Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 13)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 13)
المحتوى
WAH
Obstacle to Peace
The US administration salvaged the Shamir plan and the unity of the
Israeli coalition, after the challenge of the Likud Central
Committee’s decisions in early July. However, the Shamir plan re-
mains in the intensive care unit, requiring new animation, as most
recently attempted by President Mubarak with his ten-point plan.
Sooner or later, the Shamir plan is
bound to die - not only because it
represents the Israeli denial of the
Palestinian people’s legitimate rights,
but also because it is no more than a
reaction to the PLO’s peace initiative,
designed to foil it. In essence, it is a
maneuver aimed at gaining time in
order to terminate the uprising and
reduce international outrage at Israeli
brutality against the Palestinian people
in the occupied West Bank and Gaza
Strip. This was tangibly proven by
events on the Israeli political scene in
July.
On July Sth, Shamir himself an-
nounced the decisions adopted by the
Likud Central Committee. These made
the true intentions of his plan all too
obvious by explicitly ruling out not only
the PLO and a Palestinian state, but
any negotiations before the elimination
of «violence» (meaning the uprising),
as well as the participation of Palesti-
nians from East Jerusalem in the elec-
tions. On the other hand, settlement-
building would continue.
These conditions made it impossible
for either the Labor Party or the US to
credibly market the Shamir plan as a
«peace plan.» The Shamir plan was in
trouble, particularly after the Labor
Party’s Executive Bureau, by a vote of
45 to 2 on July 10th, recommended
withdrawal from the _ coalition
government. However, instead of the
Shamir plan being declared dead or the
coalition dissolving, the Israeli
government met to renew its commit-
ment to the plan without any amend-
ments. Why?
US SALVAGES THE PLAN
On July 10th, the US State Depart-
ment declared its intention to send a
Democratic Palestine, October 1989
delegation to Israel in order to get
clarification on the future of the
government’s «peace initiative.» The
US also stated that the Likud decisions
did not help the peace process; that the
Israeli government was not bound by
the decisions of one party; and that the
US was not willing to change its policy
according to this or that Israeli party’s
position.
To show its seriousness, the State
Department declared that the US might
look more closely at the possibility of
advancing the peace process via an in-
ternational conference, especially after
the Likud Central Committee’s hard-
line conditions. At the same time, it was
reported that the White House
pressured the Labor Party not to
withdraw from the coalition govern-
ment. This was the background for
Shamir’s retreat, whereby he assured
the US administration that the Israeli
plan remained valid, without any
changes, as previously approved by the
government on May 14th. Thus, the US
cancelled the planned delegation and
urged the Labor Party to remain in the
coalition. This paved the way for a
compromise, whereby the Israeli
government reconfirmed the Shamir
plan as is, on July 23rd.
Shamir thereby agreed that the Likud
decisions were internal party positions,
non-binding on the government, even
though part of the Likud Central
Committee’s decisions was that they
were binding on all Likud represen-
tatives in the government and Knesset,
as 3 guideline for any future negotia-
tions or implementation of the Shamir
plan. This makes it doubly obvious that
Shamir considers his «peace» plan as
no more than a propaganda ploy. He
declared that the government decision
to adhere to the plan as originally
adopted did not affect the Likud Cen-
tral Committee decisions one
millimeter. He wants to say that his
plan exists. as it is since, in his view,
there is no Arab response to it anyhow.
This compromise was acceptable to
Shamir and the Likud because it
averted the problems which would have
arisen if the government had fallen - a
return to new elections or the
establishment of a minority govern-
ment lacking in national consensus and
effectiveness. In view of the problems
Israel is already facing due to the
uprising’s daily achievements, it is to
the advantage of both Likud and Labor
to avoid further problems.
IL. ABOR’S DILEMMA
It was obvious that the Likud Central
Committee’s decisions increased the
Labor Party’s dilemma. Sections of the
party have long questioned the ad-
visability of remaining in government
with the Likud. On the other hand, past
election results indicate that Labor
would not improve its position in the
case of new elections; nor would going
into the opposition. In view of these
factors, Labor agreed to the US ad-
ministration’s advice and stayed in the
coalition, even though the essence of
the Likud position was exposed to be
somewhat different than the plan the
Labor Party purports to promote. In
order to complete the game, Labor’s
leadership met on July 10th and decid-
ed to remain in the coalition. They also
confirmed a series of decisions which
conform to Likud policy, such as: No
to a Palestinian state, no to elections
before the intifada is «exterminated,»
no to negotiations with the PLO; and
«United Jerusalem is the eternal capital
of Israel.» However, other decisions
were adopted which contradict the
Likud position, such as: territorial
compromise based on UN Security
Council resolutions 242 and 228, the
possibility of international observers >
13
هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 35
تاريخ
أكتوبر ١٩٨٩
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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