Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 20)
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- Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 20)
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ously quoted interview, Schiff confirms that reservists are gen-
erally still reporting for service, regardless of their political
views: «There are many cases in which commanders sent reser-
vists home after finding that more men than expected have
reported for duty.» The soldiers themselves continue to do what
is required of them. One soldier said after serving in the ter-
ritories: «The experiences here have pushed the left-leaning sol-
diers more to the right. Personally, I haven’t changed my basic
opinions, but on the smaller, more immediate issues of keeping
order, I'm more hard-headed» (Jerusalem Post International
Edition, February 6, 1988). A survey reported by Israeli radio
on August 7, 1989, tells something about the composition of the
army of the near future. The Education Ministry commissioned
the survey to examine the motivation of future recruits, the first
of its kind since the uprising began. It showed that 40% of future
recruits «hate most or all Arabs;» 90% would volunteer if not
drafted; and most high school students believe there will be
another Arab-Israeli conflict in the future.
Security reduced to absurdity
At least verbally, the military seems to now be adopting a
more long-term approach to dealing with the intifada. In April,
West Bank Commander Mordechai declared: «We will act as if
the intifada is going to last for 100 years.» In September, army
strategists told the cabinet that plans should be made for the
military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip at least up
until the end of the century.
Whether such plans can succeed is another matter. What the
intifada has achieved until now is not so much threatening Israel
in the military sense, but reducing to absurdity all previous con-
ceptions of security, deterrence, etc. This threatens the coher-
ence of the military institution which until now has made only
tactical adjustments in dealing with the Palestinians under occu-
pation. Although it was proven futile in suppressing the
intifada, repression is still the dominant trend in Israeli security
thinking about the occupied territories. This is clearly seen in
the detention policy. Six new detention centers have been estab-
lished during the uprising, plus the fact that 13 temporary deten-
tion centers, dubbed the chicken coops, are being used to hold
people for months at a time. Yet in June, the Isracli press
reported plans to open a new center in Khan Yunis due to over-
crowding in Ansar II and III. In July, Haaretz ran the following
headlines: «The IDF plans to double the containment capacity
of prisons in the territories...expectations are for 20,000 cap-
tives next year according to an estimate that the intifada will
continue and even become more dangerous. The annual
expense of the 8,600 present captives is 219 million Israeli
Shekels.» As the move began to extend administrative deten-
tion terms to one year, rather than six months, Rabin
announced the intention to increase prison capacity on Israeli
army radio, June 10th, saying: «Reality forces us to hold more
people because those (in prison) have proved not to be deterrent
enough.»
Failure to find new ways of dealing with the problem stems
20
HA
from Zionism’s colonial roots which require covering up all
traces of the Palestinian reality in order to justify Israel’s exis-
tence and practices. In this sense, security has always been a
cuphemism for suppressing the Palestinian identity, and this
concept is so imbedded in the state and its workings as to seem
virtually irreversible, despite all rational indications that the
present approach is failing. Thus, itis no surprise that a Tel Aviv
University poll found that 70% of the Israeli public favors
harsher measures against the intifada, even as President
Hertzog was saying on Israeli radio, May 9th: «If we damage our
democratic system, our very existence is at stake,» referring to
the settlers taking the law into their own hands.
Transport Minister Katsav expressed the prevailing con-
cept of security when he said on Israeli radio on May 11th:
«The free movement of Palestinians in sovereign Israel has
become dangerous.» Ben Dror Yemeni, an Oriental Jewish
peace activist, writing in Yediot Aharonoi, May 15, gave an
interesting perspective on the demonstrations that broke out
after attacks on Israelis:«Unlike the organizers, the particip-
ants in these demonstrations in Ashdod and Ashkelon do
not care about Greater Israel, as they do not care about gre-
ater Huangary. What they want is to get rid of the constant
fear that a son, brother or enighbor will not come home
because of a cold-blooded murder. At the bottom line, what
they want, even if unconsciously, is to separate ourselves
from the intifada, from the assaults, from the murders, the
damage which is caused to us and to them» (Israel and
Palestine, July 1989). One can only note that such senti-
ments could be channeled into support for either withdrawal
or mass expulsion of Palestinians. A report from the Tel
Aviv University Strategic Studies Center referred to a poll
which should that Israeli public opinion was becoming more
hard-line on short-term issues (increased support to repres-
sion vs. the intifada), even while becoming a Palestinian
state rose to 25%, compared to 20% at the onset of the
intifada). However, despite the failure of a military solution
to the intifada, 38% think increased military strength is a
better means than negotiations for preventing war with the
Arab states, as opposed to 27% who thought so in 1987
(Guardian, August 26, 1989).
In fact, the stage had been set for public acceptance of
brutality not only by Zionism’s long colonial history, but
also by immediately preceding events. In «Occupier’s Law
and the Uprising,» Raja Shehadeh writes: «It was the report.
issued at the end of Ocotber 1987 by the Landau Commis-
sion, the Public commission of inquiry set up by the prime
minister to look into the activities of Shin Beit (the General
Security Services) in the wake of the (Izzat Nafsu case, that
went farther than any previously published official document
in condoning on security grounds excesses and practices at
odds with international law) (Jouranl of Palestine Studies 67,
spring 1988). The commission ruled that a «moderate mea-
sure of physical pressure is not to be avoided» when other
means fail, justifying the open secret of Shin Beit troture
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