Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 32)
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- Democratic Palestine : 35 (ص 32)
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government and the SPLA in the
Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, with
the SPLA calling for Mahdi to imple-
ment an agreement it had signed in
November 1988 with the Democratic
Unionist Party, then a coalition partner
in Mahdi’s government.
On the other hand, Bashir’s pro-
posals for ending the civil war are
relatively vague. He proposes concepts
calling for peace, but in essence prac-
tices the opposite. For example, he of-
fered to put the sharia laws to a na-
tional referendum if no agreement on
them was reached. But the problem
cannot be solved in this manner because
the SPLA’s opposition to sharia is a
democratic demand which should be
implemented without maneuvers to
circumvent it.
As of yet, Bashir has not received any
response from the SPLA to his pro-
posals. But then again, does Bashir
really want peace? If so, then why
would he call for a tripartite union with
Egypt and Libya, fully aware of the
fact that such treaties remain a point of
contention with the SPLA. Moreover,
the general and his council scrapped the
tentative peace accord signed on
November 16th, which called for the
freezing of Sudan’s Islamic penal code
and the abrogation of defense pacts
with Libya and Egypt. The SPLA re-
quests for greater autonomy, and
economic and administrative reforms
have not been addressed by Bashir at
all.
For these reasons, Garang is not
convinced that Bashir wants peace or
democracy in Sudan. Therefore,
Garang turned down an invitation to
meet with Sudan’s new leaders and
dismissed Bashir’s proposals, ques-
tioning his seriousness about ending the
war, and stating that Bashir has secret
plans to partition Sudan’s northern and
southern territories. Garang threatened
to overthrow the new regime using
military force and a popular uprising,
unless it steps down and paves the way
for general elections and democracy.
Obviously, there is no common
ground between the two sides and
Bashir is only aggravating the situation
by not according the civil war due
priority.
32
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
The other major crisis in Sudan
which must be addressed in detail is the
growing economic crisis. This crippled
economy is suffering from stagnation,
inflation, a high rate of unemployment,
lack of cash flow and IMF restrictions.
The annual inflation rate is an
estimated 85 percent, alongside an in-
credibly high foreign debt.The war in
the South alone costs the government
one million dollars per day.
The measures being taken by the new
junta are only aggravating the situa-
tion. For example, the government
printed $125 million dollars worth of
local currency at the Bank of England
because there is a cash shortage, but
this will only cause a devaluation of the
Sudanese pound. It also ordered
citizens to trade in their foreign cur-
rency or face trial by a military court.
Then the government imposed a three
percent defense tax on the basic salaries
of average employees, effective July
Ist.
There is also the issue of food shor-
tages which have become so acute that
the UN, the ICRC and other organiza-
tions have sent relief food, medicines,
seeds and so on. But these are tem-
porary solutions which do not remove
the need for major structural changes in
agriculture, so that some relative form
of self-sufficiency can be achieved.
For all intent and purposes, Sudan
has been bankrupt for years. Mean-
while, Bashir’s initial policies are only
worsening the situation. He says he will
«control the market and promote
development according to a realistic,
scientific plam» (The Middle East,
August 1989). But exactly what that
plan is remains vague.
REACTIONS
The second country to recognize
Sudan’s new regime after Egypt was
Saudi Arabia which stated that it was
prepared to work on political and
economic relations with Sudan. Bashir
himself visited Saudi Arabia, after his
first visit to Egypt where he spoke with
«big brother» Hosni Mubarak. The
Saudi government promised him
financial support, but even this support
will not solve Sudan’s deep economic
crisis. Saudi Arabia and Sudan are both
Red Sea littoral countries and also have
been trying to develop a joint regional
security policy.
Many of the reactionary Arab
regimes welcomed the coup in Sudan,
due to their apprehension of the exam-
ple of democracy and the threat it could
cause in their own countries.
On the international level, two days
after the coup, Bashir met with the US
ambassador to Khartoum, Norman
Anderson. The US, for tactical reasons,
did not openly support the coup but
rather allowed its agents, Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, to do that. «The military
has arrested a number of cabinet
ministers. We regret the military taking
action to overthrow Sudan’s
democratically elected government, and
we urge an early return to democracy,»
said State Department spokeswoman,
Margaret Tutwiler on July Ist (AP, Ju-
ly 3rd). Subsequent developments will
most probably indicate that this initial
criticism was mainly propagandistic.
Herman Cohen, US assistant secretary
of state for African affairs, met with
Bashir to determine whether the US will
give aid to his government. Cohen
subsequently called Mahdi’s govern-
ment incompetent.
Sadiq Al Mahdi’s government was
democratically elected by the Sudanese
people in 1986. It is true that his
government had its share of shortcom-
ings, but at least there was a parlia-
ment, open political work and popular
participation. Mahdi inherited many
problems from the previous Nimeiri
dictatorship, and now Bashir is in-
heriting those problems, but the ability
of Sudan to resolve some of these pro-
blems with a democracy stood a much
better chance than with the present
junta.
With the June 30th coup, the Arab
world suffers the loss of a democratic
state. Bashir’s junta has not produced
any substantial policies on the critical
issues facing Sudan today. The big
losers in this case are the Sudanese
masses who have suffered another coup
d’etat in their 33 years of independence
from Britain. @
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