Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 11)

غرض

عنوان
Democratic Palestine : 37 (ص 11)
المحتوى
infiltrated, unlike the myth that presents it as a totally cohesive
unit devoid of any contradictions that could be capitalized on in
the interest of our cause.
There are two levels of contradictions that pertain to the
Zionist society. The first is class contradictions that exist in all
capitalist societies. The second is contradictions between the
Israeli society as a whole and the Palestinian people and revolu-
tion, i.e., the Arab-Zionist contradiction. Here we will discuss
the second level.
The contradiction between the Zionist entity, and the Palesti-
nian people and revolution, has generated secondary contradic-
tions in the Israeli society. These are still in their infancy, but
they interlink with the first level of contradictions. The secon-
dary contradictions are those generated between the Israeli
peace camp and the rest of the Zionist society. The peace camp
is a social force that calls for Isracli withdrawal from the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, and ending the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict. This camp is not united, and the positions in it range from
supporting autonomy for the Palestinians to advocating an inde-
pendent Palestinian state. The differences within this camp
should be capitalized on to the interest of our struggle.
Despite the fact that the Zionist socicty is shifting towards the
extreme right, we must not overlook the growth of a trend
opposing the main tendency. There is a process of polarization
going on in the Zionist entity as is clear in the slogans adopted by
the various trends in the peace camp. The results of this polari-
zation are neither consistent nor final. How this vacillation
develops depends to a great degree on the future development
of events. What is important now is knowing how to deepen
these contradictions and use them in a way that furthers our
cause and a national solution.
Some view that the present activities of the peace camp are
not equal to its activities during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
At that time, there were demonstrations of tens and hundreds of
thousands, and many new committees were formed. However,
comparing in quantitative terms alone is inaccurate. We must
also see if there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the
slogans raised then and now. The slogans of 1982 demanded an
end to the war and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The slo-
gans of today demand withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, and accepting the idea of two states. This in itself is a qual-
itative difference, because it contradicts the essence of Zionist
ideology which denies the very existence of the Palestinian
people as an independent entity which has the right to a free
independent life.
The current that is now developing in the Zionist entity is an
extension of the movement that grew up in 1982. The political
demands of this current have developed in that they are in con-
tradiction with the basis of the Zionist ideology. This current
will expand if Israeli casualties increase, motivated by the desire
to protect threatened lives, if not by political convictions. Such
expansion is also ticd to the clarity of the Palestinian policy. The
Palestinian peace initiative, that was approved at the PNC’s
19th session, was a suitable condition for the growth of this cur-
rent. |
As stated earlier, due to a set of objective and subjective con-
ditions, the uprising is incapable of changing all the essential
Democratic Palestine, February 1990
characteristics of the Zionist entity. This does not, however,
rule out the possibility of influencing some of them. The uprising
has made the Palestinian state a realistic project which can be
achieved if there is a proper militant program. Achieving the
state would deal a blow to one of the basic characteristics of the
Zionist entity - namely, expansionism, because it entails with-
drawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This would also pro-
vide conditions for impacting on the other characteristics. But
this whole process is contingent on the developments of the
coming stage.
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The uprising has overturned many concepts which the enemy
has tried to entrench over the years. For over 40 years; the
Zionist enemy has tried to pose as the victim, living in a hostile
environment. To a great degree, it succeeded in spreading this
illusion in the western world. The uprising, and the savage rep-
ression inflicted on the Palestinian people, have shaken such
convictions. World public opinion now views the Zionist enemy
as the oppressor, not the victim. The enemy has also tried to
emphasize that retaining the land and the occupation guaran-
tees Israeli security and stability in this hostile environment. But
the uprising has proved that neither occupying the land, nor
annexing Jerusalem, have guaranteed security and stability.
Many of the Zionist enemy’s allies now think that the best
guarantee for Israeli security is withdrawal from the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, and a comprchensive solution to the conflict.
Even the US secretary of state said: «Lay aside, once and for all,
the unrealistic vision of Greater Israel.»
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هو جزء من
Democratic Palestine : 37
تاريخ
فبراير ١٩٩٠
المنشئ
الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين

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