Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 6)
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- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 6)
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PLO policy
Initially, the PLO dealt with
Mubarak’s 10 points as questions
directed to Israel. The Baker plan, for
its part, was presented to the PLO
only via the Egyptian government. In
this situation, the PLO Executive
Committee and the Palestinian Central
Council advanced five points summing
up the Palestinian position on the
peace efforts:
1. Palestinian-Israeli talks should be
a preliminary step towards the conven-
ing of an international peace confer-
ence under the auspices of the five
permanent members of the UN Sec-
urity Council, with the participation of
all concerned parties, including the
PLO.
2. The PLO has the sole right to
form any Palestinian delegation to such
talks, without preconditions.
3. The projected elections would be
only a first stage of a comprehensive
settlement aimed at establishing peace.
4. The agenda for talks should be
open.
5. The Palestinian position is based
on the Palestinian peace initiative
which 1s grounded in_ international
legitimacy.
After a series of meetings of the
PLO Executive Committee in Cairo
and Tunis, four questions were addres-
sed to the US administration in rela-
tion to the Baker plan; they were:
a. Does the PLO have the authority
to appoint the Palestinian delegation
and to include Palestinians from inside
and outside the occupied territories?
b. Is the US ready to accept the
Palestinian peace initiative as a basis
for a Palestinian-Israeli meeting, along
with other proposals that have been
forwarded?
c. Is the US ready to accept an open
dialogue without preconditions?
d. Does the US agree to the talks as
being a preliminary step towards the
convening of an international confer-
ence with the participation of all par-
ties, including the PLO?
Subsequently the PLO decided to
respond by saying that it agrees on the
Baker plan only in the context of the
Palestinian Central Council’s resolu-
tions. The PLO was subject to intense
pressure from the Egyptian regime to
accept Baker’s points unconditionally.
In the process, the Egyptian regime
exhibited its bad faith by misrepresent-
ing the US position to the PLO, to
make it appear more attractive, and
also misrepresenting the PLO’s stance
to the Bush Administration, to make it
appear more conciliatory. The Egyp-
tian regime has exerted all efforts for a
settlement, but not for one that fulfills
even minimal Palestinian nghts. The
fallacy of its efforts has been proven
by reality, for the PLO has dealt flex-
ibly with the political efforts to find a
solution, but the Israeli and US stands
have remained virtually unchanged.
All along, there have been forces
within the PLO pointing out that the
concessions given by the PLO go
beyond the principles of the Palesti-
nian peace initiative decided by the
PNC, and that this could endanger
Palestinian rights without eliciting
reciprocal concessions from either the
US or Israel. With the deadlock in the
efforts to arrange a Palestinian-Israeli
meeting, the Palestinian leadership as
a whole grasped this fact. It realized
that responding to the US-Egyptian
pressure was not leading to any change
in the situation, much less towards real
peace. It perceived that dealing with
the various plans floated by the US,
Israel and Egypt could only lead to
undermining the historical gains made
by the Palestinian struggle over the
years, and the status of the PLO itself,
as the leader of the Palestinian people
and their sole representative.
It has become obvious that there will
only be more pressure put on the
PLO, and the Israeli repression aimed
against the intifada increases rather
than decreasing parallel to this point-
less diplomacy. Meanwhile, Israel is
creating new facts on the ground with
the influx of Soviet Jewish immigrants,
as well as efforts to bring more Jews
from Ethiopia to occupied Palestine.
Not only are these developments a
blow to the peace process; they push
in the direction of «transfer» - i.e.,
expelling large numbers of Palestinians
from the occupied territories to Jor-
dan, based on Likud’s idea that this is
the site for a Palestinian state. Of
course, carrying out this plan could
only occur in the context of a major
new Israeli aggression which could
spark an explosion in the whole area.
The question now is: Was it neces-
sary for the PLO to undergo this
experience, wasting so much time, in
order to realize these facts whose
broad outlines were apparent long
ago? In the light of the need to protect
and develop the intifada, does the
PLO have the possibility or the nght
to lose time running after the illusion
of a change in the US policy of uncon-
ditional support to Israel? Or to make
repeated trips to Cairo, that result only
in being subjected to pressure against
the interests of the Palestinian people
and cause? Most recently, the PLO
was the target of a campaign in the
Egyptian media, reprimanding it for
not having unconditionally condemned
the attack on the Israeli tour bus. The
real motive of this press campaign 1s
not so much connected to the PLO’s
position on this military operation, as
it is an expression of the Egyptian
regime’s irritation that the PLO did
not accept the Baker plan as it was.
For a new PNC
With the purpose of reviewing all
these developments and PLO policy in
this regard, the PLO Executive Com-
mittee, along with the leaders of the
Palestinian resistance organizations
(PLO-members), held a series of meet-
ings in Tunis in late January and early
February. One of the important deci-
sions adopted at these meetings was to
convene the Palestinian Central Coun-
cil in mid-March. A special committee
was established to determine the mem-
bership of the upcoming PNC, that
should be convened within six months.
A number of other resolutions were
adopted related to supporting and
escalating the intifada, and launching a
campaign to face the dangers of the
mass immigration of Soviet Jews to
Israel.
The significance of these resolutions
is not only that they could pave the
way for a more correct PLO policy;
they could also contribute to crystalliz-
ing more effective Arab support to the
confrontation of the Israeli plans and
aggressive policies, as well as providing
a firmer base for increasing inter-
national solidarity with the Palesti-
nians’ struggle for their national rights.
Democratic Palestine, February 1990 - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 37
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