Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 17)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 17)
- المحتوى
-
HNN)
leadership of the Arab national liberation movement. This
leadership, with its bourgeoisie nationalism, is no longer capa-
ble of leading the Arab mass movement. Although the working
class parties are not suffering from this ideological and class
crisis, they have committed mistakes which prevented them
from becoming the alternative to the bourgeois leadership.
This analysis does not excuse the PLO from its share of
responsibility for the present situation on the Arab level. The
PLO has given priority to relations with the Arab regimes, while
neglecting relations with the Arab masses. Moreover, the
ambiguous policy of giving gratuitous concessions has nega-
tively affected the Arab masses’ response to the Palestinian
uprising. Creating a state of ascent in the Arab arena is the
responsibility of all components of the Arab liberation move-
ment. The Palestinian national movement could play an impor-
tant role in activating the Arab masses, but this doesn’t excuse
the Arab national movement from its direct responsibility for
confronting the Zionist occupation, and supporting the Palesti-
nian uprising.
The overall lack of a sufficient response to the uprising on the
Arab level does not mean there were no initiatives among the
Arab masses. We have seen movement in some Arab countries -
Jordan, Egypt, etc. The Lebanese national resistance has given
a positive example of continuous daily struggle against the
Zionist occupation.
When we talk about support to the uprising, we don’t mean
only material support. The Arab masses’ activities should aim to
pressure the respective regimes into defining a clear position on
the US administration, in accordance with the demand that it
recognize the State of Palestine and our people’s right to self-
determination. The biggest favor the Arab masses could do for
the uprising is to enforce a change in the US position.
Finally, I would like to point to the need for dialogue amang
the contingents of the Arab liberation movement, on this cent-
ral issue. One practical step in this direction is worth a dozen
programs (plans). Theoretical discussion is important and so is
material and moral support. We hope that the PLO Executive
Committee implements the decision of the last Central Council,
for reviving the Arab committee for supporting the Palestinian
revolution.
So far, we in the PFLP have been unable to provide a suppor-
tive Arab environment for the uprising; nor has the PLO man-
aged to activate Arab officialdom to this end. But we must give
more attention to this issue. We must define the tasks and obsta-
cles involved in order to surmount them. I dare say it will be dif-
ficult to achieve the State of Palestine, without activating the
Arab arena on the official and mass levels.
In your view, will the new openness between the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries on one
hand, and Israel on the other, contribute to giving the
Soviet Union a more effective role in the search for a
solution to the Middle East crisis?
I would like to preface my answer by noting the distinct differ-
ence between the principled position of the socialist countries
and that of the US administration. The latter is still refusing to
Democratic Palestine, December 1989
recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people, as well as their national rights, and the fully
empowered international conference as the framework for
resolving the Middle East crisis. In contrast, the Soviet Union
has always recognized the PLO and supported our rights. It isa
mistake to compare the two positions, as do some Arab reactio-
nary forces.
We do notice that the Soviet Union has adopted flexible tac-
tics. We understand this flexibility, but we differ on some points,
without this changes our principled friendship; having tactical
differences with the Soviet Union is not harmful. Our criteria for
evaluating these various tactics is based on their results. Some of
the differences we have with the Soviet Union are as follows:
First is the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, which we feel
is harmful to our cause, regardless of the Soviet Union’s
motives, such as commitment to the Helsinki accord which
specifies freedom of immigration. But this immigration aug-
ments the strength of the Zionist entity. We must not compare
the immigration of Soviet Jews to Western Europe, with their
immigration to Israel which is a racist, expansionist state,
occupying our homeland and repressing our people.
Second is contacts with Israel such as meetings with Israeli
officials, air flights to Israel, cultural exchange and consulate
officials’ exchanging visits. I would like to ask the Soviet com-
rades if this will lead to further isolating Israel, or breaking that
isolation? Isn’t it necessary to tighten the siege on Israel, espe-
cially in view of the intifada, in order to force Israel to submit to
the international will for peace. When Comrade Shevardnadze
visited the Middle East, he said that if Israel continues to reject
peace, it will find itself in the position of South Africa - isolated
internationally. Then why this openness?
Third is the principle of a balance of interests in solving reg-
ional conflicts, that the Soviet Union called for. We understand
this in relation to the principle of an equilibrium in the balance of
forces which avoids all-out war and total defeat for either side.
‘This principle means reaching a point where each side realizes
the necessity of considering the interests of the other. In our
situation, it will take the Zionist leaders along time to realize the
necessity of a solution. The Zionist ideology, as expressed by
Shamir, stresses that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are part of
the «Land of Israel» and there will be no withdrawal from these
areas. We must struggle to force the enemy to submit to the will
of peace, and in order to achieve freedom and independence
and establish our state.
Fourth is the international conference: We and the Soviet
Union agree on the necessity of holding an international confer-
ence as the proper framework for reaching a solution to the Mid-
dle East crisis. This Soviet position, however, has changed; they
are now talking about an effective international conference
instead of a fully empowered one. We also view preliminary
negotiations as harmful in as much as these could lead to direct,
bilateral negotiations outside the framework of an international
conference.
I want to conclude by confirming that we differ with the Soviet
Union, but within the framework of principled alliance and
friendship. @
17 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 36
- تاريخ
- ديسمبر ١٩٨٩
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
Contribute
Not viewed