case if the uprising continues at a set
level. Although we have succeeded in maintaining the
intifada’s momentum and broad scope throughout the 1967
occupied territories for over a year, nevertheless we have not
succeeded in moving to the stage of total national disobe-
dience. This has both subjective and objective reasons, but we
must not give up trying. The second year of the intifada should
witness a qualitative escalation through partial, interim and
gradual disobedience which would pave the way for total na-
tional disobedience. This is the primary means for seriously
harming the enemy - politically, economically and in terms of
morale, making the costs of occupation much too high. The
Israeli losses in the first year, estimated at 1.5-2 billion dollars,
must be doubled in the second year.
Moreover, escalation of the uprising entails the use of
military force, in addition to other forms of resistance, in
order to benefit maximally from the enemy’s sensitivity to
human losses in its own ranks. This is our legitimate right as
acknowledged by international laws and conventions. It is our
right to defend ourselves and to struggle for liberation and in-
dependence. This is not terrorism as the hostile Zionist and
imperialist media try to portray. The uprising and the armed
struggle are two faces of the same coin. There is no contradic-
tion between them except to those who have tired of the armed
struggle and prematurely announced the end of this stage. In
order to keep the necessary mass character of the uprising out’
of danger, we must practice armed struggle outside the terrain
where the uprising is taking place, i.e., from across the Arab
borders and inside the 1948 occupied territories.
Democratic Palestine, June 89 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 33
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