Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 13)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 13)
المحتوى
WWI
with reactionary racist ideology from which it derives justifica-
tion for inflicting the worst oppression on the Palestinian mas-
ses, in Palestine and in exile.
This position is the essence of the policies of the ruling coali-
tion in Tel Aviv. Differences within this coalition are secondary
ones pertaining to ways and means, not aims; neither of their
policies deviate from the basis of Zionist policy. The Labor
Party, that calls for «peace» has waged three out of the four
major wars against the Arabs. During the Labor’s era, the
remainder of Palestine, the Golan Heights and the Sinai were
occupied. The Likud, on the other hand, signed the infamous
Camp David accords. Labor’s Rabin, who is directing the war
on the intifada, is not less fascist than his Likud colleagues.
Therefore, it is superficial to argue about which of the two blocs
is more moderate. In fact, their differences are a competition
between the two as to which means are best for achieving their
common goals.
Although these differences are secondary, it is our task - asa
revolution - to capitalize on them and broaden the gap. In the
current situation, transforming the occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip into a losing enterprise is an essential fac-
torin widening the gap in the two-party coalition.
When discussing the impact of the uprising on the Israeli polit-
ical constellation, we must monitor the new phenomenon. It is
true that Israeli political life is generally heading towards fascist
extremism, but it is also true that the democratic forces calling
for peace are growing more than at any other time, despite the
prevailing right-wing mainstream in the government and par-
ties. The process of polarization in the Israeli society will have a
great impact on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, although it is not
the decisive factor. We must not neglect this factor when chart-
ing our tactics in the battle with the Zionist government and par-
ties.
Many questions have been raised by a broad circle of Jewish
intellectuals and even in the Labor Party. Many Israelis have
called for an end to the crimes and crude violations of human
rights, that are taking place in the occupied territories. Some
Israeli officials, such as Weizmann, the minister of science, have
openly called for recognizing the PLO and accepting an inde-
pendent Palestinian state. Such phenomena should be encour-
aged.
More important is the probability of a real split in the Israeli
government on the issue of the Palestinian independent state,
due to the uprising. The continuation and escalation of the
uprising and its deep effects on the Zionist entity represents a
real threat, in addition to generating Arab and international
‘support for the independent Palestinian state, as a factor of pres-
sure on the Zionist government. Shamir himself pointed to the
possibility of civil war (among Israelis). The Israeli government
has been able to overcome the crises of the past two years, such
as the major conflict over Mubarak’s plan, but this situation
won't last forever. As the uprising escalates in the future, a split
could occur. At this point, we would be much closer to actually
establishing the independent Palestinian state, because exactly
at this point, one of the toughest links in the Israeli position
would be broken.
Democratic Palestine, December 1989
The US obstacle
Although it seems that the US administration is not in har-
mony with Shamir’s demands, it does in fact respond to the basic
Israeli wishes. The US has always facilitated Israel's regional
ambitions in return for Israel serving US global strategy. The
relationship is one of mutual interests. Israel isno longer merely
a tool in the hands of the US, but the US is still the protector of
Israel’s interests and reputation which is deteriorating interna-
tionally. The US worked diligently for Shamir’s election plan to
be accepted, and pressured the PLO to accept it, trying tosnatch
more and more concessions from the Palestinians. The US has
moreover exercised its veto in the UN Security Council every
time there was a proposal to condemn Zionist repression against
our people. The essence of the Israeli and US policies is one;
both stand as an obstacle to any solution that guarantees legiti-
mate Palestinian rights.
We should use all means to surmount this obstacle. The upris-
ing, if properly used as a weapon, will play a decisive role in this
regard. We must consolidate our support and protection for the
uprising in order to make it an ongoing fire that would consume
the US interests in the area. We must also urge the Arab govern-
ments to take a clear position on the US administration in light
of its rejection of our people’s right to self-determination. The
Arab states should be pressured to close their markets to US
goods. Creating these factors will guarantee a change in the US
position and end its unconditional support to the repressive
Israeli policies.
There have been many schemes aiming to abort the
uprising: the Shamir plan, Mubarak’s 10 points and
the Baker proposals. The PLO’s position on these
was sometimes ambiguous. Some felt ambiguity was
exactly what’s needed, while others urged the PLO to
take more clear-cut positions. How do you evaluate
the Palestinian position vis-a-vis these schemes?
First, I would like to emphasize that all these schemes have
one thing in common: denial of the Palestinian people’s inalien-
able rights, of the PLO as their sole legitimate representative,
and of the fully empowered international conference as the
proper solution. They are new versions of the Camp David
accords.
If we believe that the US, Israel and Egypt are pressuring the
PLO, rather than pressure being exerted on the Israeli govern-
ment, we will then conclude that the PLO leadership must take a
clear position on these schemes. The last Central Council meet-
ing, held in Baghdad, declared a clear position, but often we
hear statements by the PLO officials that raise doubts, in addi-
tion to the violations of resolutions soon after they have been
adopted. These practices lead to confusion in the ranks of the
PLO and among the Palestinian people. They moreover
encourage our enemies to exert more pressure to elicit further
unjustified concessions.
It isimportant for the PLO tostay in the limelight and not iso-
late itself from political developments. However, it is more
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هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 36
تاريخ
ديسمبر ١٩٨٩
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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