Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 13)
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- Democratic Palestine : 33 (ص 13)
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arrested 1,200 Palestinians and on
January 23, 1988, for the first time
since 1967, emergency powers were us-
ed in East Jerusalem to impose a
curfew. Rabin then forecast on March
24, 1988, «The residents of the ter-
ritories are beginning to feel
exhausted.»! He was wrong. Then he
said, «We have good people, good
Arabs, there’s a few hotheads being
roused up by phone calls from Abu
Jihad in Tunis.»2 Hence, the April
1988 inner cabinet decision to
assassinate Khalil Al Wazir was taken
and implemented. Still, the Israelis
were referring to the intifada as only
«riots.»
The second stage of Israeli official
policy was to continue the repression
while searching for a political outlet via
Jordan and some Palestinians in the
occupied territories. In a Newsweek in-
terview, Shamir said that Israel would
only agree to negotiate with its Arab
neighbors without pre-conditions, thus
offering direct talks anticipating the
results of «peace for peace» as Shamir
calls it, or really «peace for nothing.»
Shamir later said, «There is no PLO
option. There will be no Palestinian
state declared under occupation... and
if such a state is declared this will be
most dangerous for the people in the
territories.»> But with the Jordanian
move of severing legal and ad-
ministrative ties with the occupied West
Bank on July 31, 1988, the door was
closed to the Jordanian option. Still the
government did not face reality. It
swiftly intensified repression, deluding
itself that this was working as was ap-
parent in Rabin’s comments in autumn
1988, «Plastic bullets have reduced
violence in the territories» and «The use
of live ammunition reveals a downsw-
ing of the uprising.»4 Rabin even had
the audacity to forecast on November
16, 1988, that within six months the in-
tifada would die out, but he was wrong
again.
Eventually, some superficial gestures
were made by Israel in order to look
good in the international arena. Shamir
said, «I don’t believe in conferences
and things like that, but if it can help
someone that these negotiations be held
under some formal auspices of the
superpowers or the UN, I don’t mind,
as long as the negotiations are direct
Democratic Palestine, June 89
and on the condition that the external
bodies do not intervene in the content
of negotiations.»> Shamir also ac-
cepted the idea that the US and Soviet
Union host talks held under UN
auspices.
Meanwhile, Rabin continued with his
carrot and stick tactics, such as his
January 20, 1989 proposal to have
neutral, non-UN supervision of elec-
tions in the occupied territories, and
considering freeing jailed Palestinian
leaders who would be willing to
negotiate with Israel. However, the
carrot is nothing compared to the stick.
The third stage is the continuation of
repression and looking for a political
outlet via Palestinians in the occupied
territories, including followers of the
PLO. This strategy can best be ex-
emplified by Rabin’s scheme. His plan
has three stages; it begins with a three
to six month period of calm (after the
intifada has been suppressed), and then
elections in the territories take place.
These elections would serve to establish
some sort of governing council to han-
dle Palestinian self-administration over
an interim period of time. Then those
elected officials would be delegates to
an international conference that would
in turn negotiate a final settlement.
Although Rabin only refers to the par-
ticipation of Palestinians from the oc-
cupied territories, his plan hints that
they could be acting on behalf of the
PLO, because he offered at this point to
release from administrative detention
Faisal Husseini who is known to be af-
filiated with the PLO. Foreign Minister
Moshe Arens also added in March that
he did not object to negotiating with
Palestinian personalities who support
the PLO but are from the occupied ter-
ritories. Rabin realizes that there must
be political talks; he is quoted in
February at an inner cabinet meeting as
saying, «It is not possible to put an end
to the intifada militarily.» Then he
said on May 8th, «The _ present
measures are of no use, the only way is
through a political solution.» /
Both the Labor and Likud wings of
the government realize talks must occur
but somehow fantasize that a non-PLO
Palestinian partner will materialize;
this illusion is due to their fear that
talking to the PLO will eventually lead
to the creation of an independent
Palestinian state and be interpreted as a
reward for the intifada. The govern-
ment’s official positions, which both
Likud and Labor agree on, are the
following:
1. No withdrawal from’ united
Jerusalem which is the eternal capital of
Israel.
2. No to a Palestinian state; Israel’s
eastern border will always be the Jor-
dan river; no other sovereignty over the
Gaza Strip as well.
3. No withdrawal from the Golan
Heights.
4. Settling the problem of Palestinian
refugees should be a part of any solu-
tion.
5. No Palestinian right to repatriation.
6. No to negotiations with the PLO.
7. No to a fully-empowered interna-
tional peace conference.
8. Ruling out total Israeli withdrawal
from the 1967 territories and no non-
Israeli military force will be allowed to
enter the West Bank.
9. Lastly, the Palestinians in the oc-
cupied territories should practice some
form of self-administration in regards
to their internal affairs.
In regards to the settlements in the
occupied territories, there is no inten-
tion of dismantling them. In fact, there
was a decision by the coalition
government to build eight more, of
which three have already been built.
Shamir views these as Israel’s security
against a possible Palestinian state.
MUCH ADO ABOUT
NOTHING
The culmination of all of the
previously mentioned plans, statements
and tendencies has come about in the
form of the Shamir plan which was first
introduced during his April visit to the
US. This plan is based on four points:
1. An expansion of the Camp David
accords between Egypt and Israel, re-
jecting any «land for peace» formula in
the occupied territories.
2. Calling upon the Arabs to quit
hostilities and the economic embargo
on Israel, and begin negotiations.
3. Resolving the Palestinian «refugee
problem perpetuated by the Arab
governments» while offering what
Shamir termed decent housing and
dignified living for the Palestinians.
4. So-called free and democratic elec-
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