Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 10)
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- Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 10)
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The Fatah Conference
The fifth conference of Fatah (Palestine National Liberation Movement) concluded on August 9th in
Tunis. Due to Fatah’s status as the largest component organization of the PLO, the conference was
followed with great interest by Palestinian, Arab and international forces. In this article, we will deal with
the major political issues which have significance for the Palestinian struggle as a whole, without covering
all the details of the conference’s work.
Two important documents were
adopted at the conference. The first
was the political program, on which we
will concentrate our discussion, because
it contains the basic principles of the
Fatah movement and also addresses the
current situation. The second document
was the communique which reflected
some of the important points contained
in the program.
MIXING STRATEGY AND
TACTICS
The political program includes a set
of tactical, strategic and current tasks
which should be compared with the
original strategic and interim goals. of
the Palestinian revolution. We can
begin. to evaluate the political program
by noting some points which might be
useful for such a comparison:
First: The program lacks criticism of
past experience despite the fact that this
would strengthen the movement and
help it overcome its shortcomings,
assuming that critical review would be
used to change positions and practices
for the better.
Second: The program mixes between
current and strategic tasks. Moreover,
there is sometimes a tendency to play
on words when assigning priority to the
various tasks. This appears to be a at-
tempt to escape responsibility for how
these tasks should be implemented in
practice, and which tasks are con-
sidered primary. Below we will provide
some examples:
- The program omits all mention of
the liberation of all of Palestine, despite
the fact that it correctly posits the
Palestinian people’s historical right to
Palestine. The program labels the par-
tition of Palestine and the establish-
ment of the Zionist entity in 1948, as a
big crime. Nevertheless, the conference
failed to define the strategic tasks
needed for reversing this crime,
although it did clearly define the in-
terim tasks for ending the 1967 oc-
10
cupation of the rest of Palestine.
-In the process of discussing
escalating the struggle, the program
uses the term armed action, not armed
struggle. This is not just a case of
mistaken word usage, but means prac-
ticing violent actions in a tactical, in-
termittent way, rather than seriously
considering armed struggle to be the
basic, strategic form of struggle re-
quired for the liberation of Palestine.
This is reminiscent of the way in which
Yasir Arafat used the ambiguous word
caduc (obsolete, or null and void), to
describe the Palestinian National
Charter, during his May visit to Paris.
He used this word to meet the demands
of the French government for a change
in PLO policy, while avoiding the ap-
pearance of violating PNC decisions.
Thus, changes in wording about the
armed struggle make us wonder
whether it is being seriously considered
as the basic way of confronting the
Zionist enemy. Moreover, armed action
is not described in the program as being
ongoing, whereas other forms of
struggle are. Statements by Fatah of-
ficials after the conference have con-
firmed such doubts. Some defined
armed action as referring to the intifada
which is at present predominantly mass
rather than armed struggle. Abu Iyad
of Fatah’s Central Committee also said
that the use of the term armed struggle
in the conference’s communique did
not necessarily mean that it would be
used today or tomorrow. Such
statements make one think that em-
phasizing armed struggle in the com-
munique was more of a rhetorical
threat to the US in view of its failure to
advance the dialogue with the PLO,
rather than expressing serious intent to
escalate the liberation struggle.
- The conference adopted the pro-
gram of the 19th PNC session which
Stresses the Declaration of In-
dependence and the establishment of
the State of Palestine. However, the
conference avoided assessing
statements and moves by some PLO
leaders since the PNC, that violate the
PNC’s decisions. In fact, we do not
know the real decision of the con-
ference concerning UN Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338 serving as the
basis for resolving the conflict in the
Middle East. One could view it as
positive that these resolutions were not
mentioned if this means that they were
not adopted as part of Fatah’s pro-
gram. On the other hand, it is inconsis-
tent to adopt the PNC’s program
without mentioning them, for their ac-
ceptance at the PNC marked a break
with previous PLO policy. Failing to
mention them may be no more than an
evasion of responsibility, keeping the
door open for adopting whatever posi-
tion serves tactical and pragmatic con-
siderations in the future.
In the same way, the conference took
no clear position on Israel’s right to ex-
ist, or whether the Palestinian National
Charter is considered caduc. Moreover,
there is no mention in the program of
the Camp David accords, despite the
fact that the Zionist enemy continues to
mold its plans on these accords. The
Democratic Palestine, October 1989 - هو جزء من
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