Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 19)
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- Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 19)
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lians. Rabin recently said that 120 had refused service in the ter-
ritories (Middle East International, July 22, 1989); all but four
are reservists. According to the Israeli draft resitors organi-
zation, Yesh Gvul, 90 soldiers have been imprisoned for refus-
ing to serve in the territories (A/ Fajr, September 25, 1989). In
early summer i988, 12 army officers were removed from their
posts in the Gaza Strip. In September 1988, 16 were arrested in
connection witha scandal whereby 60 (some report more) wang-
led their way out of army service.
Sending in special units aimed to counter demoralization, but
this generated new phenomena which affect the military's unity
- the cornerstone of all Israeli security concepts. Paratroopers
and other elite units are reported to be disge:sted with the bar-
baric state of affairs reigning after the increased deployment of
the Golani, Givati and border guards (Al Fajr, August 21,
1989). More recently, special companies have been established
composed of 18 to 21-year-olds, to serve in the territories for
three years continuously. According to Al Hamishmar, July 25,
1989, army elements describe these as a «greenhouse for excep-
tional acts,» referring to terrorization of members of these com-
panies by their own colleagues.
Bysummer 1988 publicstatements by military officers made it
clear that the manpower and resources being employed to con-
front the intifada were going to affect the armed forces’ prog-
rams for combat training and weapons procurement. As Rabin
was later to admit: «Riot control and running behind children
throwing stones is not the most effective way to train a combat
soldier «(Jerusalem Post, June 8, 1989).
It is clear that demoralization is not restricted to reservists or
the ordinary soldiers. The July 1988 edition of Israel and Pales-
tine reported that Chief of Staff Dan Shomron had the Defense
Ministry translate into Hebrew a book which argues that French
army’s efforts in Algeria were doomed to failure; he distributed
copies to all the generals under his command. Zeev Schiff
(Haaretz, July 14, 1989) writes that the military sources who
continue to say that the uprising is fading « suffer from the syn-
drome of Vietnam and Algeria, characteristic of armies trying to
suppress a foreign population in revolt... There are several addi-
tional criteria besides the number of stones thrown at Israeli sol-
diers by which to examine the military situation. For instance,
can an Israeli visit the vegetable market in Nablus or Gaza, as he
could before the intifada? The uprising has removed the Israelis
from Arab population centers...The deterrent capacity of the
Israeli army against the Palestinian population is weakened,
and desperate acts by individuals, like the case of the bus to
Jerusalem, prove it.»
Decline of the army’s stature
In Haaretz, July 16, 1989, Schiff wrote about the decline of the
army command's stature since the start of the intifada, because
it was «dragged into the crux of a political debate against its will
and in this debate there can be no winners.» He notes that it is
the first time ever Isracli citizens have attacked the army com-
mander (as happened to Shomron at the funeral of an Israeli sol-
Democratic Palestine, December 1989
dier) and that politicians hint that the army’s operational failure
is politically motivated, i.e. that it does not want to win the war.
Israelis expected that the war could be won in a single, quick
operation. but Schiff says this is impossible. «Likewis~. che gen-
eral command is not dcting as though it is a war that wil have far-
reaching strategic ramifications...the problem is treated as
thoughit’sa matter of ongoing security.»
Shomron also implied that the problem is related to political
considerations when he told the Knesset Defense Committee:
«We can tsolate the activists, but we must be careful not to
destroy tne delicate consensus which binds the IDF in its daily
battle against civilians» (Jerusalem Post, June 24, 1989).
Castigating the army’s performance occures in the highest
political echelons. Trade and Industry Minister Sharon,
speaking on Israeli radio, suggested Rabin should resign and
said: «For 14 months, the security flaw continues, maybe the
worst in our history (referring to the danger of a Palestinian
state)...not one of us draws conclusions. No one is resign-
ing, no one is sacked and nothing is investigated» (Bissan
Press, February 3, 1989). Prime Minister Shamir’s call for
Jewish self-defense, after Israelis were attacked by Palesti-
nians in May, was not only a threat to the masses of the
uprising. It was a challenge to the army’s monopoly on
defense affairs as institutionalized by Ben Gurion when the
Zionist state was established. Shamir later elaborated on this
in an interview with the Jerusalem Post, May 9, 1989: «We
hear Jews saying that the state must provide security. I don’t
like to hear this. It 1s we who created the state: What is the
state, some central body? Times are difficult, and each one
must view himself as a partner to the national experience.»
While this serves the Zionist right’s aims of increasing
extremist and settler violence against the Palestinians, it also
opens a Pandera’s box of questions in a state where the
military and security insitution. has always occupied the
pivotal position.
A sober assessment is offered by military historian Martin
Van Crefeld of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. In an arti-
cle entitled «The Era of Conventional Wars has come to an end»
(Haaretz Weekend Supplement, May 12, 1989), he is quoted as
saying, «The Israelis are living in an illusion that they still have
an army. But that’s a mistake. It’s a disintegrating structure that
has totally lost its deterrent capacity.» He bases his views on the
fact that today sophisticated weaponary is less crucial than the
motivation of the soldiers and their willingness to make sac-
rifices: «Now that there is controversy about our wars, this read-
iness has decreased, while among the Arabs, from whom we
have taken everything, it is increasing all the time. This is an
important component in deterrence.»
One cannot, however, conclude that the Israeli army will just
fall apart. This is ultimately related to how Israel reacts to the
continuation of the uprising and the questions this raises: Will
consensus evolve for a political solution, or will Israelis maintain
a garrison state at all costs? There are, in fact, indications that
the army can continue despite the present dilemma. In the previ- >>»
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