Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 30)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 30)
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With the June 30th coup d’etat ends the first democratically elected
government in the last 20 years of Sudan’s history.
The recent coup of General Omar
Hassan Ahmed Bashir has destroyed
the accomplishments of the Sudanese
people who, through their April 1985
popular uprising, chose democracy,
political pluralism and debate, the
freedom of political and union ac-
tivities, and freedom of expression. The
toppling of this democratic experience
is indeed a blow to democratic aspira-
tions.
PROBLEMS MAHDI FACED
The deposition of Sadiq Al Mahdi
will not solve the problems that have
existed in Sudan for many years. The
roots of many of these problems go
back to 18 years of Gaafar Nimeiri’s
pro-western dictatorship which was
deposed in 1985 with the participation
of the Sudanese armed forces.
After the April 1985 uprising, within
exactly one year, elections were held,
fulfilling a promise to the masses that
power would be transferred to civilians;
Mahdi’s Umma Party won a
parliamentary majority.
One of the two main problems
Mahdi’s government faced was the civil
war in the South which has continued
like an open national wound. The se-
cond problem was the economic crisis,
consisting of stagnation, inflation, high
unemployment, foreign debt, cash
shortages and IMF pressures. Other
closely-related problems included tribal
feuds and shortages in food supplies.
Many mistakes were made by the
Mahdi government, but it would have
been impossible, in any case, to resolve
all of these problems in only three
years.
ANNIHILATION OF
DEMOCRACY
The new junta has its own program
for solving the many problems Sudan
faces. Its two basic premises are (1)
annihilation of democracy and
30
violating basic human rights, and (2)
vagueness. A list of the first actions
taken by the junta shows the destruc-
tion of all traces of the democracy that
was built up during Mahdi’s govern-
ment:
Bashir suspended the constitution
and announced military rule. The
parliament was dissolved as were the
president’s cabinet, all political parties
and unions. The independent press and
non-Islamic societies were closed.
There was a clamp down on all free
expression, meetings, demonstrations
and strikes. A dusk-to-dawn curfew
was imposed; communications were
cut. Some leaders of political parties
and unions were arrested, while others
were banned from travelling or work-
ing. Twenty-eight of the country’s
military officers were dismissed - vir-
tually the entire senior command of the
armed forces.
In place of all these institutions,
Beshir established the so-called
Revolutionary Council for the Salva-
tion of Sudan which holds all
legislative, executive and judicial
authority without popular constraints
Or supervision. Moreover, Bashir
named himself head of state, prime
minister, minister of defense, head of
the 15-member Revolutionary Council
and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces, meanwhile elevating his own
military rank from brigadier to lieute-
nant general.
EGYPT’S ROLE
It is no coincidence that on Friday,
June 30th, Middle East Radio (Egypt)
was the first to report that Sudanese
armed forces had entered areas in
Khartoum, the capital, and had taken
over the president’s palace. It is also no
coincidence that within a few short
hours, Egypt became the first country
to recognize the new regime. In fact,
Egypt’s delegation, which was sent to
meet the new regime’s leaders, included
the head of the General Intelligence
Service (GIS). Nor is it a coincidence
that the very next day Egypt sent Sudan
20,000 tons of fuel oil, cargoes of
medicine, children’s food, vehicle spare
parts, ammunition and army uniforms.
Can it also be a coincidence that
Nimeiri sought refuge in Cairo after
deposition?
There are several reasons for Egypt’s
interest with the government of Sudan.
To say the least, relations between
Egypt and Sudan over the past three
years have not been at their best. Some
of the events which have aggravated the
situation include Egypt’s refusal to ex-
tradite Nimeiri to be tried in Sudan,
and Mahdi’s promise to receive Khalid
Abdul Nasser who is wanted in Egypt
for anti-government activities. Another
factor was the close relationship bet-
ween Mahdi and Gaddafi which had
irritated Egypt.
But the main reason was the Egyp-
tian regime’s fear of the spread of the
democratic experience in Sudan, and
particularly the effect that it might have
on Egypt’s population, due to the prox-
imity of the two countries.
The second reason was Egypt’s
frustration by Mahdi’s inability to end
the war in the South. After the coup,:
Egypt is exporting new weaponry to the
junta in Sudan, and has persuaded
Saudi Arabia to provide financial
assistance. Ending the war in the South
is critical for Egypt due to its heavy
dependency on the waters of the Nile
River. The continuation of the war in
the South could threaten Egyptian
water supplies.
Egypt is to receive 55.5 billion cubic
meters of water from the river under
the 1959 Nile Water Agreement bet-
ween Egypt and Sudan, which inciden-
tally expired on June 28th of this year.
So far, Egypt has exceeded this limit
and still requires much more for a ma-
jor expansion of irrigated farmland
scheduled.
With the projected Jonglei Canal, a
355 kilometer conduit through the Sudd
Swamp in Southern Sudan, Egypt needs
the war to end fast, particularly since
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