Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 25)
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- Democratic Palestine : 36 (ص 25)
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to increasing the number of seats in
the Lebanese parliament from 99 to
108, to give Moslems equal representa-
tion, the document stated :«The tripar-
tite Arab committee has reached full
agreement...with Syria for ending its
security duties (in the Beirut area)
within a period not to exceed two
years» (Al Safir, October 25th). It also
called on the Lebanese parliament to
meet in Lebanon no later than
November 7th, to ratify political
reforms agreed on, and to elect a new
president for Lebanon.
The big challenge
The broad-based agreement in Taif
served to accentuate Aoun’s isolation
and the fact that his «war of libera-
tion» had been a disaster, since he
managed neither to win it, nor to turn
it into an all-Lebanese war against
Syria, as he had planned. Tactically,
the general initially announced his
acceptance of the Taif talks, hoping
they would fail. His dilemma lay in the
fact that if he rejected the plan, he
would thereby be defying the Arab
and foreign states that had backed
such a accord. Yet, to accept it meant
relinguishing his aims and admitting
that the fighting and suffering of the
past six months had been in vain.
When the accord was adopted, it was
obvious that Aoun was the big loser,
and he stepped up threats against
Christian members of parliament and
religious figures who had _ backed
reconciliation. According to Aoun,
«The people will not have mercy on
those who are negligent» (International
Herald Tribune, October 16th). His
isolation even in the «Christian camp»
was further exposed when 24 of the
Christian deputies held a private meet-
ing in Taif to discuss Aoun’s stance.
They issued a statement, saying: «It
was a choice between a continuation of
the destructive war and peace (the Taif
accord)...It was a wise choice if com-
pared with other negative rejections»
(AP, October 24th). Aoun rejected
George Saadeh’s challenge to a tele-
vised debate, saying: «There is no
need for any dialogue about the Taif
Democratic Palestine. December 1989
accord. I shall not allow it to go into
effect» (Al Safir, November 14th).
Due to uncertainty as to what Aoun
might do, the majority of MPs stayed
out of the areas of his control until the
parliament session; East Beirutis
delayed their return to Lebanon until
the session itself, lest the general hold
them hostage to prevent a quorum for
electing the new president. When the
parliament finally convened at the
Qlaiaat air base in northeast Lebanon
on November Sth, and elected Rene
Mawad as president, Aoun’s suppor-
ters attacked the residence of the pat-
riarch, Nasrallah Sfeir, the highest
Maronite authority in the country,
because of his support to the presiden-
tial elections. They insulted him and
forced him to kneel and kiss a poster
of Aoun.
Seventeen days after being elected,
President Rene Mawad was assassi-
nated in a bomb attack that killed 23
other people in West Beirut. Many
suspect that Aoun and Israel were
behind the killing. He had refused to
recognize the legitimacy of the new
president on the pretext that he him-
self had dissolved the parliament prior
to the elections. Aoun further vowed
to block the formation of a new gov-
ernment, warning Christian politicians
not to join the government which
Mawad had mandated Prime Minister
Salim Hoss to form: «No one will form
a government of national unity... Those
who take part in the Hoss cabinet had
better stay in the land of Hoss» (AP,
November 15th).
Despite the atmosphere of terror
and despair which the assassination
was intended to create, the Lebanese
parliament reconvened two days later
and elected Elias Hrawi as President of
Lebanon. A few days later, a broad-
based cabinet was announced as the
result of Hoss’ efforts to bring rep-
resentatives of the various political fac-
tions together in the government, in
line with the compromise reached at
Taif. Still, Mawad’s assassination and
Aoun’s continuing threats give an idea
of the uncertainty which the national
reconciliation process is facing. Aoun
continues to refuse to vacate the pres-
idential palace at Baabda, to allow the
new president to take up residence
there.
Many questions can be raised about
the future tasks of the newly formed
legitimate government in Lebanon, but
there are some immediate tasks that
cannot be avoided. Prime among them
is the removal of Aoun, who has been
Officially fired and _ replaced as
Lebanese Army commander, but has
yet to abdicate. The new government
is charged with determining how to
depose him, and this is a task which
will enjoy the full support of the vast
majority of Lebanese, since it is obvi-
ous to all that Aoun is the main inter-
nal obstacle to reuniting and stabilizing
the country.
Yet however urgent, this task is only
a beginning to pave the way for
reforms in the unjust, sectarian politi-
cal system whose _ disintegration
allowed the recurring rounds of vio-
lence, and the interference of outside
forces, which aggravated the internal
crisis. Israel, of course, stands as the
external force with greatest interests in
Lebanon’s disunity and weakness. It
was not by coincidence that Israel
escalated air attacks on Palestinian
positions in Lebane~ ‘1 the days bet-
ween Mawad’s assassina..on and the
election of Hrawi. In view of Aoun’s
untenable position in most of Leba-.
non, there is a possibility that he will
embark on more direct coordination
with Israel and its proxies in the so-cal-
led South Lebanon Army. For all
these reasons, enforcing Israeli with-
drawal from all of Lebanon would be
the greatest single step towards unity
and stability that the new government
could take. However, past experience
shows that enforcing Israeli withdrawal
is too great a task to be accomplished
by the diplomatic endeavors of the
Arab League or Lebanese government
alone. This, coupled with the fact that
the Taif accord provided for partial
reform, but not abolition of the secta-
rian system, set limits for what the new
government can accomplish, despite all
its good intentions.
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