Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 22)
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- Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 22)
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and now director of Tel Aviv University’s Center for Strategic
Studies. These officers call for withdrawal from the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, based on conviction that continued occupation
is a security liability, and that peace would better serve Israeli
security interests. Most favor demilitarization of the West Bank
exceptfor an early warning system and permanent Israeli intelli-
gence facilities on the mountain ridge.
Israeli newspapers were soon reporting that 70-80% of the
present general staff believe somewhat the same. Three Labor
ministers, former chiefs of staff, including Rabin, were said to
concur that the occupied territories are a burden in strictly milit-
ary terms (Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 17, 1988). A poll
commissioned by the new council showed that 20% of Likud
voters would support territorial compromise if Israel’s defense
needs were guaranteed. A poll published in September 1988
showed almost 60% of Israelis supporting some kind of territo-
rial compromise, whereas pre-uprising polls generally regis-
teredno more than 40% for this option.
There remains, however, a group of senior officers who insist
that the 1967 occupied territories are decisive for Israeli sec-
urity. An example is the former intelligence officer and reserve
general, Lavran, who emphasizes Syria’s growing air power and
other Arab states’ acquisition of ballistic missiles. This, in his
view, makes it imperative to maintain control of the 1967
occupied territories to provide «strategic depth» that would
limit Arab temptation to deal Israel a decisive blow (Report on
the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1988).
Such thinking parallels Zionism’s historical position on territ-
ory, which is today upheld by Likud, as evidenced by Shamir’s
leadership. He is managing affairs of state so as to maintain the
status quo, considering this preferable to a peace settlement that
would involve concessions leading to a Palestinian state which is
seen asa threat to Israel's very existence. Labor's historical slide
to the right and the existence of the national unity government
means that this position predominates in practice. This is the
most immediate reason that the combined impact of the intifada
and the PLO’s peace offensive has not evoked any decisive
change in official Israeli policy. Speaking on Israeli radio,
January 16, 1989, Forcign Minister Arens spelled out why the
government would not be affected by the new PLO policy: He
said that Arafat’s recognition of Israel was contingent on a
Palestinian state, self-determination and return, which together
mean the destruction of Israel.
Even those who advocate territorial compromise hedge their
bets considerably. The gencrals of the Council for peace and
Security prefer that the occupation be superceded by autonomy
or federation of the West Bank with Jordan, rather than Palesti-
nian independence. Abba Eban is perhaps the most famous
Israeli to have reversed his position on territory. From being the
foreign minister of the 1967 war, justifying territorial acquisi-
tion on security grounds, he today finds the status quo untena-
ble, and advocates peace and withdrawal. However, an inter-
view with Middle East, May 1989, is enlightening. Asked if the
PLO was required to recognize Isracl’s pre-1967 borders in
22
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order to meet Israeli security needs, Eban answered: «Youcan’t
guara‘.tee Israel’s security needs by newspaper or radio inter-
views. There has to be meticulous negotiations about every
square kilometer, about every hill, about every valley. And the
only thing that’s quite obvious is that you cannot secure it by any
mechanical formula, such as going back to previous lines -
because the previous lines, for example, were dividing
Jerusalem...I believe Israel would be well advised to make only
those territorial changes which do not involve exercising our
jurisdication over additional populations in any large num-
bers.» Here Eban mixes security concerns with Zionist territo-
rial ambitions concerning Jerusalem, and does ret depart from
the Alon Plan (Labor’s traditional model) which involves -nne-
xation of as much as one-half of the West Bank.
Most of the advocates of territorial compromise are somehow
tied to the traditional Labor concept, and Rabin’s position
exemplifies where that leads. Although reportedly viewing the
territories as a military liability, he has repeatedly proclaimed
that lsrael will never return to the pre-1967 borders. His direc-
tion of the war on the intifada serves to delay any withdrawal at
all costs. According to Haarerz, September 4, 1989, he even has
a problem with Mubarak’s proposal that the army should with-
draw from the polling areas during elections in the occupied ter-
ritories.
Even those prepared for substantial withdrawal and dealing
with the PLO under certain conditions (Peace Now, Mapam,
the Citizens Rights Movement) have avoided support to those
refusing service in the occupied territories. This would be the
most powerful means of pressuring the Israeli government
towards territorial compromise, but this «left» is still caught up
in the Zionist security rationale where the military remains a
sacred cow. Crefeld, the military. historian previously quoted,
wants immediate withdrawal. He says, «Everybody agrees
there has to be a great wall between us and them, and the only
argument between Ghandi (Zeevi, the Moledat MK who advo-
cates «transfer») and Shulamit (Aloni of the Citizens Rights
Movement) is on the location.» He would prefer transfer him-
self, but finds it unrealistic, so he is for a wall «located where we
choose, so that there are as many Arabs as possible outside. »
Years of Zionist ideology and practice, cloaked in security
jargon, have erected a barrier in the minds of even those Israelis
who aspire for peace. This leaves a big gap between recognition
that the occupation is untenable, and the obvious conclusion of
unconditional withdrawal. A few Israelis have written about
this problem. Meron Benvinisti, former mayor of Jerusalem,
who became famous for his studies about the occupation, says,
«...The Israelis cannot acknowledge the fact that there is
another collective identity or entity on this land... That is why,
whatever is being said in Algiers or Stockholm does not mean
anything to the majority of Israelis.» He is not optimistic about
the uprising breaking the impasse:«...the uprising has already
become a way of life for both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs
(and I include among them Israeli Arabs). The communities in
the land are slowly adjusting to the low-intensity inter-com-
Democratic Palestine, December 1989 - هو جزء من
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