Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 9)
غرض
- عنوان
- Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 9)
- المحتوى
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First: The influential Palestinian leadership has a broad net-
work of relations with the Arab regimes. Asa result, its policies
have gotten closer to the overall Arab line. Although its policies
distinguish themselves from those of the regimes, by the
demand for an independent Palestinian state, the Palestinian
right wing often adopts the harmful tactics of the Arab regimes.
The inside, however, is relatively free of this tie.
Second: Over the past 20 years, a particular social strata has
crystallized in the ranks of the Palestinian revolution, mainly
in Fatah, as a result of the political relations and organizational
style of the right wing. This strata became bureaucratic; to a
big degree, it lost its militant character and became corrupt,
its interests are contrary to the revolution’s. This reality was
clearly seen in the thinking and practice of this strata that holds
- Sinijana Awad, from Rama, the occupied West Bank, Palestine
important and sensitive posts in the upper echelons of the PLO.
This strata adopts policies that protect its own interests, relin-
guishing all revolutionary policies and means that are not inline
with its own interests. This strata constitutes the social base of
the right wing in the PLO. In contrast to the exterior, such a
strata hasn’t crystallized in the interior where the objective con-
ditions are different since there is direct occupation and daily
oppression.
Third: The active participation of the interior in the decision-
making process will improve the internal balance of power
within the Palestinian revolution, politically and in class terms.
If this happens, it will be mainly to the interests of the Icftist
forces. In all the battles waged by the Palestinian revolution,
including the intifada, the leftist forces’ involvement in the deci-
Democratic Palestine, February 1990
sion-making process has been less than their actual contribution
to these battles. Adjusting this ratio will have a positive effect on
front work in the Palestinian revolution, as well as on the mass
work of all forces, and the democratic struggle within the PLO.
The more the leftist forces, and consequently the masses, par-
ticipate in decision-making, the more effective will be the demo-
cratic struggle for maintaining a clear and firm nationalist line;
capitulationist tendencies will be isolated.
Fourth: Transforming the interior into an active participant in
the decision-making process will broaden the mass base of the
uprising. A greater mass dimension will consolidate the social
base of the Palestinian revolution, paving the way for it to seize
the initiative in confronting the occupation. It is nothing new to
say that the mass dimension is one of the principal factors in the
continuation of the uprising.
Greater participation by the exterior in decision-making will
not only contribute to the continuation and escalation of the
intifada. It will also shield both the interior and the exterior from
the pressure of the Arab regimes. Due to the uprising, the Arab
regimes are no longer able to impose their political conditions
in isolation from the will of the people who are resisting the
occupation; they cannot but be supportive, at least verbally.
This makes the PLO’s political moves relatively free of the con-
ditions of the prevailing Arab order. Furthermore, it gives the
PLO the possibility of pressuring Arab officialdom. The PLO
leadership, however, has not been utilizing these chances, espe-
cially not at this time when it is called upon to do so more than
ever before.
The uprising and the armed struggle
Onc of the important issues raised by the uprising is it itsclf
being one of the different forms of the Palestinian struggle.
Some have tried to create a contradiction between the intifada,
as a militant mass struggle, and the armed struggle. This con-
tradiction is false and doesn’t exist. The proper form of struggle
is not determined by the wish of any one party, but is based on
the objective and subjective conditions, as well as the nature of
the struggle and of the enemy we are confronting. Economic
battles for better wages or social conditions are not usually
waged through armed struggle. However, homelands cannot be
liberated via strikes alone.
Although there is no contradiction between the uprising, asa
new phenomenon and form of mass struggle, and the armed
struggle, there is a need to study the relation between the two.
Throughout their history of national struggle, the Palestinian
masses have experimented with all forms of struggle - peaceful
and violent, armed and unarmed. From its inception, the Pales-
tinian revolution adopted armed struggle as the main form of
struggle against the Zionist army. Morcover, the achievements
of the contemporary Palestinian revolution would never have
been realized if not for armed struggle, due to the nature of the
enemy we arc confronting. The uprising itself came about as a
result of the accumulated experience of the struggle, of which
armed struggle was animportant aspect. What is needed is a rad-
ical review of the armed struggle, aimed at gearing it to comple-
ment the uprising and contribute to its continuation and escala-
tion. To this end, we point out the following: - هو جزء من
- Democratic Palestine : 37
- تاريخ
- فبراير ١٩٩٠
- المنشئ
- الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين
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