Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 12)
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- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 12)
- المحتوى
-
WA
A scientific view of the uprising’s characteristics reveals its
comprehensiveness very clearly. All strata and sectors of the
Palestinian people, all ideological trends, are involved within its
framework. Our people began to confront the Zionist authority
with a unified national will, in order to achieve the main goal of
freedom and independence. On the basis of mounting a total
confrontation, I welcome Hamas’ joining the trend of confron-
tation against the Zionist enemy. Those who know the history of
HAMAS, its slogans, priorities and the problems it has created
in the occupied territories, will see that there is a great differ-
ence today, and welcome the joining in with the nationalists.
There is no doubt that the participation of Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad in the conflict is a national gain for our struggle and
a motivating force for the uprising. However, the continuation
of the uprising calls for this trend joining the United National
Leadership of the Uprising. To realize this aim, we should work
sincerely to resolve the obstacles delaying this.
What are these obstacles? I am sorry to say that the main
reason 1s Hamas which binds the ideological factor with the
political factor without giving the current political moment the
weight it deserves in determining alliance and the requirements
of the confrontation. According to its vision, Hamas feels that it
is agood chance for confronting the Zionist enemy, because this
will provide a suitable political moment for competiting with the
PLO. At the same time, I am very sorry to say that the political
line of some influential forces in the PLO, who are giving
gratuitous concessions and recognized resolution 242, bear part
of the responsibility for alienating Hamas from the PLO. Inthe
light of this analysis, efforts should continue so that Hamas, and
all the forces that participate in the uprising, would join the
United National Leadership. I appeal to all forces and to the
masses to strive for all joining in the UNL.
Concerning the Muslim Brotherhood’s success in the Jorda-
nian elections and its influence on the occupied territories, this
question entails deep contemplation, especially since this bloc
has announced that it is going to ask King Hussein to retract his
decision about severing ties with the West Bank. We cannot
ignore this danger. As soon as the king had declared this deci-
sion, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement faulting this
step. In contrast, we, along with the masses and all progressive
and nationalist forces, considered this decision as a big victory
for our people, as it dealt a severe blow to the so-called Jorda-
nian option.
It is very possible that the Muslim Brotherhood’s position will
affect the position of Hamas in the occupied territories, even
though we would not wish for this. But the political position will
be decisive. Our masses will be with those who stand beside their
aspiration to confront the Zionist enemy.
Despite the importance of supporting the uprising
from outside, we notice a reduction of military opera-
tions against the Zionist forces across the Arab bor-
ders. What has made this task so difficult?
The attempt to support the uprising by military operations
from outside has not stopped. The weakness of the military
12
operations has objective and subjective reasons. The objective
reasons are: (1) the intensified measures taken by the Arab
regimes and the agents of Israel, and (2) intensified security
measures by the Israeli forces themselves. In Lebanon, for
example, any commando group should take into account that it
will face the barrier of the UN forces, of the Lahd forces and of
the Israeli forces, plus some mobile barriers that might be
erected at different times and places. There has also been infor-
mation coming from Jordan about the new measures of the
regime to prevent any Palestinian military activities against
Israel.
There are also subjective reasons for the decline in military
support from the outside. Some organizations took a political
decision preventing them from practicing armed struggle to sup-
port the uprising from across the Arab borders. This is based on
their political vision and their betting on the Arab regimes; they
intend to open the way for bargaining and improving their own
position vis-a-vis international and regional powers that are
involved in deciding the future of the Arab-Zionist struggle.
Thus, they think that their position will facilitate making politi-
cal gains from the uprising. This is one of the explanations.
Some have understood that the uprising is an alternative to
the armed struggle, while real understanding of the uprising isto
see it as acomplement to the armed struggle. Political and milit-
ary support for the uprising are of great importance, and there is
no contradiction between the two. Military support to the upris-
ing from the outside is related to the necessity of making a
change in the balance of forces in order to make the enemy rec-
ognize our national rights, and withdraw from the occupied
land.
Political support to the uprising, which has occupied first
priority, means protecting it politically, in contrast to military
support. This subject has been proved by international
revolutionary experience and by our own experience. The polit-
ical mistake does real harm to the revolution if it aborts the fac-
tors which lead to victory. Many times, it was a political mistake
which led the revolution to retreat. Even before our contempor-
ary revolution, the Palestinian experience in 1936-39
demonstrated the importance of the political line.
I am not seriously worried about the uprising if the military
operations have declined from the outside, but I am very anxi-
ous about the Baker plan and other suspicious initiatives aimed
at aborting the uprising. Protecting the uprising politically has
priority, and the political support is closely related to the milit-
ary, economic and moral support.
By what means can a change be incurred on the US
and Israeli rejection of Palestinian rights?
The Israeli obstacle
The Israeli position continues to be characterized by intransi-
gence and rejection of all of our people’s national rights, as well
as of all international conventions and a fully empowered inter-
national conference. Such rejection exposes the nature of the
enemy as being racist, fascist and colonialist. The enemy views
the Palestinian people as its own historical negation. Therefore,
we are not confronting an ordinary enemy, but one that is armed
Democratic Palestine, December 1989 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 36
- تاريخ
- ديسمبر ١٩٨٩
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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