Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 5)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 5)
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delegation that would include persons
expelled from the occupied territories,
i.e., PLOers.) Again, Shamir bolstered
his own leadership, as well as the pre-
vailing government line of de facto
blocking peace, while making a pre-
tense of cooperation with US diploma-
tic efforts.
The day after the Likud session, the
Israeli government survived 10 no-con-
fidence motions in the Knesset, six of
them protesting Shamir’s own state-
ment about the need for «Greater
Israel» to absorb new Soviet Jewish
immigrants. Also the flurry around
Sharon’s resignation gave Shamir a
chance to send signals to the US:
Look! I’m besieged on all sides. Be
patient so I can ready the Israeli polit-
ical scene for peace.
Moreover, in early January, the
Israeli interior ministry slapped a
travel ban on a number of prominent
Palestinians who were thought to be
planning to travel to Cairo to discuss a
Palestinian delegation to peace talks.
Later in the month, one of them, Fai-
sal Husseini, thought to be a candidate
for the delegation, was arrested (later
released).
All this serves to confirm that the
real aims of the Shamir plan were as
follows: (1) foiling the Palestinian
peace offensive, by throwing the ball
back in the PLO’s court and making it
appear as the party rejecting peace,
especially in view of the broad interna-
tional support and attention accorded
to the PLO after the 19th PNC; (2)
buying time for new attempts to termi-
nate the uprising; and (3) creating an
alternative Palestinian leadership that
would comply with Zionist plans.
Baker agrees to talk about talks
The Bush Administration endorsed
Shamir’s plan as the centerpiece for
Middle East diplomacy, based on the
historical US policy of unconditional
support to Israel, and a decision not to
forward an initiative of its own. At the
same time, the US administration was
aware that the plan needed embellish-
ment in order to lure Palestinians into
the game of quelling the intifada polit-
ically and thus resolving Israel’s
dilemma; the US also recognized the
advantages of having the PLO’s con-
Democratic Palestine, February 1990
sent to this process. To this end, Baker
proposed 5 points in October 1989,
with the idea of convening a US-Egyp-
tian-Israeli meeting to discuss ways of
convening a Palestinian-Israeli meet-
ing. Baker’s points were accepted by
the Egyptian government which set
about trying to obtain the PLO’s con-
sent as well.
However, in the face of outright
Israeli rejection, the US accepted
amendments to its points in December.
Most important of the assumptions on
which Israel predicated its acceptance
were: (1) restricting participation in
elections to Arabs from the occupied
territories, 1.e., Palestinians living in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but not
Jerusalem; (2) limiting the agenda of
talks to the election plan; and (3)
allowing Israel to participate in the
selection of a Palestinian delegation.
Thus, the US accepted Israeli veto
power over the Palestinian delegation,
while American officials promised not
to force the Israelis to talk to the PLO.
To date, Israel has not definitely
accepted the amended US formula for
talking to Palestinians. Still, US offi-
cials have exerted no pressure on
Israel, not even to comply with ideas
which they deem advantageous to
Israel in the long run.
US compliance with Israel has been
exhibited in a number of other fields
as well. In its first year in office, the
Bush Administration used its veto in
the UN Security Council three times to
save Israel from international censure.
In December, Vice-President Quayle
announced the administration’s aim of
revoking the 1975 UN resolution which
equates Zionism with racism.
Moreover, despite Bush’s many decla-
rations about limiting nuclear prolifer-
ation, the adminstration has taken no
action concerning the reports of
Israeli-South African cooperation that
enabled the apartheid regime to
develop nuclear missiles. This inaction
is not because the reports are
undocumented - they are based on US
Defense Department and CIA infor-
mation, among other sources.
Most importantly, by denying entr-
ance to Soviet Jewish emigrants, the
US has given Israel an enormous
demographic boost which can only
serve to harden Israeli ideas that the
Zionist state can remain large and
strong despite being besieged by the
intifada.
The intifada and peace
The US’s kid glove treatment of
Israel and callous indifference to peace
prospects stands in sharp contrast to
the current reality in occupied Pales-
tine. The Palestinians of the occupied
territories are continuing their daily
struggle, asserting the necessity of ful-
filling Palestinian nghts, as the basis of
a just peace. The demand for peace
was dramatically emphasized by a
series of internationally sponsored
events in the last days of 1989, with
the title- 1990: Time for Peace,
arranged by the NGOs, Israeli peace
forces and a Palestinian committee.
Among the activities was a human
chain around the Old City of
Jerusalem, in which 20,000 partici-
pated. Even more would have come if
not for the occupation army refusing
entry to Jerusalem for Palestinians
coming from the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. The hostile stance of the Israeli
government was also exhibited when
the police attacked the demonstrators.
At least 60 were injured, including
members of international delegations.
One of them, a progressive Italian
woman, lost her eye when the police’s
water cannons shattered glass in a
nearby building. At least 50 people
were arrested, 16 of them Palestinians.
Israeli brutality against the masses
of the intifada continues unabated. In
mid-January, the occupation army
opened yet another detention center in
the Gaza Strip. In early February, the
Occupation authorities began sealing
Palestinian homes on the pretext that a
family member had thrown a stone, in
a new spiral of collective punishment.
Previously sealing and demolition were
reserved for houses where someone
was accused of throwing firebombs or
a more serious act. Now it can hit lit-
erally each and every family. Such
innovations in the war on the intifada
are another confirmation that the last
thought on the mind of the Shamir
government policymakers is_ finding
ways to deal with the Palestinians in
the interests of peace. - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 37
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