Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 14)

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عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 14)
المحتوى
for the elections, if they are from
friendly countries, and that East
Jerusalem Palestinians could vote, but
not in Jerusalem.
US PRESSURES THE PLO
Instead of drawing the obvious con-
clusions from the Likud decisions, the
US administration considered the
government decision to reaffirm the
Shamir plan as adequate. The US con-
tinued in its policy of trying to circum-
vent an international peace conference
and the PLO’s peace initiative. It con-
tinued to try to pressure the PLO to
accept the Shamir plan, ambiguously
claiming that it is only the beginning of
a process, but without specifying the
woe le
— ee eee eee
situation would leave it without an ac-
tive policy in the area. The US rushed
to salvage the Shamir plan because it is
as much a US plan as an Israeli one in
terms of its emergence, essence and
aims. Now, the US is trying to exploit
the events around the Likud Central
Committee’s decisions to beautify the
Shamir plan and have Shamir himself
appear as a «moderate» who is besieged
by extremists and needs support. The
overall aim of these maneuvers is to
maintain the US’s role and hegemony
in the Middle East, by buying time for
Israel to terminate the uprising through
broad-scale repression; meanwhile, the
US works politically to trap the PLO
into accepting the Shamir plan, hoping
| 2. The elections should be interna-
| Palestinian candidates.
basis for this process, its stages, the
PLO’s role or how the Palestinian
people’s national rights will be ad-
dressed. The US administration fur-
thermore tried to take advantage of the
Fatah conference’s communique, to
propagate that the PLO had retracted
its moderate line. US insistence on its
position led to the failure of the fourth
round of the US-PLO dialogue, just as
the previous meetings had failed to
make any real advances.
This proves that the US does not view
Shamir’s plan merely as a first step that
is subject to amendment, but rather as
an expression of US policy in the Mid-
dle East, based on the lines of Camp
David, where there is no room for the
PLO or Palestinian rights. If the US
administration was really serious about
advancing the peace process, it should
have seized the opportunity to pressure
Israel, especially after the Likud deci-
sions. Instead, it saw the failure of the
Shamir plan as a threat, because not to
present a peace project in the current
14
_ tionally supervised.
_ 3. Protection would be provided for the
on a final settlement within a three to
five-year interim period.
7. Freedom of expression.
8. No Israel entry into the polling
areas.
9, Israel would accept the principle of |
land for peace as part of a final settle- |
i vote.
to isolate the PLO from the uprising or
lessen support to this struggle.
The US role in salvaging the Shamir
plan was vital to its survival, since the
US is almost the only power to have
accepted this plan unconditionally.
Added to the Palestinians’ decisive re-
jection and the opposition of many
Arab governments, Europe seems more
inclined towards an international con-
ference for solving the Middle East
conflict. In June, both the EEC and the
Socialist International, in their respec-
tive meetings, called for a UN-
sponsored international peace con-
ference; the EEC emphasized the im-
portance of the PLO’s participation in
this conference. (The Israeli Labor
Party boycotted the Socialist Interna-
tional meeting due to the PLO’s having
been invited as an observer.)
MUBARAK STEPS IN
Taking advantage of Egypt’s official
reintegration into Arab_ politics,
residents of East |
HHH
Mubarak proposed a plan which serves
to back up the US efforts to salvage the
Shamir plan. He presented it as a means
of finding a middle ground for further-
ing the peace process - a compromise
between the Israeli proposal for elec-
tions under occupation, and the PLO’s
support to elections after Israeli
withdrawal from the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Though presenting some
changes in the means of holding elec-
tions, Mubarak’s points don’t differ in
essence from the Shamir plan or Camp
David. There is no mention of the PLO
as the party to be negotiated with, or of
the Palestinian state.
Thus, Mubarak joins the Israeli
government and the US administration
in retarding the peace process, despite
statements to the contrary, for there
will be no peace in the area without
recognition of the Palestinian people’s
national rights to repatriation, self-
determination and their independent
state. The Palestinians are continuing
the uprising in an unprecedented man-
ner, having determined that they will
not retreat from their goals of freedom
and independence, whatever sacrifices
this entails. It is not wishful thinking to
say that Shamir’s plan will inevitably
face death, because in the last analysis
it aims to create an alternative Palesti-
nian leadership, and such attempts have
repeatedly failed. The Palestinian peo-
ple are united in viewing the PLO as
their sole, legitimate representative.
Anyone who wants to resolve the con-
flict must take this into account, and
address the PLO.
@
Democratic Palestine, October 1989
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Democratic Palestine : 35
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