Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 5)
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- Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 5)
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the fines imposed on them by the
Zionist judicial system, in accordance
with the UNL’s directives. Also during
1989, Palestinian lawyers staged two
month-long boycotts of the Zionist
courts, in protest of the total lack of
due process.
Solidified unity
The unity in struggle of the Palesti-
nians under occupation, which enabled
the uprising in the first place, was sub-
stantially bolstered in the course of this
year. The major political trends main-
tained their unity in the framework of
the intifada, despite differing views on
the PLO’s tactics in connection with
the Palestinian peace offensive. In
February relations of coordination was
established between the UNL and
HAMAS, to ensure unity of action.
Equally significant was the drive
towards unification of the mass organi-
zations. This began in late 1988, with
the formation of a coordinating council
for the various women’s organizations
in the occupied territories. In January,
the writers’ union was reunited in the
territories. Later on, higher councils
were formed grouping the student
Organizations and workers’ commit-
tees. The Higher Workers’ Council
took on particular significance not only
to compensate for the continuing divi-
sion of the trade union federation, but
also on the forefront of the major bat-
tle of the year. Their protracted strike,
to protest the imposition of new ID
cards on the Gaza Strip population,
spearheaded confrontation of the most
sustained Israeli drive to divide the
Palestinians and reassert control over
the occupied territories, starting with
the Strip.
The efforts to solidify unity not only
succeeded in_ thwarting repeated
Zionist onslaughts. They also provided
an example to the PLO institutions in
exile, as to how internal democracy,
collective leadership and proportional
representation of the active forces, are
key links in mounting a struggle equal
to the Zionist challenge. A number of
national institutions and unions faced a
situation during 1989 whereby the
Democratic Palestine, December 1989
terms of their administrative bodies
expired, but the situation of siege,
mass arrests and curfews ruled out
holding ordinary elections. The UNL
issued guidelines for forming new
administrative bodies on the basis of
competence, proportional representa-
tion and assigning top priority to
national unity, while complying with
the respective organizations’ bylaws.
Political cohesion
Also on the political level, the
intifada and the UNL provided an
example from which the entire Palesti-
nian revolution can benefit. The calls
of 1989 devoted more attention to
political issues than those of the previ-
ous year. The focus was on registering
the progress made by the PLO’s diplo-
macy, and charting the intifada’s over-
all course and tactics in accordance
with achieving Palestinian rights. The
focus on unity organizational and
political - was essential in a year when
the Zionists’ main target was exactly
Palestinian unity, as the means for
penetrating, weakening and_ then
crushing the intifada. Call no. 41,
issued June 13th, stressed that «our
national struggle is facing a critical
moment. The enemy has resorted to
the idea of defeating the intifada
through political means after being
convinced that repression alone had
failed to affect it.» This was mainly in
reference to the Shamir election plan
which, while only a rehash of the
Camp David formula, was introduced
with the intention of deflecting interna-
tional criticism of Israel, dividing the
PLO on how to react, and fabricating
an alternative «leadership» in the ter-
ritories.
Of course, the Shamir plan was
rejected by the PLO and Palestinian
people, as a fraudulent attempt to
market the impossible idea of «free»
elections under the guns of the occupa-
tion army. However, subsequent
attempts to keep this plan alive have
been multiple, ranging from the
Mubarak and Baker proposals, to
Israeli officials meeting with notables
in the territories to try and show that
the Palestinians could be drawn into
the game. In this situation, the UNL
has shown great political firmness and
tactical wisdom. The UNL forbid all
meetings with Israeli officials, mandat-
ing meetings only with Israelis who
advocate unconditional withdrawal
from the occupied State of Palestine,
as well as the Palestinian right to self-
determination and_ statehood. This
decision was made in knowledge that
the Israeli government would use
meetings with Palestinians to show its
international allies that there were sup-
posed non-PLO’ers ready to cooperate
on the elections. At the same time, the
UNL mitigated its ban to allow for the
conditions of occupation: Palestinians
who were summoned (i.e. forced) to
meetings were obliged to report their
contents to the public and speak only
on the basis of national consensus (the
Palestinian rights to repatriation, self-
determination and an_ independent
state, via ar international conference).
Ey the same token, the UNL
announced the reasons that the
Mubarak and Baker plans were unac-
ceptable, immediately upon publica-
tion of these plans.
Rising Israeli repression
Of course, the Zionist political
onslaught did not preclude continued
repression. On the contrary, Israeli
soldiers, Shin Bet agents and various
special forces pursued the activists of
the uprising even more relentlessly in
1989; if anything, the occupation
authorities broadened the ongoing
campaign of collective punishment,
especially the total imposed in the
Gaza Strip.
Approximately the same number of
Palestinians were killed by Israeli sol-
diers, settlers and agents in the second
year of the intifada, as in the first year.
Thus, the intifada enters its third year
on the backdrop of the martyrdom of
over 800 Palestinians. Most telling was
the abrupt rise in repression connected
with the introduction of the Shamir
plan. The Jerusalem-based Database
Project on Palestinian Human Rights
issued a table entitled «Human Rights >
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- Democratic Palestine : 36
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